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Il<TRODUCTION. 
The present thesis is based on work which has 
extended over a long period of years. 
As far back as 1917 I had already gathered 
considerable material on the subject when the 
completed compilation was lost in H.M.S. "Hilary" 
in that year. She was sunk by enemy action. 
It is perhaps fortunate that my previous 
immature work could not be presented. Since then 
an experience of twenty -five years of world travel 
,covering perhaps the most vivid twenty -five years 
of history has enabled me to extend my work and 
the present thesis is submitted with the humble but 
sincere hope that it may add to the appeal for 
sanity in the deliberations of those who are 
striving to restore world peace. 
A lack of imagination is at once one of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the British peoples. 
Disaster has often to be upon them before they can 
be aroused to take measures for defence, when by 
vision and forethought it could have been averted. 
Only by such vision and action now, can the 
disaster be avoided which would follow the 
2. 
dis- organization of Sanitary Cordons inevitable in 
a World War. 
I had an opportunity of seeing this on a small 
scale during one of the revolutions in Brazil when 
non - immune troops were sent to the endemic areas 
of the North, in 1926. 
Yellow Fever broke out among those troops, 
and panic ensued, although Brazil has been 
accustomed to that disease for hundreds of years. 
During 1925, when I was Director of the 
Yellow Fever Campaign in Parahyba do Notre in 
Brazil, Small -pox devastated the city, but that was 
taken calmly, as it was a regular occurrence, but, 
when a few cases of Yellow Fever were introduced 
from the outside into a city free of the vector, 
Aedes agypti, and therefore safe from spread, the 
panic was spectacular. 
That was because everyone knew that the 
Authorities had, in vaccination, the means to check 
and prevent Small -pox, and that it was due to 
contact with humans, and willingly submitted to those 
3. 
Means. Yellow Fever, on the other hand, was a 
"ï >YSTERY" to superstitious people - and most people 
are - and considered as a Visitation. 
The difference between the comparatively 
sparsely populated and immune Brazilian endemic 
area and the congested and absolutely non - immune 
tropical East, where the Aedes agypti is the 
common domestic mosquito and proved vector, is only 
one of degree, but of alarming magnitude. 
Again, while the control of Aedes agypti is 
simple, and the method thoroughly understood and 
worked out over years, with complete success in the 
West, the East has much more complicated problems. 
The ease of .cedes agypti control is due to its 
entirely domestic breeding habits, and control of 
the habits of the people as regards their water 
supply also controls the mosquito, but in the East 
there are other mosquitoes not domestic in their 
breeding habits but feeding avidly on humans, such 
as Aedes Albopictus, which can convey Yellow Fever, 
These mosquitoes breed in the jungle and plantation. 
It is admitted that, as in the case of 
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Malarial control, finance is paramount; this is 
the case also in Yellow Fever. The financial 
requirements of Yellow Fever control in an 
entirely _'cedes agypti area, s in Brazil, being 
concomitant with the modern requirements of a pure 
water supply the expense is, in terms of control, 
within the sanitary budget. 
On the other hand, the expense of controlling 
mosquitoes which breed outside houses on waste 
land as well as cultivated land would be 
prohibitive. 
It is essential, therefore, that Yellow Fever 
never reaches the East. 
Carter, in his masterly work ''The Early History 
of Yellow Fever" (1931) , has shown how the disease 
came with the slave trade from the :'.rest Coast of 
tifrica to the East Coast and Islands of the Central 
and South Americas. The wooden sailing ship of 
those days was ideal for the mosquito vector, and 
this manner of spread only ceased xith the change 
to metal ships. 
During the days of slot' sail the mosquito was 
the factor that mattered because, once infected, 
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it could remain alive long enough to infect humans 
on arrival at the other side, without the 
necessity of transference through man. This will 
be explained in detail in another section. Now we 
have both fast water, and still faster air transport. 
I well remember my thoughts when, at Pernambuco in 
February 1926, I saw Major Franco, the Spanish 
Aviator, land from Dakar in the first flight across 
the Southern Atlantic. Before, the insect alone 
,could come, or, as was more usual, man and insect 
came together, for man alone would have been dead 
or recovered in the time necessary to make the 
crossing; now, as a result of air travel, either 
or both could come alone or together. 
Four years later, although only eight trans- 
South Atlantic flights had been made, my forebodings' 
were unhappily proved right, by the discovery of 
A.gambiae in the town of Natal after a severe 
outbreak of Malaria. This mosquito, the common 
vector in Africa, had never before been in 
America and the town of Natal had never before had 
an epidemic of Malaria. 
Malaria had been present only in the outskirts 
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and further country, never in the town itself, -due 
to the unsuitability of the breeding places for the 
native mosquito but A.gambiae found in the town 
ideal and preferential breeding pools. 
If the Anopheline mosquito, a much less hardy 
insect than the medes agypti, could survive 
crossing, what was to prevent the spread of Yellow 
Fever to the East by the same means? 
As will be shown, this has, up until now, been 
prevented by rigid sanitary control both of ships 
and aeroplanes under international arrangement. 
What hopehave we that this agreement would be 
continued under the disruptive factors in war? 
le know from past experience that it would not. 
What then can be done? The British Empire, 
at least, can do a great deal which at present it 
is not doing, and the burden of this Thesis is how 
and what to do. During the three years in which 
I helped to control Yellow Fever (1923 -1926) in 
Brazil my ideal Was to take all rntontolo,gical 
phenomena seen in the laboratory to the field and 
conversely to attempt to elucidate all field 
phenomena in the Laboratory. 
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experiments were made and many reports 
sent to the International Health Board of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, under whose auspices I 
was working. Not only was the Entomology of 
Aedes agypti studied, but also the Epidemiology 
of the disease in relation to the history and 
economy of the country. 
The International importance of the question 
naturally came to be realized, but the opportunity 
to see for myself meant years of waiting and many 
thousands of miles of travel. 
Since that time - 1926 - I have made 5 
complete voyages round the world, touched at all 
of the large centres of tropical population and 
many of the smaller, taken the Diploma of the 
London School of Tropical Ledicine, studied the 
political and financial situation bearing on the 
subject, and finally remained long enough in the 
East (Malaya) to find oút by experiment the 
relation of my Brazilian findings, as regards the 
Aedes agypti, to the conditions there. 
From this, I am of the opinion that there is 
only one means of controlling Yellow Fever or 
preventing it gaining a foothold, and that is by 
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the time - honoured and proved method of dealing 
with the vector in its larval state. 
One admits that great advances have been 
made in the immunology and serology of the disease 
and that protection can be given to a proportion 
of those exposed, but in view of the immense 
populations which would have to be dealt with in 
the East, it would be a mere gesture. There 
would seem to have been a tendency to develop the 
purely scientific laboratory side of the study 
of Yellow Fever to the neglect of control and 
field work, which is an art. 
The great and original demonstrations of this 
art, in Havana and Panama, followed a very scanty 
knowledge of the Entomology and Epidemiology of 
the disease, but were entirely and finally 
successful, and when Noguchi was making his 
tragic proto- zoological errors, the disease was 
being conquered in the very countries where he 
was making them. 
The main object of all scientific work is to 
understand, to predict, and lastly to control, 
but the greatest of these is to CONTROL. 
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HISTORICAL SURVEY, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISTRIBUTION. 
To appreciate the present danger of Yellow 
Fever, a careful study of its past history must 
be made, especially that part when it first 
manifested itself to the civilized world. 
This study has natural divisions, the first 
of which is its origin. 
Origin. 
The evidence to be examined is both 
Biological and Historical, and, of the latter, 
negative and positive. 
Yellow Fever has been permanently endemic in 
only two regions, the tropics of West Africa and 
the Americas. In other regions it has either not 
appeared or, having appeared, not established 
itself. 
In the ancient world of the I._editerranean, 
about which we have a long general and medical 
history, there is nothing to show its existence 
until well after regular communication had been 




Carter, in "The Early History of Yellow Fever ". 
states:- "The reaction of the negro to Yellow Fever 
is, I think, just what one would expect to be 
evolved in a race, for many .g=enerations, subject 
to that infection. Negroes contract the disease, 
so far as we know, as readily as other races, but 
have it more mildly and rarely die of it. Thus 
they are apparently as susceptible to the infection 
as other races, but less susceptible to the toxins; 
and this is what we would expect in the evolution 
of a race long subject to Yellow Fever. The 
American Indian, on the contrary. has shown no 
immunity either to the infection or the toxin. 
He contracts Yellow Fever and dies of it as 
readily as the white man ". 
The proved vector, Aedes aegypti, is found 
in many ports the world over, and also far into 
the Interior, but this does not mean that it 
originated at any one of those places, as it is 
easily carried in ships, especially wooden ships, 
so that it would be ultimately distributed, 
climate being favourable, from what ever place it 
originally existed in permanence. 
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The insect is biologically differentiated as a 
commensal of homo sapiens, and not one of the older 
forms, so that one should find in the original 
region other forms allied to it, but not so 
biologically differentiated. 
fo other species of the sub- enus is found in 
the Americas, but there are many species in Thst 
Africa and elsewhere ig the Old 7orld. These 
other species breed with Aedes agypti and have a 
similar biology and we may therefore deduce that 
it is, originally, an Old Thrld insect. Eefore 
1492, the date of the discovery of imerica by the 
Old World, the insect could not have been 
introduced by immigration from North China by way 
of the Aleutian Islands, owing to the cold climate 
through which it would have had to travel; 
therefore, if this insect established itself in 
Í the .mericas only after 1492, Yellow Fever could 
not have existed there before that date. 
The weight of biological evidence both from 
the point of view of the vector and the host 
gives the Old 7dorld origin an antecedent 
probability of great significance. 
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Historical Evidence. 
Notwithstanding the biological evidence 
pointing to 'r:est Í fr.ica, we must admit that the 
first recognition of the disease as an entity was 
ixode in the New Horld. 
Foth West -Africa and Tropical 7ierica came into 
intimate communication with Europeans at about the 
-same time, and a long time before Yellow Fever was 
recognized in either region. . Cape Verde was 
rounded in 1444 and the first settlement, 3áo Jorge 
da Mina, was made on the Guinea Coast in 1482, 
eleven years before Columbus founded Isabella in the 
newly discovered uraericas. Early and intimate 
communication was established between these two 
regions enabling both the disease and its insect 
vector to have been transferred from either one to 
the other and become established in which ever was 
its new home before it was definitely recognized in 
either. 
The bond of union between these revolons was 
the slave trade which began almost immediately on 
the discovery of _'.merica and Herrera (v.1 dec, 1 lib5) 
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states that the Governor of Hispaniola petitioned 
that "no more negroes be allowed to come in as they 
were already too many for good order ", this being in 
1503. This trade began with the Spanish and 
'Portuguese but was continued by the English and 
'French later. The disease was carried back and 
forth many times and consequently each accused the 
other of being the source of infection. 
The "Fever of Bulam" was brought from West 
Africa in 1793 to the Island of Grenada, and dread 
widely over the Lesser Antilles and South Carribean 
region, while in 1866, a ship, the Rosa del Turia, 
with 200 deportees from Havana carried the infection' 
to Fernando Po where it spread to other islands in 
the Gulf of Guinea making great ravages. (Yglesias 
y Pardo, quoted by H. Rey 1878). 
Many other instances are on record, and Flu (1910) 
states that "Yellow Fever which was epidemic in 
Togoland was imported from America probably before 
1896 ". 
It can thus be understood that much confusion 
has justifiably arisen among the earlier epidemiolo -' 
gists. We know that, in order that the disease 
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can be endemic certain conditions must be present 
in terms of heat, moisture and concentration of 
population. 
Before the discovery of America by Columbus 
there were only for regions which fulfilled these 
conditions to wit- the Gulf Coast of : _exico, the 
Maya country of Yucatan and Central America, the 
Coastal Region of Peru and the area around the 
Carribean, both mainland and islands, linked by 
voyages of the natives, to make a unit. These 
regions would serve as permanent endemic foci from 
which the disease could spread causing epidemics at 
'a distance. 
We can eliminate the Peruvian region because 
it was isolated from other concentrations of 
population living in conditions favourable to 
continuous J_edes aegypti activity. 
The history of this region is well known and 
no epidemic is recorded either among the natives or 
Spaniards until long after the Conquest, when Small -. 
pox and Typhus were brought in and caused havoc 
amongst the former. As to the Carribean region it 
is not so easy to be definite, but we do know that 
after discovery and settlement by Europeans when 
susceptible immigration, population, and inter- 
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communication was greater than in the pre -Columbian 
period, Yellow Fever died out more than once and didi 
not establish itself continuously which proves that 
it could not have been, by itself, a permanent focus, 
although by communication with other permanent foci, 
it might have maintained long continued epidemics anct 
re- infected other regions. The curtailment of 
trade and communication during the last war is a 
case in point (Carr, Times of India, Jan, 13th, 1926). 
The other two regions had all that was necessari 
to form permanent endemic foci. Heat and moisture 
for..the insect, and a concentration of population 
sufficient to furnish enough susceptible persons to 
continue the disease indefinitely. These regions 
are close enough to provide easy communication and, 
were the disease originally present in either, it 
would spread to the other, at first epidemically, 
then endemically, according to the social 
condition existing at the time. 
Examination of Pre- Conquest Records. 
In August 1521 Cortes captured Mexico City. 
He found that records were kept in picture writing 
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and hieroglyphics. These vere translated into 
!Spanish and also French. The conquest itself did 
not upset the social conditions of the is Mexican 
people. The petty states continued to be ruled 
under the Spaniards as before, and the codices 
continued to be kept throughout, and after the 
conquest, as before. For seventy -five years before 
the conquest and for about sixty years after, we 
have good and reliable records of wars, territorial 
expansion, deaths and accession of rulers, record of 
eclipses, storms, earth quakes, droughts, famines 
and unusual Mortality from divers causes. Less 
reliable but good accounts, and what is important, 
unbroken, are found in The Anales de Cuauhtitlan 
from 635 to 1519. The chronology. is absolute as it, 
can be verified against the dates given for eclipses 
of the sun. These records are important because 
they include data concerning troop movements from 
the "Tierra fria" to the "Tierra caliente", in other; 
words the "acid test of the presence of Yellow Fever 
in an endemic area" (Carr, unpublished report to the 
International Health Board, July 1926). 
n 1926, during the Yellow Fever campaign in 
Bahia, Brazil, the presence of non - immune troops 
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from the cold South soon uncovered Yellow Fever, 
which had been smouldering unrecognized in the 
Interior towns of that state. One would therefore 
expect to find in the records r__.ention of what would 
have been an "unusual ::tortality" had such occurred. 
Carter, The Early History of Yellow Fever, 1931)),' 
sums up the evidence, pro and con, as follows: - 
"Did Yellow Fever exist in this reL-ion at the time 
of the Spanish Conquest` If so, it disappeared 
entirely during or soon after that Conquest, and 
gave no evidence of its presence for over a hundred 
years. If this region, taken as a whole, was, up 
to that time, a permanent endemic focus of Yellow 
Fever, was there anything in the Conquest to make 
the disease disappear? One would think the 
.contrary. The effect of movements of men in _asses 
is generally to spread infection, and the advent of 
the susceptible soldiers from the highlands of 
Guatemala and from Tlazcala and other parts of the 
Mexican plateau would specially have had that effect. 
True, one can conceive of a great increase of 
infection thus produced so completely immunizing 
a region that Yellow Fever is ultimately eliminated 
by that very increase. But there had been many wars 
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in Yucatan before, assumed to have no such effect; 
and certainly the effect of wars as we have seen 
them in Cuba, Mexico, and Central merica in recent 
years has been to spread and increase Yellow Fever. 
I think, then, that we must conclude that Yellow 
Fever did not exist among the Mayas at this time, 
and hence that this region was not a permanent 
endemic focus of Yellow Fever. 
To sum up, quite certainly the effect of the 
Conquest would have been :- 
(1) to increase the prevalence of any Yellow Fever 
already existing in Yucatan, in Mexico, or in 
Central 1- úerica ; 
(2) to increase the communication between Yucatan 
and the coast sections of the other two; and 
(3) if any one of these regions were infected with 
Yellow Fever, to increase the danger of its 
I communication to others, as every condition 
favouring infection was increased by the Conquest. 
Therefore, and since, in fact, the Conquest 
having taken place, Yucatan was not infected for well 
over a hundred years thereafter, it is not reasonable 
to claim that it would have been infected during 
this time if the Conquest had not taken place. 
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The evidence then is strong - to my mind convincing - 
that at the time of the Conquest Yucatan was neither 
a permanent endemic focus of yellow fever nor a 
component part of a permanent regional focus. 
That aegypti were prevalent in Yucatan in 1648 
goes without saying - else there had been no 
epidemic." 
In any case it seems to him (Carter) that with 
the data we have on Yucatan, one of the aDove 
conclusions (1) or (2) is inevitable, and the first 
must be accepted in any case since it is implied 
in the second. rouhere about the Carribean do the 
pre- Columbain conditions for the breeding and 
existence of aegypti seem to have been so good as 
among the Mayas. If aegypti were not prevalent 
there during this time, obviously they were not 
indigenous to this region - they could not have died 
out - hut were introduced later. If not indigenous 
to Yucatan, it is extremely improbable that they 
were indigenous to the Mexican littoral. That 
being so, YELLOW COULD NOT HAVE ORIGINATED AND 
BEEN PERMANENTLY ENDEMIC IN EITHER OF THESE AREAS. 
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In the last section of the Historical evidence we 
have come to the conclusion that from the time of 
the Spanish Conquest until 1648, we had no positive 
data, and that the native Mexican records were ell 
negative. 
Various epidemics were mentioned e.g. small -pox 
measles and a "Tabardillo" (probably Typhus or 
Scarlet Fever). 177elina Solis Vol.1 page 130, 
mentions an unnamed "peste" in 1571, following a 
famine, and again in 1561, but nothing resembling 
Yellow Fever. There can be no doubt of the cause 
of the great epidemic of 1648 in Yucatan, and that 
it occurred in a susceptible community, proving 
that yellow fever had not been there before, or, 
at least, had been absent for a very long time. 
None of these in their descriptions can 
compare with the account in Cogollude's "Histeria 
Yucatan (1688, lib.xll, cap.12 et seq). He 
states "in the beginning of June the peste began 
in the city of Campeche and in a few days so pressed 
upon it that it was totally laid waste" 
He notes that those who followed the Image in 
procession were killed, Indians as well as priests 
21. 
and "those who died appeared tlae most healthy and 
robust ". 
In an unpublished report to the International 
Health Board I noted the same (Carr, March 23rd, 
1925) general condition owing to the festival of 
Carnaval, held during the season of optimal 
meteorology. "The tribulation of the city was 
great AS NEVER HAD IT ELPERIENCED SUCH A 
=ASTER-. In the beginning (Merida) "few of the 
friars died....when the peste was at its height 
few were sick...afterwards many sickened at once ". 
This is to be noted as typical of the disease. 
The extrinsic incubation period in the 
mosquito, plus the period of intrinsic incubation 
in man, would give this interval between the first 
few, and the many following. 
The Epidemiology of Yellow Fever fits this 
description or, at least, some other insect borne 
disease:- "Pestilences are accustomed to be a 
common accident in other lands, which uniformly 
attack all, bdct it was not thus in Yucatan, which 
was the occasion of the greater c.nfusion. 
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It is not possible to say WHAT WAS THIS 
BECAUSE TEE PHYSICI.A.NS DID NOT RECOGNISE IT ". 
The symptoms described leave nothing to add to 
those I have seen myself. 
ñt first the natives were not attacked except 
"only those who were with them (the Spaniards) and 
those who went to the city. These went out 
touched with the malady and the most part died in 
their puebloes ". "On this account the Indians 
said with boldness that the malady was a judgement 
of God, since they were only sick in the city and 
towns (of the Spaniards). "An Indian proclaimed 
that all the Spaniards had to die and that the 
Indians alone would reain ". 
The above is interesting in the light of what 
the disease is called by the people of Brazil 
behind the backs of the Americans, especially during 
that period, 1923 - 1926, when The United States 
was suspected of Imperialistic designs on South 
America. 
It was called "Febre Patriotica" because it 
killed the foreigner. 
23. 
"As to what I said, that the sickness 'Killed the 
most robust youths the quickest, I will say .... 
that of the children of tender age whom the peste 
attacked in Yucatan, there were very few who died 
compared with the people of more advanced age". 
This observation is to -day of the utmost importance, 
and constitutes our greatest diagnostic difficulty. 
The symptoms in children are so slight, as a 
rule, that many cases are missed and the disease 
well established in a locality before an 
unmistaken case is diagnosed, usually in a foreign 
non - immune adult. 
To sum up the epidemiological points noted by 
Gogolludo:- 
(1) Lesser mortality among children. 
(2) Greater severity among the robust. 
(3) Absence of a second attack. 
(4) Delayed incidence and then sudden outbreak 
among the Friars and Indians. 
(5) Newness of the disease to the inhabitants. 
(6) Physicians did not recognize it. 
(7) Previous healthfulness of Yucatan (other 
countries were accustomed to pestilences" it 
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was not so in Yucatan ". 
From these observations we may deduce that, 
(a) Yucatan had had no epidemic of Yellow Fever 
since the beginning of the Spanish Conquest, 
120 years before. 
(b) That the 1648 Epidemic was Yellow Fever 
(cj That it attacked in a virgin soil. 
(d) That it must have been brought from outside. 
Having established the fact that Yellow Fever 
existed in the New 7orld, how was it brought, and 
who brought it? 
To answer this, an account must be given of the 
history of the disease in parts of the incriminated 
area other than Yucatan where it was first so 
definitely described. Before the mosquito host 
was definitely settled by the investigations of 
the American Commission in Havana during 1900, the 
early writers, with the exception of Findlay, 
thought that Yellow Fever in Hispaniola (Hayti) 
was indigenous and caused by telluric emanations or 
local saprophytic, but facultatively parasitic to 
human beings, producing the disease in those 
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susceptible to it, but existing in places inde- 
pendently and remaining indefinitely unless 
destroyed by some natural agency as frost etc. 
This would date it to geologic times. Findlay 
believed that it was introduced by Carib Indians 
in 1495 from the mainland or other islands as 
Hispaniola had been previously free from it. 
That no fever, or other malignant disease was 
reported among the Indians when the Spaniards 
first landed in 1492 makes this view improbable. 
Zany epidemics are described pointing to I.:ala.ria, 
small -pox, famine with its deficiency diseases 
and other conditions familiar to Europeans. 
Particularly be it noted, that, never until 1649 
was there any mention of epidemic disease in ships 
either lying in harbour or taking expeditions. 
The absence of such reports is of the utmost signi- 
ficance. 
This completes our review of the history of 
yellow fever up to the year 1648, in which year, 
we believe, it made its first appearance in the 
New 
To revert to the question, who brought it and 
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how? What change had occurred in the means or 
triode of communications, or the social conditions 
of the area? 
Previously I remarked on the factor of the 
slave trade which had begun soon after the 
discovery of the Americas. It must be remembered 
that the slaves :vere mostly adults which means, if 
they had come from the Test African endemic areas, 
that they were immune. 
It must have taken a very long time before 
_Aedes aegypti, transported in the ships either as 
adults or larvae, or even as egs, could settle 
in their new surroundings and, as there would be 
very few docks or quays for them to lie alongside 
in the new ports, flight or other means of making 
the shore would be precarious. Coming ashore 
with the slaves, who would be half naked and with 
no gear, would be rare. 
A few years before, and during the year of the 
Yucatan epidemic, a completely new factor in 
'maritime communication began to levelop.. This 
factor was such that it greatly favoured the 
conveyance of both Aedes aegypti and Yellow fever. 
Buccaneers, mostly French and English, but also 
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Dutch, began to attack vessels in these waters and 
also to raid the towns of the Spanish Main. 
Cogullude and Molina Solis report that pirates were 
very prevalent during 1648. A famous Captain, 
Jacob Jackson, sacked Champoton,a town well in the 
interior, having landed 1500 men. These piratical 
movements must have profoundly altered the social 
and maritime life of the region and placed it in 
both direct and indirect contact with West African 
ports. 
Expeditions sailing for the Spanish Main, 
because of favourable winds, usually called some- 
where on the West African coast for water and 
victuals, where they often remained a long time 
to repair, and pick up consorts separated on the 
voyage from Europe, an ideal way to collect both 
the insect and the fever. 
Du Tertre (1667 -1671 vol.l.p.421 -22) states 
"during this same year, 1648, the 'peste' until 
then unknown in these islands since they were 
inhabited by the French, was brought here by some 
vessels; it began at St. Christophe, and in the 
eighteen months it lasted it. carried away nearly 
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one third of the inhabitants ". It was brought by 
a vessel from La Rochelle, France, and most probably 
had first called at either the mainland or one of the 
islands of the West African Coast. 
Throughout the littoral of the Carribean and in 
the Antilles generally, and spreading north to the 
coasts of the colonies of Spain, France and Great 
Britain as well as south to Brazil, and crossing to 
the Western coasts of Central and South America, 
Yellow Fever epidemics became common after 1648. 
Findlay (Trabajos Selectos, 1912, p.122) states 
"From 1511, in the year Velasquez came with three 
hundred residents of Sto. Domingo to settle the 
Island of Cuba, to the year 1648 or 1649, in which 
its population increased to a little less than 
30,000 inhabitants, in spite of having an important 
commerce and the generality of the vessels which 
sailed from Nombre de Dios and Vera Cruz for the 
Peninsula or for Sto. Domingo, touched at Havana, 
there was no notice that any of the inhabitants had 
suffered on its soil from the grave pestilences 
which, year after year were wont to afflict those 
who went to the ports of the neighbouring continent 
mentioned above. 
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The principle which we have to recognize that a 
locality has not suffered before from Yellow Fever.. 
IS THE APTITUDE WHICH THE GENERALITY OF THE 
POPULATION IN SUCH LOCALITIES MANIFEST TO CONTRACT 
THE DISEASE WHEN ANY EPIDEMIC OF YELLOW FEVER 
COMES TO INVADE THEIR TERRITORY FOR THE FIRST T=. 
With its help we see corroborated our assertion 
that in the first hundred and thirty -eight years 
of the occupation of this Island of Cuba by the 
European race there has not been manifested in it 
the pestilence which immediately spread through the 
Island, from the year 1649 to 1655, and of whose 
nature there is no plausible reason to doubt that 
it was the same Yellow Fever which subsequently had 
come to establish here its kingdom." 
This last observation by Findlay, and the way 
he has put it, is a poignant reminder of what would 
happen in the East with its non - immune millions. 
After 1658, nothing further was heard of 
Yellow Fever in Havana until 1761, when it was 
reintroduced from Vera Cruz, and then it created 
havoc among the British troops under Pocock and 
Albermarle, who had captured the city. From then 
on it was permanently endemic until 1901, when, for 
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the first time, Gorgas finally banished it by 
control of Aedes aegypti. Once the city had 
become an endemic centre, disease among adult 
citizens was hardly noticed, the mortality was among 
the immigrants. 
Children were so lightly affected that Gorgas 
used this fact to change his plan of attack, from 
the disease to its vector, in his compaign in 
Panama; the latter he could control, the former 
he could not, as it was seldom recognizable. All 
those recorded as having had Yellow Fever developed 
it within two and a half years of arrival, very few 
had it after the third year. It was known among 
the laity as the "fever of acclimatization ". 
Almost all the other islands in the West Indies 
have a history of Yellow Fever, but one of the most 
deadly occurred in St. Lucia. Berenger- Feraud, 
quoting du Tertre, states:- "in 1665, an English 
squadron which was in good health took possession of 
Sainte Lucie, and placed there a garrison of 1500 
men; cy the month of January of the following year 
this garrison was reduced to 89 the result of 
a violent epidemic of Yellow Fever ". (op.cit.p.30). 
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Martinique in 1690 had an epidemic reported by 
Pere Labat (1722). It was brought from Recife, 
Brazil, by a French war ship, which had called there 
on its way from Siam. 
In Brazil the disease does not appear until 
1686, possibly because the mosquito had not had time 
to become sufficiently concentrated or because 
buccaneers were never as active on that coast, there 
being no attractive loot until much later. 
Da Rocha Pitta gives an excellent account (Historia 
da America Portugueza.1730). It first demonstrated 
itself in Olinda, a residential suburb of Recife, 
then spread to Bahia, where it was severe, showing 
a virgin soil, and then died out from failure of 
the human host until reintroduced in 1849 from 
Havana or New Orleans. 
The fleet of Gomez Freyre de Andrada, sailing 
from Lisbon early in 1685, stopped at the Cape Verde 
islands, which even then were "notoriously unhealthy" 
¡Ind during the voyage from there to Brazil had had 
much disease and lost many of the crew. They put 
n at Recife for a refit and later the epidemic 
broke out. 
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Although the disease did not become endemic in 
the United States, because of climatic deterrents, 
there were yearly epidemics in the coast towns, and 
up the Mississippi valley. American expeditionary 
forces to Vera Cruz in 1846 "died like flies and 
during the campaign in Cuba 1898 -1900, had Spain 
not surrendered, indeed, it is almost certain that 
the United States would have had to withdraw its 
troops: 
I quote from "William Crawford Gorgas, his 
life and work" (Gorgas and Hendrick 1924):- "For 
two centuries the coast cities of the United States 
had served as its most promising hunting grounds. 
New Orleans, Mobile, Charlestown, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, New York, New Haven, Nantucket Island, 
Boston and other places had many times satiated 
this voracious appetite. In none of these cities 
was Yellow Fever "endemic "; the disease could 
exist perpetually only in countries which were warm 
all the year round, for the frosts of autumn and 
winter immediately destroyed the cause; in most 
American cities, therefore, the Yellow Fever came 
as a summer plague, falling upon them with ferocity 
and disappearing almost as unexpectedly as it had 
appeared." 
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(It is interesting to note here that many unwarrant- 
ed reputations were made by sanitarians of the days 
before Aedes aegypti was incriminated, who thought 
that their work had been the means of causing the 
disappearance of Yellow Fever when it was actually 
Dr. Frost.)" 
"The mortality from such invasions was always 
high. In 1793 a Yellow Fever epidemic killed 
4,000 men, women and children in Philadelphia, or 
one tenth of the entire population." 
"This was one of the worst visitations in 
American history, although no more destructive than 
the one that terrified the Mississippi valley in 
1878, reaching its most alarming phase perhaps in 
Memphis ". (State of Tennesse, almost 500 miles up 
the river and carried by boats.) 
"Probably the Philadelphia epidemic of a 
century before owes its fame chiefly to the 
vividness with which it has been described. The 
famous Dr. Benjamin Rush and Matthew Carey have 
left accounts which have a strong resemblance to 
Defoe's description of the great London plague 
(Black Death)." 
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"Reading their graphic pages, indeed, one might 
fancy himself in the English capital in 1644 -65." 
"The same terror, the same panic in face of en 
unknown and impalpable enemy, the same manifestations 
of the worst passions of human nature, as well as of 
the best, mark the Philadelphia story of 1793 as 
they do the London visitation of the preceeding 
century." 
"The situation continued until the appearance 
of frost, when the plague vanished as mysteriously 
as it had arrived, and the town again adjusted 
itself to normal conditions. One writer records, 
as an evidence of the popular frenzy that had 
ruled all summer, the delight with which the 
populace looked upon a conventional funeral pro- 
ceeding in leisure and dignity through the streets. 
It had for so many months been the custom to 
hustle off unattended corpses at midnight, or to 
leave them unburied in vacant lots, that even this 
sombre manifestation of normal existence was a 
cause for general rejoicing." 
It was particularily noted by Rush that 
"people who constantly associated with the disease 
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did not necessarily contract it while thousands 
who had never come near a patient dropped in their 
tracks ". He notes yet again that "moschetoes" 
were very plentiful about Philadelphia in 1793 and 
Noah Webster describing the New York epidemic of 
1795 states:- "mosquitoes were never before known 
by the oldest inhabitants to have been so numerous." 
Such was the religious idea of the origin of 
disease in those days that the above two points of 
paramount significance in the epidemiology of 
Yellow Fever were entirely missed by a famous 
physician and the mystery only cleared up by his 
fellow countrymen more than a hundred years after- 
wards. 
During the 19th. century not a year passed 
that did not claim its victims from Yellow Fever 
in many American cities, and the Philadelphia 
scenes were duplicated as late as 1878 in Memphis. 
In that year there were 100,000 cases with 20,000 
deaths, in the United States, the last outbreak 
occurring in New Orleans in 1905, five years after 
the vector had been definitely established by Reed 
and his co- workers in Havana. 
We had already noted that the invading English 
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and Colonial American troops who captured Havana in 
1762 had to abandon the enterprise after a few 
months because of Yellow Fever, and in 1800 the 
pick of Napoleon's army which landed in Haiti had 
almost vanished after a year. 
In George Town (British Guiana) 69ó of the 
garrison died in 1840. 
Crossing to Europe we find that the disease 
appeared time after time in various ports of Spain; 
Cadiz suffered five epidemics in the 18th.century 
and Malaga one. In the 19th. century the disease 
manifested alarming proportions, from 1800 down to 
1821 Cadiz, Seville, Malaga, Cartagena, Barcelona, 
Palma, Gibraltar and other ports suffered 
severely as well as the surrounding country. In 
Barcelona. in 1821 five thousand persons died. 
At Lisbon in 1857 six thousand died in a few weeks. 
Italy, France and even England (Swansea 1865) 
have not escaped. 
From this survey it can easily be seen what a 
tremendous olitical factor Yellow Fever has been 
in the New World, from the Argentine to Quebec, 
and in the European Old World, its western coasts 
from England to Italy. 
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Let us now examine the other two regions which was 
decided could be a permanent endemic area, tropical 
West Africa. It was decided (page lo) that, 
biologically, the evidence pointed to West Africa 
as the origin of the disease and its vector. 
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. 
The evidence produced, and the data examined, 
although negative, in the survey of the New 7orld 
is, in my opinion, completely against the origin 
of the disease in that hemisphere. Ispo facto, 
we are reduced therefore to that other area which 
meteorologically and historically can produce the 
necessary conditions. It is not necessary to 
search beyond 1648 because it has been established 
that Yellow Fever was present at that time in 
Yucatan, and its presence in West Africa after that 
date could mean that it had been transported from 
the West. 
The disease has never been recorded on the 
East Coast although entomologically and sociologi- 
cally there is no reason that can be found, either 
now or in early times, why it should not have been 
there as it has in the West. Therefore we shall 
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confine our attention to the West. At once we 
must note that the evidence, both positive and 
negative, contrasts, rather than compares, with that 
of the Americas. 
There are no native records in Africa such as 
we have of the Mexicans, Mayans and Peruvians before 
the Spanish Conquest. The history of voyages 
down the West Coast were good, such as that by 
Ramusio (Naviationi et viaggi. 3rd.ed. Venetia, 
1485 -1557) but they were of discovery only and had 
not the element of intense excitement engendered 
by the "New World" of Columbus. In the Americas 
there were large settlements made; in Africa 
only trading posts established. 
These "posts" were at the mouths of large 
rivers and not up into the interior, while in the 
Americas, because of the healthiness of the 
plateaux, permanent settlement was made by the 
invaders who mixed with the indigenous peoples. 
In the islands off the coast actual settlements 
were made, and from them we can expect more definite 
data of disease, especially if that disease was not 
known to the colonists in their mother country, 
if the disease were already endemic an epidemic 
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would not occur. In the Americas the native 
suffered equally with the invader; this fact 
compelled notice. 
The constant presence of malignant malaria, 
with the difficulty of differentiation from Yellow 
Fever, makes early accounts unreliable, and it was 
Schette (1778) who first definitely described an 
epidemic in a body of British troops at St. Louis 
de Senegal. 
The most reliable criterion we have in such an 
area is a history of shipping after visiting ports 
in that area, especially if the disease continued 
to attack the crews at sea, but whatever is found 
we must not expect it to be the clear -cut evidence 
such as we have from the Americas with epidemics of 
frequent occurrence and high mortality. 
EARLY HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA. 
Much of the continent of Africa had been well 
known from the very earliest period of European 
history, but of that part of it which concerns us 
in our survey of the West Coast, in terms of Yellow 
Fever, there are no records until the latter part 
the 15th century. 
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The east coast was early brought into 
communication with the Levant by Arab traders who 
founded settlements as far down as Madagascar in 
the 10th century, and there is on record, as early 
as 130 B.C. an expedition of Eudexus of Cyzicus; 
but nowhere can we find an account of a disease or 
of an epidemic which can, even remotely, be 
associated with Yellow Fever. Walckenaer 
(Collections de Relations de Voyages ..en.. Afrique 
1842,vol.lx.pp.379 -380) has examined very thoroughly 
all the legends and reports of the early historians 
regarding West Africa from Pharaoh Neche, 600 B.C. 
to the Dieppois, 1488 A,D, and concludes that the 
evidence given is not valid. We begin to have 
reliable evidence about the middle of the 15th 
century, from the Portuguese. 
Ramusio (Navigationi et Viaggi, Venice 1564 -83, 
vol.1.) recounts at length the various voyages, 
under the patronage of Prince Henry the Navigator, 
which opened up communications between Europe and 
West Africa from 1434 to 1455. 
On 1488, Bartolome Diaz made his famous voyage 
round the 'Cape of Storms" (Cape of Good Hope) and 
reached the Eastern Mainland above Port Elizabeth 
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and returned, followed by Vasco da Gama in 1497- 
1499, on his voyage to India. 
The islands were discovered, or perhaps re- 
discovered, earlier. The Canaries, the only 
inhabited ones, by the Spaniards, in 1402, the others 
by the Portuguese, Madeiras 1418, Cape Verdes 1456, 
Soa Thome 1470; all became settled in the 15th. 
century and the communication between them and 
Europe was much greater than with the mainland, as 
also with the Americas because of the slave trade. 
The first settlement on the continental coast 
was at Arguim, in the bay just south of Cape Blanco 
in 1488. It was a fort built as a base for the 
slave trade. Elmina followed in 1482 and Angola 
in 1490. Holland, France, England and even the 
State of Brandenburn continued these settlements, 
but they were mere posts, not colonies. Angola 
was the centre of the slave trade and had as many 
as four hundred and fifty men as garrison. 
While the mainland settlements remained small, 
the islands rapidly became well populated with 
Europeans and developed into ports of great activity 
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with constant communication with both the West 
Coast and tropical America. 
The logs of the Portuguese voyages were 
exceptionally well kept, especially those of Ca da 
Mosto in 1456. These have been quoted in Azurara's 
Chronicle (1841) and in Ramusio's Collection (1563- 
83). The second voyage of Mosto included an ascent 
of the River Gambia "for about sixty miles" to "the 
country of Battimansa "; it goes on to state "at 
the end of the 11th day we decided to leave and go 
to the mouth of the river, because many of us had 
begun to suffer with hot fever which is acute and 
continuous". 
The word "continuous" seems to indicate 
Malaria more than Yellow Fever, but no further 
details of sickness was given, indicating that it 
could not have interfered seriously with the 
expedition. 
Had there been the malignancy reported by later 
expeditions, with the inconvenience caused to their 
object undoubtedly it would have been noted. 
The earlier visits were confined mostly to the 
coast and the vessels anchored off shore, while the 
latter, in which much sickness was reported, were 
up river for the purpose of trade. 
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Saco (op. cit.p.41.) quotes Bernaldez as 
follows " in 1471....the flotilla discovered a 
mine of gold on the 'coast of the black Xelefes'.. 
The major part of the crews became sick and died 
without remedy and afterwards, pursuing their 
voyages, the travel became easier and they became 
well and ceased to die." 
Abstracts from English logs of the ships' 
voyages to West Africa, and the Gulf of Benin in 
particular, have been given by Walckenaer (1842) 
and Carter (1931) has examined the original accounts 
and states as follows:- "In particular all of these 
expeditions sickness is noted, and in some, the 
mortalities are excessive. For instance, in the 
expedition of Windham and Pinteado to Benin, in 
1553 'scarcely forty' out of a hundred and forty 
men returnea to Plymouth; and nearly all the deaths 
occurred within little more than a month, aboard 
ship lying at the mouth of the Benin River, dying 
'sometimes three and sometimes four or five a day' 
(Hakluyt, op cit, vol.xl, pp 80 -81). The loss in 
Newton's and Bird's expedition, also to Benin in 
1599, was proportionally as great, and in as short 
a time. "It is worth noting that the ships of 
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Windham and Pinteado lay in the Benin River, near 
the mouth, while a party went up the river '50 or 
60 leagues" to 'the King of Benin his court' to get 
their cargo (cardamons). All the sickness recorded 
was in the men who stayed with the ships." 
"Such community mortality as these expeditions 
suffered, and in such a short time - hence not caused 
by recurrent attacks - is indeed extremely high for 
Malaria, even in West Africa, and it may well be 
that it, or much of it, was from Yellow Fever. 
This however, is the only evidence therefore, and 
one hesitates so to pronounce it." 
In the history of these expeditions and in that 
of the early settlements we are confronted 
continuously with the poor accounts of the diseases 
which prevailed, and the difficulty of differential 
diagnosis between Yellow Fever and Subtertian 
Malaria, which pertains even to this day in the 
hinterland of Brazil and caused me much trouble 
and doubt in analysing reports from both poorly 
trained medicos and laymen. The negative evidence 
in Africa has not the same weight that the same had 
in the Americas. The conditions in the latter 
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were such that the presence of Yellow Fever was 
easily recognised and of such epidemic extent that 
it could not have been there before, at least not 
without being recorded, and it never was. The 
accounts we have may have been Yellow Fever, but 
we cannot be certain, so we shall turn to the histor* 
of the islands off the coast, which were true 
colonies, and with the exception of the Canaries, 
were uninhabited at the time of discovery. 
The Aedes aegypti, even if not indigenous, 
must have been introduced early, and either with it 
or afterwards the disease, if it was present on the 
mainland. But even more than the islands, ships 
visiting them are more important as indicators. 
SHIPPING. 
Between 1599 and 1641 Sao Thome was twice 
captured by the Dutch, and both times the fleet of 
the invaders suffered a high mortality. Dapper, 
Barbot and Labat all mention these invasions, but 
there is the usual scant detail as regards symptoms 
and mortality. Dapper states:- "The Dutch had no 
little number of deaths and of sick men when they 
made themselves master of the islùn.d in 1641 under 
Admiral Jol, for there hardly remained 10 or 12 men 
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sound of each company, and Jol himself died, besides 
several other chiefs. Finally the malady raged 
with so much fury and it extended itself so among 
his men that there hardly remained enough for 
sentinels, and so few sailors that there was 
difficulty in equipping two vessels. The most part 
died of pain in the head so violent that it threw 
them into madness and folly. Some had a pain in 
the belly which carried them off in 3 or 4 days." 
Barbot speaks of "this sort of Cholick" as 
that "it has swept away an incredible number of men 
...It...with the bloody flux, killed such a number of 
Dutchmen the two several times they subdued the 
island, in the years 1610 and 1641, as before 
mentioned, that the island was then known in Holland 
by the name of the Dutch Churchyard." 
Labat gives a similar account. The mortality 
quoted by Netscher (1853, p.121) from Dutch sources, 
,says that of 600 men landed on the island in October 
1641, only 230 remained in December. These data 
suggest Yellow Fever, both mortality and symptomat- 
ology. 
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Keeping before us 1648 as our key date for 
positive identification of Yellow Fever, we must 
conclude that up until th'e early years of the 17th 
century, we may only presume Yellow Fever in Africa 
from the indefinite descriptions given. There has 
been nothing like Cogolludo's description of the 
Yucutan Epidemic of 1648 which was certainly Yellow 
Fever. 
Over a hundred years were to pass before Lind 
and Schoote made their reports of fevers in Gambia 
and Senegal which we can take as definitive. Lind, 
who was an authority on tropical diseases, wrote in 
1768 a treatise on diseases of hot climates of which 
there were several editions, and we quote from the 
fifth. (Essay on Diseases Incidental to Europeans 
in Hot Cliïi.ates, 1792). He gives several 
descriptions, but one is certainly Yellow Fever. 
"During August 1768, the sloop "Merlin" with 
90 men entered the Gambia River. She continued 
six days in the river, employed in wooding and 
watering. While there all the men were in perfect 
health, but in about two days after they put to sea, 
those who had been employed in wooding were successively 
taken ill, afterwards those who had been employed in 
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the duty of watering were seized in the same manner. 
At first these men alone were seized with the fever, 
and several of them a day continued to fall sick for 
six or seven days; at length almost all that had 
been employed on those services were ill; after 
them, their attendants were seized with the fever, 
and in such numbers as to leave no doubt of the 
disease being infectious" (Op.cit. pp. 184 -5). 
Here again the evidence is only epidemiological, 
no clinical description being given. The incubation 
periods in the men are correct and especially the 
fact of the attendants in the sick bay being affected 
later from Aedes infected from the first cases. 
Lind himself thought it was malignant malaria 
and he quotes later in the same treatise from the 
log of H.M.S. "Weasel" clinical descriptions of what 
was undoubtedly malaria, confusing the two diseases. 
Lind also makes the observation, made a thousand 
years before by Roman writers, that malarial fevers 
ere hardly ever contracted during the daylight, and 
concluded that this applied to Yellow Fever. This 
istake has been responsible for many deaths in ships 
lying off infected ports, because in my own experi- 
ments I found that Aedes aegypti bite during every hour 
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of the day or night. 
Schotte presented a report to the Royal Society 
in 1780 on the "Synochus Atrabiliosa" which he had 
studied in Senegal in 1778. He states that the 
garrison had been in fair health until early August 
when a "raging" epidemic began which lasted until 
the middle of September. 
St. Louis de Senegal had 92 white inhabitants, 
and of these 59 died at the rate of 3 to 5 a day at 
the peak of the epidemic, which was the month's end. 
There have been many similar outbreaks since this 
report and epidemiologically they were the same. 
It had taken 134 years after Cogolludo in Yucutan 
had definitely described Yellow Fever, for Schoote to 
make as definite diagnosis in Africa, although even 
then he was not certain with what he was dealing. 
Had he read Towne, Hughes, Bruce or Warren, on the 
disease in the Antilles, he could have recognised 
at once with what he had to do, for they had pub - 
lished in London before this period. 
What was the cause of this lag? 
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It must be remembered that even at this present 
time the occurrence of an epidemic is often the first 
notice we have of the existence of the disease. In 
Yutucan the epidemic was noted as a new disease, 
attacking both foreigners and natives, while in 
Africa it was thought to be only an increase or 
exacerbation of a disease already present. In 
Africa it was the introduction of susceptible people 
into an already endemic locality. Schotte 
differentiates between his "Synochus Atrabiliosa" 
and the ordinary fevers of the country. He did not 
indicate that it was a newly introduced disease. 
The history of the disease in Africa is more on 
a parallel with the history of troops sent out to the 
West Indies after Yellow Fever had become endemic 
there. Again, Africa has never been permanently 
settled by non -immunes in those parts which have 
endemic Yellow Fever; whereas the Americas were so 
from the beginning, and that means more, and proper, 
records were made of conditions affecting immigration. 
From Schotte's time on, reports of yellow fever 
on the West Coast of Africa have been constant, 
sufficiently constant to deduce that the disease has 
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been endemic. 
Intervals have occurred without reports, and we 
know positively that the disease has been introduced 
into Africa ports by ships from the Americas, but it 
has been demonstrated often enough in places which 
precluded any such means of origin. Also, this 
does not mean that every port or section has had the 
disease permanently, but that the disease has been 
present at some spot all of the time; constituting 
a regional focus in West Africa long before it 
spread to the Americas. 
The disease has been one of European settle- 
ments or ships touching at the ports, and very 
seldom mentioned as affecting natives, which does 
not mean that natives are immune to infection, but 
that they do not suffer recognizably. We have this 
in the native white peoples of endemic America, who 
are under modern methods of observation (such as has 
never been the case with the large majority of the 
native Africans), and for the same reason. 
It is an established fact that the Negro has 
both a racial and specific immunity; he is 
resistent to the toxins although not to the infection, 
with much less reaction and markedly less mortality. 
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Negroes in the southern United States, where no 
yellow fever had been before, suffered much less than 
the whites when an epidemic did occur; and we have 
the classical example of the half- white, half -black 
brigade, sent to Mexico by the French in 1862 from 
ordofan, which had never known yellow fever. The 
blacks enjoyed "almost absoulte immunity" and no 
mortality, while the whites suffered severely. 
The disease therefore, is propagated by the 
(Negro, especially the children, who because of the 
mildness of the attack, are not noticed. The whites 
are not in sufficient numbers to provide for 
endemicity, therefore are merely the indicators of 
the disease among the blacks. 
From this survey of the early history of Yellow 
Fever, we may now come to some conclusion as to its 
origin. 
The first recognition of the disease as an 
entity was in the Yucatan epidemic of 1648, and we 
decided that as it attacked the native as severely 
(or even more severely) as the white invader, it 
could not have been endemic, at least for a very 
long time. 
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The native and Spanish history from the time of 
the conquest had given no indication of its presence 
until 1648, and nothing before. It was a new 
unknown disease. 
The length of time from the Conquest to the 
first epidemic was undoubtedly due to the fact of 
the absence of the vector in sufficient numbers, 
although communication between Africa and America 
had been constant for more than 100 years. So also 
in those other parts of the World where conditions 
are favourable for the propagation of the disease 
and vector, as in parts of Asia and East Africa, one 
or other of the three essentials must be lacking. 
The virus, functionally active vector, or non - immune 
population in sufficient numbers. In these other 
regions it must have been the absence of the virus, 
as both men and vector are abundantly present. 
Our conclusion therefore is, that the West 
Coast of Africa is the place of origin of Yellow 
Fever, at least as far as mankind, as we know him at 
present, is concerned. Whether West Africa was the 
place where Yellow Fever first evolved as a human 
disease cannot be determined, for we know almost 
nothing of the evolution of man and his parasites. 
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The next great landmark in the history of 
Yellow Fever was the discovery and proof of its 
means of vection. This fundamental factor in 
control was the discovery of the vector in Aedes 
aegypti. 
In 1881, Carlos Findlay of Havana had read a 
paper before a medical congress in Washington U.S.A., 
making the assertion that Yellow Fever was caused by 
the "Stegomyia" mosquito. He asserted in vain, was, 
in fact, laughed at and discredited as a crank by 
many learned societies and tropical experts. 
Meanwhile Manson had discovered in 1880, the 
vector mosquito of filariasis. In 1889, Smith and 
Kilborne proved that Texas fever was transmitted by 
tick, and Ross in 1897 demonstrated that Anopheles 
was the infecting agent in Malaria. 
These discoveries brought a new interest to 
Findlay's theory, which had lacked proof because of 
the yet undiscovered fact of "extrinsic incubation", 
which Carter found in 1898. The Spanish -American 
;war was the opportunity offered to test all this 
during the occupation of Havana by the United States' 
troops, who were being attacked by Yellow Fever. 
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In 1900, a scientific commission was appointed to 
study the disease. Here in. Havana were the four men who 
were to solve the Yellow Fever mystery which had baffled 
the doctors for centuries and caused the loss and misery of 
millions, as well as altering frequently the politics of the 
powers in their colonial ambitions. 
Findlay, Carter, Reed and Gorgas together, with theory, 
experiment and practice ideally proved that Yellow Fever 
could be banished. 
A description of this work will be given in another 
section. 
For the 140 years, from 1762 until 1901, Havana had not 
been free from Yellow Fever for a single day. Every year 
had had a record of death. For the ten yearns before the 
American occupation the average mortality. was five hundred 
per annum. In 1896, the deaths were 1,282; in 1900, the 
year preceding the work of Gorgas, 310 -- and those at the 
beginning of an epidemic which his control methods stopped. 
Control was started in Niarch 1901, and the deaths 
subsequent to this were exactly five during July and August. 
Apart from a small outbreak in 1905, which was promptly 
checked, thirty -two years have passed without a single new 
case being reported in this city, which had been the peste's 
main headquarters in the Antilles. 
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This Epical, and Epochal demonstration marked the 
beginning of a series of successes in the control of the 
disease in those regions where, heretofore, it had held 
undisputed sway. 
Panama had been a byword for many generations, in 
terms of Yellow Fever. 
In 1904 the United States, having taken Panama from 
Columbia, began to build a canal. 
In William Crawford Gorgas, His Life and Work (1924) 
we are told, "There was one man however, who knew that 
American wealth, American engineering skill, and American 
energy would not in themselves accomplish this great 
programme . . . The Doctor's papers at that time disclose 
the general failure to grasp this great truth ". 
Gorgas appealed to the Washington Authorities pointing 
out the importance, before all else, of the application of 
the new methods of sanitary control. 
It states that Gorgas wrote to the Surgeon- General, 
"to the enormous loss of life that had been caused amongst 
the French working at Panama, due to tropical diseases; 
that by far the most important of the diseases were Yellow 
Fever and l(alaria; that if we could protect our labourers 
on the canal as we had the people of Havana, we should be 
able to build the canal without anything like such losses as 
had occurred to the French." 
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That the French had suffered notoriously was well Down 
on the spot, but had been carefully hidden from the share- 
holders, with the resultant scandal and complete failure of 
the attempt. 
Anthony Froude wrote of Panama in 1885, "There is not 
perhaps now concentrated in any single spot so much 
swindling and villainy, so much foul disease, such a 
hideous dungheap of physical and moral abomination. The 
Isthmus is a damp, tropocal jungle, intensely hot, swarming 
with mosquitoes, snakes, alligators, scorpions, and centi- 
pedes; the home, even as Nature made it, of Yellow Fever, 
Typhus, and Dysentery." 
Ships had special instructions for approaching Panama. 
De Lesseps, the French Engineer -in- Chief, when first 
he began work in 1881, was told by the French resident, Le 
Blanc, who tried to dissuade him from his attempt, "If you 
try. to build this canal, there will not be trees enough on 
the Isthmus to make crosses for the graves of your labourers:" 
"ï'ahy, do you really wish to commit suicide?. To go 
there is to run to your death." "Death," he reported, 
"was constantly gathering its harvest about me ". "Funeral 
trains are as much an institution as passenger or freight 
trains." 
"Since the advent of De Lesseps' canal -men on the 
28th of February, 1881, thousands upon thousands have been 
buried there, (Monkey Hill Cemetery) ". "During two 
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seasons of epidemic it is said that the burials averaed 
from thirty to forty a day, and that for weeks together." 
"A not unusual sight during the French period was a ship 
riding at anchor in the harbour of Colon, with not a soul 
on board; every member of the crew had died of Yellow 
Fever." 
Gorgas calculated that the French had lost one -third 
of all their white employees, - a total, in eight years 
of 20,000 lives. "Had the sickness rate of the French 
prevailed when the ,(americans were at work, we should have 
had about 13,000 men in hospital constantly, and, had their 
death rate prevailed, we should have lost not far from 
3,500 men a year. we were 10 years in building the 
canal, this would have meant the sacrifice of 35,000 lives. 
The humane sentiments of the American people would not have 
tolerated such a slaughter." 
When Gorgas first went to Panama, there was no sign 
of Yellow Fever, for it must be remembered that this as 
an endemic focus, and after the French failure, there had 
been almost no fresh immiration to show it up. 
Because of this apparent absence of the disease, the 
Engineers and Contractors who followed, thought that Gorgas 
was a fanatic, and every obstruction was put in the way of 
his endeavours to protect the work. 
59. 
soon, sporadic cases began to be seen, but as yet no 
large outbreak. Then several members of an Italian Opera 
Troupe caught it and two died. This was the signal for a 
general epidemic all along the line. 
The scenes of panic were enacted, as they had been for 
hundreds of years. 'tTie canal force .. seemed to be 
possessed of one single view - to start for home." "';then 
several rmerican officials died at Ancon Hospital, the 
desire to get away became almost a frenzy." "There was 
only one reason why they did not get away en masse, and that Ì 
was the lack of shipping space to carry them." "At that 
moment the American adventure was tottering on precisely 
the same brink that had destroyed the French." 
"The real meaning of this epidemic was that the 
United States could not build the canal.1° 
Due to the crassstupidity of both Medical and lay 
authorities on the Canal and in Washington, Gorgas was 
relieved, and-was only reinstated by President Roosevelt, 
acting as a DICTATOR over the head of his kinister of War. 
That action of the President's saved the canal, for in 
1906, the last case was seen. 
At the last post mortem Gorgas said, "Take a good 
look at this man, for it is the last case you will ever see. 
There will never be any more deaths from this cause in 
Panama." 
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A four hundred years' scourge had been wiped out by a 
campaign of less than six months. It was the greatest 
triumph yet won by preventive medicine. 
On August 15th 1936, The Straits Times of Singapore 
published an article by the writer, in which I said, "Few 
u 
realize that the Panama Canal is not a monument to an 
Engineer, but to a sanitarian. General Gorgas was not 
primarily a scientist; he was aMaster Controller." 
"Little did Gorgas know that by the very ease with 
which he cleaned the Canal Zone, he was making the path of 
the Yellow Fever Sanitarian a thorny one. Given the same 
conditions of unlimited money, bayonets, and a fixed 
territory, one could clean the world of disease." 
"Those who have followed in Mexico, South L erica and_ 
Africa, know by the thinned ranks and the heartbreaks, the 
almost insurmountable difficulties which are encountered 
when an ignorant, and sometimes antagonistic populace 
have to be dealt with and begged to co- operate for the saving 
of their lives." 
After 1906, the encouragement given by these two 
demonstrations in Havana and Panama, caused a wave of 
enthusiasm among those nations where, for so many years, 
there had only been dumb acquiescence to both the endemic and 
epidemic status quo. 
In Rio de, Janeiro, where 28,078 persons had died in the 
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thirteen gears before 106, only forty -two died in that year, 
thirty -nine in 1907, four in 1908, and none in 1909. 
The cities of tropical South },merica, Central America 
and 1:exico were put under control to the extent of causing 
the disease to disappear for long periods, or rather, to 
go into hiding, for the reasons I have stated as regards 
imperfect control in terms of the difference between military 
and civilian authority. 
Up to this date small outbreaks have occurred all over 
the old area, but were promptly extinguished as soon as the 
officials were sufficiently aroused. In the United States, 
during the epidemic of 1858, althouh every known control 
method was employed, including rigid quarantine, there were 
13,817 cases and 3,984 deaths, in Tew Orleans. 
3ecause of official slackness and actual obstruction, 
nothwithstanding the work of their own sanitarians, this 
same city had another epidemic in 1905, with 3384 cases 
and 443 deaths. 
This was the last epidemic in the United States, but it 
must be emphasized that it only ended with the frost, 
demonstrating, once again the stupidity of authorities who at 
that time had complete knowledge of the means of control. 
In the West Indies, the military records show that 
Yelloic Fever had been continuously present in all the islands 
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up to 1846. 
After this period, a fundamental reform took place 
in the shape of a piped water supply. This type of supply 
cuts at the very root of Yellow Fever if the supply is con- 
stant, while it actually increases it, if intermittent. 
In the islands it was the former, and after 1850, 
Yellow Fever ceased being endemic and became an imported 
disease from the great endemic foci. 
The disease has not appeared since the Great `gar, 
and undoubtedly the cause was the restricted inter -island 
trade due to shortage of shipping during the liar. The 
history of the disease in ;lest .erica since the discovery 
of the means of control has been similar to the Americas. 
First enthusiasm, then a slacking off, but the conditions of 
endemicity in Vüest Africa are very much more complicated 
than in the Americas, of which I shall have more to say in 
the section on EpidemiologT. 
From St. Louis, or the northern Senegal coast to 
Fernando Po off the coast of the Cameroons, Yellow Fever 
has been demonstrated repeatedly up to the present. 
It must be remembered that we have decided that the 
disease originated on this coast or in the hinterland, and 
therefore has always been ENDEKIC, and that the negro has a 
racial immunity which has allowed the disease to remain 
unrecognized until shown up by the introduction of non- imnunes. 
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Little interest and attention has been given to the 
danger, as the country has never been permanently settled 
by Europeans, as in the Americas. To complete the 
Historical Survey and note the present. Geographical 
Distribution, I give the figures in the last "Public Health 
Reports, United States `Treasury Department, April 23rd. 
1937 ". 
"BRAZIL - Cases reported, 125.. Deaths, 67 (by the 
Viscerotome Method, post mortem). 
A few cases each from Columbia, South America, and 
Dahomey, French Equatorial . fri ca, Gold Coast, Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, sierra Leone, French Sudan; 
fourteen cases with seven deaths on board S.S. "Sea 
Rambler" out of Dakar bound for the River Tyne in 
England." 
The last landmark in the History has been the discovery 
of the Causative Agent. 
Yellow Fever has come out into the open where v,e have 
now a fair chance in the fi : :hting of it. It would be more 
correct to say that all the many organisms which have 
heretofore been blamed, are now exonerated, and the cause 
definitely proved to be an ultra- srxiscroscopic virus. It 
has been proved in 1900, that the virus would pass through 
a Chamberland F Filter, but in 1928 Stokes, Bauer and Hudson 
carried the experiment to finality and went on to develop 
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both a vaccine and serum. 
The details of these experiments and their consideration; 
in relation to control, awaits another section. 
It might be asked why so much space has been given to 
the historical section. 
As stated in the introduction, the reason for the 
Thesis is a desire to bring into prominence the very serious 
possibility of disaster in the East, especially in relation 
to British interests. 
From sTest Africa as the original endemic focus, we have 
seen what happened to the Americas when the vector and virus 
were introduced to a non - innnune people. There it took more 
than 150 years to become dangerous for the reasons 
described. 
It could be likened to a slow- burning damp wood fire. 
The East, with its enormous non-immune population, 
BUT WITH THE VECTOR ALREADY THERE, AND WITH TEE POSSIBILITY 
OF THERE BEING MORE TEO. ONE VECTOR, WOULD EXPLODE LICE A 
PETROL DUMP were the match of the Virus thrown into it, 
either in the form of an Aedes Aegypti during its infective 
stage, or a human in the infectious stage. 
The panic, mortality and economic disturbance of Yellow 
Fever caused in both Africa and the Americas has been 
described at length, and I am of the opinion, from my 
experience in Central and.South America fighting the disease, 
and from my observations and studiesin India, Malaya and 
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'other Eastern countries, that all these conditions would be 
increased a hundred fold, with a repercussion fatal to our 
Empire. 
End of Section on History and Geographical 
Distribution. 
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E P IDEL IOLOGY. 
Carter, (Earl;? History of Yellow Fever, 1931), began 
his first chapter with this statement: "Yellow Fever is 
contracted by man in nature from the bite of a mosquito, 
Aedes (Ste ,omyia) í;,e gypti (Linnaeus), itself infected by 
havixv; fed on a man sick of that disease, and, so far as 
known, is in nature only thus contracted." However, in 
1927, Stokes, Bauer and Hudson (1928 Am.Jour, Trop.Med.8:103)', 
working on the ':Jest Coast of Africa in the Yellow Fever 
Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation, began a new era 
in our knowledge of Yellow Fever, by showing that certain 
Indian Monkeys were easily susceptible to infection. Their ' 
work also finally exploded the roguchi fallacy as regards 
"Leptospira Icteroides" blind adherence to which had put 
the clock back for mahy years in terms of both laboratory 
and field work. The impetus thus given has resulted in an 
enormous increase of our knowledge from every aspect, some 
of it encouraging, but much of it adding to our already 
profound dread of its spread. 
In order not to confuse the issue this part of the 
section will confine itself to the epidemiology of the 
disease as it was known before these new discoveries, because) 
notwithstanding, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONTROL HAS NOT CHANGED. 
The enemy, and the forces required to combat him 
remain the same. The new era has unearthed entomological 
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auxiliaries to the old enemy, extension of his range, but 
by the same token, has greatly augmented our armarnentarium, 
especially the intelligence service. 
The newer knowledge will be discussed at the end of the 
section. 
The first requisite in the epidemiological cycle of 
yellow fever as a disease of humans, with the exception 
possibly of the newly discovered "Jungle" type of small 
importance, is a man containing the virus in his blood. The 
second requisite is the presence of Aedes Ae; pti Iioscuitoes 
living within the optimum range of temperature and humidity; 
optimum, both : "or itself and the contained virus. The 
third requisite is another man who is susceptible, an_' . the 
mosquito living long enough and having access to both. These 
factors may now be considered separately. 
THE TTIRUS TP? a E FIRST LAN. 
The virus of Yellow Fever, producing as it does, strong 
anti- bodies in the blood of its victim, and, should he 
survive, conferring a lasting immunity, can only continue 
to exist if the mosquito is present under the conditions 
stated, susceptible men are available while they are infective, 
and more mosquitoes present to convey it to more men. 
From this it follows that, if either of the latter 
factors are not present, susceptible humans or active 
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mosquitoes, the virus must die, and cannot be reintroduced 
even if both mosquito and susceptible humans are again 
present, without a fresh first requisite. 
Carter, (1901, Med.Record.59; 933 -937) introduced the 
term "Extrinsic incubation" and in ( Trans. "oc.trop med. and 
hyg, 10:119 -129, 1917) another paper some years later, 
described the "spontaneous disappearance of Yellow Fever from 
failure of the human host." 
These studies explained how Yellow Fever had so often 
died out in the '.ïest without any interference by man, and 
also postulated that in those specific places, there was no 
other animal than man which was infective to the virus. 
If the virus exists only in the human, it could continue; 
in the host for the period only of the incubation, plus the 
period of active disease, during which it could be transferred 
to a mosquito. 
In actual experience in the field, these periods 
combined; equal nine days. If, however, the mosquito only 
carries the virus, and the third requisite, the susceptible 
man, is lacking, the virus would live a long time. 
Many experiments have proved that the mosquito is 
infective during its entire life, and that although it is 
improbable that the insect, in nature, lives as long as in 
captivity, the longest time recorded must be taken as its 
longest infective period, i.e. five months. During this 
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period, were requisite number three present, the disease 
could be continued. 
In the field, epidemics which are being fought by the 
sole method of destroying the insect in its larval state, 
are usually terminated in about six weeks of intensive work. 
THE SECOYD REQUISITE, actively functioning Mosquitoes. 
Such a mosquito must be able to move, eat, rest, and 
propogate normally. 
Both sexes must have proper temperature and humidity, 
and the female, the proper place to deposit her eggs. 
The Pasteur Commission to Brazil in 1903 (Marchou, 
Salimbeni, and Simond,. Ann.de l'Inst.Pasteur, 17; 665 -731, 
1903) found that the lower limit for feeding was 18oC. and 
the upper, 39°C. The limits of breeding are slightly less, 
but it is the feeding limit that is of sanitary importance. 
As in all the Insecta, the higher the temperature and the 
less moisture, the more incompatibility with continued 
eiistence. This may explain the absence of Yellow Fever 
from the East in terms of the transport of infected mos- 
quitoes, as the upper limit of temperature is far exceeded 
in the areas through which their conveyance could be 
affected, and also the lower limits of humidity. 
The modern air transportation will render this 
temperature -humidity barrier ineffective. Hibernation 
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occurs in the egg stage. The eggs are laid above the 
water line and remain there dry after the water has receded 
from any cause, such as evaporation. Viability is retained; 
for as long as six months in my own experience, (Jameson -Carr; 
Experiment No.13, Unpb.report,Rock,Found, 1924) and that the 
necessary male- female emergence time is retained (Jameson - 
Carr, Exp.No.7.Unpub.report,Rock.Found.1924). Males emerge 
first and are therefore ready for the sluggish, still damp 
female, who is caught on the wing before she can escape, 
when copulation takes place; the male being smaller and 
weaker might not get another chance. 
Although the imago dies quickly below - 0.C. the 
larvae and eggs will stand freezing for a short time with, 
however, much lowering of viability. (Larchoux, Salirnbeni, 
and Simond. ínnn.de l'Inst.Pasteur, 1903.) In practice, it 
must be remembered that viability may remain unimpaired in 
the temperature of the house, although the outside temperature 
is inimitable, the Aedes Aegrpti being in its normal habitat 
within the house, hence the old name Stegomyia, from the 
Greek, Stegos, a house, Muia, a fly. 
BlREEDING PLACES. 
This subject was thoroughly investigated by the Author 
during 1924 in Parahyba do Norte, Brazil (Jameson -Carr,Exps. 
Nos.l 22.Unpub.Reports,Rockefeller Foundation,1924). 
These experiments were divided into three parts. 
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, First Tart. - Laboratory experiment with common containers, 
as to preference. 
Fourteen containers were tested, being one of each type 
found to contain larvae in the city. New plain wooden 
barrel, wooden barrel lined with cement, new earthenware jar, 
empty dry ^oconut shell, tin can, iron can, copper can, 
porcelain toilet jug, flower pot of earthenware, flower 
vase containing Bowers (glass), agate spitoon, zinc can, 
aluminium can, thin necked earthenware water bottle. 
A large room was completely sealed and made as much 
like the ordinary room of the city house as possible. 
Seventy -five females and twenty -five males, bred out in 
the laboratory, were placed inside, together with fruit, both 
died and fresh, and at intervals of four hours, I entered 
to give a blood feed. Special precautions were taken to 
thoroughly clean the containers with boiling water and 
scrubbing. 
Two days after this, eggs were seen to have been laid 
inside the plain wooden barrel, above the actual water line, 
but within the line of damp wood which extended by capilarity 
12 inches above the water. 
In two more days, the first larva was seen. All the 
other containers were negative. The barrel was now removed 
and again thoroughly scalded and scrubbed and filled with 
water to be sure no eggs remained. 
72. 
This was replaced and exactly the same phenomenon 
occurred. 
The insects immediately laid on the sides while the 
other containers remained negative. 
This barrel was now removed entirely, the plan being; to 
remove each container as it was chosen by the mosquito. 
The order of laying thereafter was as follows: - 
Coconut, Flower jar (with flowers), Red earthenware 
water jar, tin can, cement -lined barrel, zinc can, iron can, 
spitoon, porcelain water jug, copper can, flower pot (glazed), 
aluminium can, thin- necked water bottle. 
All these took from ten days in the Red earthenware jar, 
to twenty -one days in the Spitoon, to complete the cycle, with 
the exception of the zinc, iron, copper and aluminium, in 
which the larvae only reached the second moult in the first 
three, when they died; and in the copper where they did not 
hatch at all. The order of laying was as above, but not the 
order of hatching, for the reasons for which the original 
report may be consulted. 
This experiment appeared to show that if forced, the 
Aedes Ae.ypti female will breed by depositing her eggs on the 
edge.of water in at least any of the containers found 
commonly in the habitations of Parahyba, but has distinct 
preferences. 
The preference for the wooden barrel can be explained, 
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not in terms of the water in the container, but in terms 
of the surface above the water. 
The mosquito's instinct places her eus where they 
have the best chance to stick, in this case on the rough 
wood and within the capilary line where they have the 
opportunity to wriggle down to the main body of water, which,!, 
in wooden containers, was found to evaporate much more 
slowly than in those of other types. (Jameson -Carr, Exp. 
No.10. Unpub.Report, Rock.Found. 1924). 
Second fart. 
Observations as to the type of containers found to 
contain eggs or larvae in the field, in a town under control,i 
the index in the city being 2%. 
Third Part. 
Observations with these containers found to be, in 
the previous experiments, common foci, but with special 
containers supplied by the Department, and in a district 
which had never been worked, and in which the mosquitoes 
and the inhabitants were without interference. 
These observations and experiments covered one year's 
work, and the conclusions were as follows: - 
CONCLUSIONS. 
(1) Aedes Aegypti, in both controlled and uncontrolled areas; 
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show the same predilection as regards oviposition. 
(2) The relation of the number of containers, in terms of 
the nercentage of foci, does not alter in controlled and un- 
controlled areas. 
(3) Field work does, and should. confirm Laboratory ;Fork, i__ 
the latter is done in strict conformity with the former. 
(4) The mosquito has herself shown the type of breeding 
place which she considers IDEAL. 
(5) Her ideal is a container which :,fives her a surface upon 
which to deposit her eggs, and where they will stick, with 
no conslieration of the water content. 
Other observations and conclusions in this experiment 
will be referred to in the section discussing control. In 
Experiments TTos. 6 and 18 (Jameson -Carr, Ljnpub.Report, Rock. 
Found.l924) I was able to show that Aedes ti.ejruti would 
breed in a mud puddle only under extreme artificial con- 
ditions of forcing, but that under natural conditions they 
would not, also that after three years of searching, I was 
unable to find a single instance of that insect breeding 
in the axils of plants, although it had been often reported. 
I am of the opinion that the reason why ,odes Aegypti prefer 
man -made containers and has, as its natural habitat, the 
interior of man's dwellings, is, that she prefers human 
blood, as whenever I entered their cage they immediately 
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left any other animal on which they were feeding - cat, doe, 
hare - and bit me. Of these three, the hare was her choice 
and was used in most experiments, (Jameson -Carr, Unpub. 
Report, Rock.Found.1925). It is well known that animal 
sereens are used in malaria prevention where it has been 
shown that certain animals are preferred, by certain 
Anophelines, to humans. 
The Third Requisite, the susceptible other man. 
The susceptible man, accessible to an infected 
mosquito, is the final factor in the continuance of the 
disease. 
It follows that, as inimunit?r is the consequence of 
survival, a degree is reached where no man susceptible is 
available to an infected mosquito, and the disease will die 
out, this process being imown as "failure of the human host" 
(vide ante). Since both the man and the mosquito are 
necessary, it is not essential that all susceptible men 
have been eliminated by infection, as infected insects may 
be feu in their vicinity either because there are few men 
left to convey infection, or a temporary or permanent 
reduction in the actual numbers of mosquitoes. 
Under the law of chance, it is therefore not 
necessary to exterminate aegypti to eliminate Yellow Fever 
from an infected area. 
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It will die out from failure of a sufficient number of 
vectors. 
This reduction to a failure -point in numbers of 
mosouitoes is called the "critical index" and must vary in 
relation to the susceptible men ,_resent; being less as the 
susceptibles increase. 
In like manner the number of susceptibles in an area 
compatible with "el=imination by failure of human hosts" must 
vary inversely, more or less, with the number of active 
aegypti. 
In planning a campaign against Yellow Fever, it is 
important to realize that the '`Critical index" is not the 
same even in different areas in the same town or community, 
(Jameson -Carr, Un.pub.heport, Rock.Found.cap.lO.1924). The 
native sections of a town are apt to retain an immunity 
regardless of the continuance of an index above critical, 
while the sections where non- inmtune strangers congregate 
are a very different problem, and much more dangerous. 
size of a town or community is of less importance than the 
number of susceptible imigrants - which includes new-born 
babies. 
Both these factors usually increase together, and this 
has been amply demonstrated in the history of Yellow Fever 
in Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Panama, where the disease did 
not die out spontaneously, they all having, over many years, 
77. 
a continuous immigration of non- iniraunes. 
The fact, that in many areas the disease has 
spontaneously died out, is a strong piece of evidence that 
immunity is permanent. In 1917, (Carter, Trans.Soc.Trop. 
med. c hyg.1917), introduced the term "regional focus" to 
describe an area of small communities too small in themselves 
to remain permanently infected, but in sanitary communication 
by means of travel. In such a group of areas, the 
mechanism of spread would be slower than in more congested 
communities such as towns. By the same token, elimination 
would be slovrer. 
One such type of area was the interior region of Bahia 
(Jameson- Carr,Unpub.Report. Rock.liound. Pay 22nó,1926). It 
had been hoped, and expected, that by merely eliminating the 
disease from the main endemic focus in the capital of that 
state, that the interior mould "burn. itself out ", but that 
did not occur, and after three ;;rears' work, cases continued 
to be found progressing from small village to small village. 
In fact, this region was a permanent endemic regional 
focus. 
In the interior of Viest ..frica we have a like condition 
at the present time, and up until 1917, the south shore of 
the Caribbean and the Lesser Antilles could be so defined. 
The disease died out in the latter wring to the great 
diminution of inter- coastal and inter -island communication 
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during the late Great War, this, through failure of the 
human host, not absence of the mosquito vector nor control. 
Yellow Fever is present always at some place in these 
regions and before one place can free itself by "failure 
of the human host" another with sufficient susceptibles 
becomes infected, and again the first place becomes 
reinfected when enough immigrants have arrived in the shape 
of non-immune strangers or babies. 
".ravel is the necessary factor in keeping the disease 
alive. 
The contrast between a permanent regional focus and a 
town is, that in the former the spread is by means of 
infected men, while in the latter, it is by infected 
mosquitoes. 
Distribution and means of dispersion of pedes aegypti. 
In the section on History, the conclusion was reached 
that all evidence pointed to test Afriaa as being the area 
of origin of 1iedes aegypti. 
In the first part of this section the conditions 
favourable to the life of aegypti were given. From 
whatever point of origin, the insect has travelled far, and 
the means have been human. 
Preferring, as has been shown, both domestic association 
ti^rith, and blood of,hunans, it can easily be seen that by 
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human agency its dispersion has been effected. 
From a study of the preferential breeding places, it 
is obvious that the conditions aboard a sailing ship were 
ideal, especially in hot climates. 
Drinking water carried in artificial wooden containers, 
or bilge water in ships plying on rivers, accessible to the 
insect, were exactly what she needed. 
Only recently has this means of water carriage been 
supplanted by iron closed containers in the modern ships, 
but in the East, in the coastal trade, the old method still 
obtains, and there I have found them in abundance, as lately 
as September 1936, (Jameson-Carr, Unpub.Report. to Med.Off. 
of Health, Penang S.S.). 
Not only could the mosquito gain access to the water 
container of the ship lying alongside, but a usual method 
of watering ships was, and is, to carry on board a container 
(Barraca) already seeded either with the larvae or eggs of 
the insect. 
The ship would thus be a floating host from which the 
mosquito, in any of its three stages, could fly or be 
carried ashore at another port. 
If the necessary conditions for propagation were found 
at another port, a new colony would be founded from which 
new dispersals could take place. 
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.ere conditions unfavourable, e.g. low temperature 
or excessive dryness, there would be no propagation. 
At the present time Aedes. aegypti are found in every 
port, both sea and river, where conditions are suitable. 
Although the above is undoubtedly the usual means of 
dispersion, 1 have often found in 'razil the drinking water 
tanks on railway coaches containing larvae of aegypti, and 
as the poorer people carry their own water in the ordinary 
red earthenware bottles from their houses when they travel, 
there 1 have found both larvae and eggs. 
Household furniture, baskets of vegetables and even 
personal clothing, have been shown conveying the adults from 
place to place. 
.;hen the insect - whatever stage - is planted in a new 
spot, the natural dispersion is slow because of the short 
flight of the female who only moves if immediate blood (human 
is not at hand. 
Conditions required for the permanent existence of Aedes 
ageypti. 
These are tyro: -- 
(1) Suitable breeding places. 
(2) Suitable temperature and humidity. 
The first depends on the domestic water supply and its 
means of storage. 
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There are three general types of community in terms of 
domestic water supply: - 
(a) Where all the domestic supply is derived from a reservoir 
and conveyed to the outlet in pipes, the supply being 
constant. 
(b) The supply is from a reservoir and piped, but 
irtermittant. 
(c) A natural and primative supply from rainwater, wells etc. 
The first precludes the necessity for storage, and being 
always covered, prevents the female from having access to it. II 
The second, being intermittant, compels the inhabitants 
to store their water in various containers, usually uncovered, 
therefore allowing access to the mosquito. 
The third is similar to the second, but with this great 
difference; those with an intermittant supply fill up their 
containers while they can, and they are usually numerous, 
while those who have to draw from wells or rivers only procure 
enough for their daily needs. 
I have seen a battery of 200 large jars in a cellar in 
Parahyba do Forte, Brazil, each one containing a focus of 
'edes aegypti, larvae and eggs. 
From this, it can be seen that each locality is a law 
nto itself. 
A piped, constant water supply is concomitant with 
advancing civilization and has been used to combat Yellow Fever 
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without other means being employed, e.g. in Santos, Brazil, 
which was of old a veritable hot -bed of the disease. 
Shortly after a modern water supply was installed, the 
disease automatically disappeared, there being no further 
need of using artificial containers giving access to 
mosquitoes. In terms of control, the second type of 
community is the more difficult, (Jameson -Carr, Unpub.Report, 
Rock.Pound.l925). 
I 
Temperature and Humidity. 
The limits of these two factors in permanence of the 
species is determined by the position of the region in 
terms of latitude, between 38 degrees North and 35 degrees 
South. 
Altitude affects temperature, especially at night, no 
less than latitude, and must be taken as one amongst a 
variety of variants, e.g. wind, ocean currents, and the 
difference between house temperature and that outside. 
Carter, (The Early History of Yellow Fever, 1931) states 
the position as follows: - 
''From what has been said of the biology of this insect, 
there are evidently two conditions of temperature, both of 
which must obtain in any region for the continued existance 
of aegypti in it: 
(1) The low temperature of winter must not be so low or so 
prolonged as to destroy the species - the hibernating 
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eggs. 
(2) The high temperature of summer must be sufficient for 
the development and reproduction of the insect. 
The natural life -zone of the species, the region in 
which it is permanent, so far as temperature is 
concerned, includes all regions in which both of 
these conditions are fulfilled, and none other." 
Geographical distribution and dispersion of the disease. 
The dispersion and distribution of Yellow Fever depends 
on the dispersion and distribution of the virus and active 
aegypti at the same time in the same place. 
The means of dispersion of the virus, in infected amen 
and mosquitoes - and it has no other existante of importance 
is the same as that of the insect as discussed above, i.e. 
human transport. 
There are differences in detail depending on whether 
the virus is in infected mosquitoes, infected men, or 
combined. 
Infected Mosquitoes. 
The description of the dispersion of the uninfected 
insect covers also the dispersion of the infected one, 
with, fortunately, this difference. 
The mosquito does not pass on her infection to either 
her eggs or larvae. 
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The infected insect may infect men in transport, or 
may not, depending on whether it has access to them, has 
passed the stage of "extrinsic incubation or encouters 
only men already immune. 
It may arrive at the destination without having 
conveyed the disease. Having arrived, its further destiny 
depends on the conditions present, breeding places, 
temperature and humidity, and the presence or not of 
susceptible men. 
Whether it remains there permanently, or only 
temporarily, depends on the temperature primarily, but 
with the other variants having their influence, as already 
discussed. 
In the case of ships, the original infected insect 
may die, or be blown outboard, after infecting men, who 
can then infect insects breeding on board, the infected 
insect having deposited eggs in unprotected containers. 
The limit to this cycle is only obtained when all the 
men are either immunized or dead. 
Infected Dien. 
If there are infected men on a carrier (after the 
first three days of the disease) secondary cases will occur 
only if there are present uninfected mosquitoes who live 
beyond the period of "extrinsic incubation" and then bi,ten 
other non - immune men. 
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This may take place either on the same carrier, if the 
voyage be long enough, or ashore after arrival. 
If there are no active vectors on board, or the 
infective men are only in the stage of incubation, the 
disease will not spread. 
The final result will depent on whether the sick man 
is over the stage infective to mosquitoes when he goes 
ashore and the state of activity of the mosquito there, 
if he is not, whether the conditions will allow of the 
planting of an endemic, or only an epidemic focus. 
Dispersion by Man and Josquito combined. 
In the days of sail this was the usual means. 
If the vessel bred mosquitoes, and the climate was 
suitable, she carried infection to her destination, either 
in man or mosquito. 
If she did not breed mosquitoes, the fever died out 
when the infected insects were blown outboard or 
climatically killed. On reaching port, she was free from 
the virus. 
If a carrier did not convey mosquitoes, a twelve day 
voyage would preclude the introduction of the disease on 
arrival. This length of time includes the maximum 
incubation period plus the period in which the man is 
infective to mosquitoes. If however, the carrier did convey 
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mosquitoes, the danger would last as long as the life of 
the insect. 
It was this last fact which caused the perturbation 
amongst sanitarians on the opening of the Panama Canal, and 
would do so again were that filter of shipping disturbed 
by a war. 
The insect could be carried in a closed hold, giving 
no warning of its presence by causing an outbreak on the 
voyage, and be distributed into the highly susceptible 
regions of the East. 
Infected men alone, before they reached infectible 
mosquitoes would have died, or become non- infective. 
Rate of dissemination of the virus. 
When first introduced into an infectible community 
the virus spreads slowly, because of the "extrinsic 
incubation" period in the mosquito. 
Thereafter cases contracted in the first focus will 
develop further afield and infect other aegypti, and in a 
few weeks, cause a rapid spread. 
If the virus is introduced by the mosquito to a place 
not hitherto breeding them, the spread rate will depend on 
the spread rate of the insect as determined by the factors 
already discussed. 
This is well illustrated in the epidemic of 1793 in 
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and described in the section on 
"History" Pages 
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Regions in which Yellow Fever becomes established can 
re- infect those regions from which they originally received 
their infection, but which had freed themselves from the 
disease, either by "failure of the human host" or winter 
temperature. 
Thus Yellow Fever passed between the rest Coast of 
Africa and the East Coast of South America and from island 
to island in the Lesser Antilles, causing many recriminations', 
between the local authorities and giving subject for a 
humerous account by Moreau de Jonnés (Iionograohie historique 
et médicale de la fiêvre jaune des Antilles, 1820). 
Carter, (Early History of Yellow Fever, 1931) has put 
under the following headings the conditions favouring the 
occurrence and persistence of the disease. 
These are both meteorological and sociological. 
"Very obviously, in regions in which the temperature at 
all seasons is within the limits given for functional 
activity, given suitable breeding places - and in practice 
only the lower limit need be considered - the aegypti imago 
will be active (reproducing and feeding) the whole year round 
"In such regions the second requirement for the 
continuous existence of Yellow Fever - the Presence of 
functionally active aegypti imagoes - will exist at all 
seasons of the year: and if the other two factors are 
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also present, Yellow Fever may continue during the entire 
year. Such a fever is said to be "=A :IC, and such a 
region is said to be in the endemic zone." 
"This second factor (active aegypti) will also be 
present at any season (the breeding places being unchanged) 
in proportion as temperature at that season approaches the 
optimum of aegypti development: and consequently - the 
other two factors remaining constant - Yellow Fever will 
increase and decrease as the temperature approaches and 
departs from this optimum. This was seen in Havana, Rio, 
Vera Cruz, and óther places in which the fall of temperature 
was not sufficient entirely to prevent ae Trpti activity at 
any time, but did limit it during the colder season. he 
conditions of temperature affect the factor of aegypti 
activity in other ways, in none of which it is compatible with 
the ErDEL ICI`s L of Yellow r ever, that is, continuance of the 
infection from year to year without re- introduction, and 
yet with any of which Yellow Fever may and does occur." 
(1) "The seasonal fall of temperature may be sufficient to 
suspend the activity of the imagoes for some consider- 
able time - generally by destroying them - but is not 
sufficient to destroy the eggs. 
(2) The temperature during the cold season may fall so low 
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and remain law so long as to destroy the viability of 
the eggs of the ae- pti." 
(3) "The conditions of temperature may be such that when 
aegypti are introduced they cannot propagate." 
(4) tAegypti may be active aboard ship in the harbours of 
ports, the temperature of which ashore are well 
outside of the feeding limits of that insect." 
"Naturally, places under the temperature conditions of 
(3) or (4) are always "non- infectible territory. Those 
under (2) are uninfectible also, until aegypti are 
introduced and have become sufficiently abundant to 
propagate Yellow Fever, as are those under (1) during the 
winter." 
From the foregoing discussion we can now define the 
terms Endemic and Epidemic, with reference to areas in which 
Yellow Fever can occur, and the sociological factors 
involved. 
Endemic. 
In endemic areas, Yellow Fever is not controlled by 
seasonal differences of climate, the aegypti being present 
sufficiently numerous and functionally active during the 
entire year. 
Once established, and without any control, it will 
remain, depending entirely on the presence of susceptible 
men. 
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If the supply of susceptible men gives out, the area 
becomes free of the disease, being known as a temporary 
endemic area, from failure of the human host. This 
phenomenon frequently occurred in the .LAntilles, and some 
South and Central American areas and cities, although there 
are abundant aesypti at all seasons. 
If, on the other hand, the supply of susceptibles is 
constant, so also will be the disease, which will be present, 
with varying incidence, all the year. This is called a 
permanent endemic area. 
Such areas we find were Havana, Rio, and regionally 
endemic areas as the interior towns and villages of the States 
of Bahia, Pernambuco, Parahyba and Ceara, in Brazil, 
( Jameson- Carr,Unpub.Report,Rock,Found. Larch 23rd,1925). 
Epidemic. 
Epidemic areas are of two types (1) where the mosquito 
lives through the winter in the egg stage, and (2) where it 
is killed. 
In the first type, the area is always possibly infectible 
during the sunnier; in the second, only when mosquitoes are 
introduced. 
As examples of the first, we have the Gulf States of 
North America, and of the second, the Northern States of the 
same country, and the Northern Coast of the Mediterranian. 
There are some border -line areas depending on the 
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degree of coldness in different years. 
According to this definition, the difference between 
epidemic and endemic areas is due to the biology of the 
mosquito, and that between permanent endemic areas and 
temporary endemic areas is due to a sociological factor, i.e. 
the supply of susceptible humans. 
This difference in definition of endemicity from the 
usual one used in the epidemiology of other diseases, to wit, 
permanent and temporary, is of great importance in planning 
a campaign of control. 
Permanent and temporary endemicity are influenced greatly 
by local and national customs of those areas. 
In my reports on the flog of the disease in Brazil 
(Jameson -Carr, Unpub.Reports, March 1925, August 1926, Rock. 
Found.) I showed the religious (carnival), military 
(revolution) and labour (coffee pickers) movements to be of 
paramount importance in the epidemiology of the disease. 
Studying the mortality returns in Parahyba do Norte, 
Brazil, I could get no information of any value owing to 
their perfunctory character, therefore I made a search into 
the records of deaths amongst British subjects in that town 
as far back as they had been kept, and found that the majority 
had died during the first three months in any year, and of 
those months, most in March. As diagnosis was not given, 
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the crude death rate was all that indicated that there had 
been a distinct rise every year. 
A further search was made in the same records of 
seven other towns on the coast., from Santos in the south to 
Ceara in the north, and all gave the same indication. 
All these towns were in the endemic zone and had a 
high index of aegypti breeding when uncontrolled. They 
differed in rainfall and extremes of temperature, but all 
showed the rise during the first three months with the apex 
in March. 
iL record of diagnosed Yellow Fever admitted to the 
Strangers Hospital in Rio de Janeiro since its opening had 
the same curve (foreigners only) as the crude death rate 
in the city. The entomological factor was common to the 
zone, thermal and fluvial variants were similar, what then 
was the other factor? I quote from the March 1925 Report: - 
"During the first three months of the year, in all 
these catholic states, there is a general movement of 
the people of the Interior, due to religious festivals, 
but by far the greatest movement is in the latter part 
of February and the first week of March because of 
Carnival. At this time, it is the custom of all who 
can afford it, to make for the large cities, where it 
is well known every hotel and pensao is booked long 
ahead. Again it must be remembered that travel in 
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this country is determined by the rains, and the year- 
end is the period of best roads, while September is the 
worst. Thereafter there is a general exodus back to 
the country." 
"Also, business travellers at this time take advantage 
of the people being more ready to spend and being-, in 
greater numbers in one place, and these travellers are 
usually non - immune foreigners." 
At the time of writing the above the large towns were 
under control but not the smaller towns and villages in the 
hinterland, and it was in those areas of regional endemicity 
that the disease was being revealed. 
Again I quote from my Report of July 1926. 
"Owing to the recurrence of the revolution in the 
Interior, troop movements Have extended to include the 
entire region controlled by the Sao Francisco River, 
from the sea to the town of Pira-Pora, which is the 
terminus of river transportation in the State of vinas 
Geraes, and only good fortune can prevent the disease 
being carried into regions where no previous history 
has been elicited. Darin: June, the department of 
Public :Health in Rio reported cases in Pira-Pora, whether 
amongst troops or civilians was not stated, and this is 
important, because of the meteorology of the moment and 
the altitude, which has a marked effect on the propa- 
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gation of Yellow Fever, Fira -Pora standing 480 metres 
above sea level. The population flow on this river is 
a factor of epidemiological importance, as it is 
seasonal, and consists of coffee -pickers from the towns 
along the Sao Francisco in Bahia and Minas, proceeding 
to the State of Sao Paulo for work. This exodus begins 
in March which is the month of highest Yellow Fever 
incidence in Brazil." 
This observation, made in 1926 Was justified by the 
outbreak of 1928 -29 in Rio, which city had not been known 
to have had a single case since 1908. No effort was made to 
prevent a spread from Pira -Pora in Minas Geraes towards the 
Federal District and Capital, and Soper (Distribution of 
Immunity to Yellow Fever, 1937) states: - 
"Cases were dia,r_osed ho Dever, almost la mediately 
following the discoverer of the disease in the neighbouring 
Federal District, City of Rio de Janeiro, in May 1928, and 
during the succeeding three years Yellow Fever was found at 
more than two score points in this small state." 
These sociological factors have been dealt with in 
detail because in the East generally, there is a parallel 
movement, religious, military and labour. 
At the beginning of this section there was mentioned tha 
a new era had begun in our ldlowledge of Yellow Fever, after 
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Stokes, Bauer and Hudson in 1927 proved that certain monkeys 
were susceptible to the disease, and that it was caused by a 
filterable and ultra -microscopic virus. 
That this proof should have been so long delayed is the 
more remarkable seeing that Balfour (The Wild Monkey as a 
reservoir for the virus of Yellow Fever, Lancet, 1914) had 
stated that in his investigations in the Island of Trinidad, 
L 
B.W.I., the older negroes had told him that it was a 
tradition among them that an epidemic of the disease amongst 
humans was always preceded by an epizootic amongst the Red 
Howler donkeys in the forests. 
Between 1923 and 1926 the writer repeatedly suggested 
to the heads of the Yellow Fever Conrnìission, both in Brazil 
and ITew York, of the International Health Board of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, that this tradition should be 
followed up scientifically by their laboratory staff to the 
end of, perhaps explaining, sporadic outbreaks in the 
Interior of Brazil which were puzzling the Commission. 
The neglect to do this was because the campaign at that 
time was being conducted on the assumption of the correctness 
of the ieoguchi Theory of "Leptospira Icteroides" as the 
cause of the disease. I summed up this attitude in a 
letter to the "Straits Times" of Singapore, August 15th, 1936, 
as follows: - 
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"I would here suggest a warning. There is distinct 
danger in terms of disease control of a scientific 
national monopoly." 
"The American Army Medical Service, and later, the 
International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation 
have had such a monopoly of the Yellow Fever situation 
in investigation and control, that for years, any 
statement by one of their Staff was taken as beyond 
question. It took failure in Brazil and Africa in the 
attempt to control, and death in its investigation, to 
show this inherent danger." 
I have mentioned before that the impetus given by the 
findings in 1927 has caused an immense amount of research, 
so much so that in the "Epidemiological Report" IIo.R.E.179, 
of the "Health Section of the League of Nations" on Yellow 
Fever, 598 scientific papers are listed in quotation, as 
between 1929 and 1935. However, on this very point, the 
writer has made the following observation: - 
"In examining the recent literature concerning Yellow 
Fever, full as it is of the great advances which have 
been made in the purely scientific aspects of the 
disease, one feels that its control has lost emphasis in 
the enthusiasm for the new discoveries." 
"Havana and the Canal Zone were rendered safe, AND HAVE 
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CONTINUED SO, after the few initial weeks work done 
according to the findings of the "Reed Commission" 
thirty -five years ago, and the discovery at the same 
time by Carter, of the "intrinsic innubation period" 
in the mosquito, but that work has never been allowed 
to slacken." 
"Nothing more is therefore necessary to eliminate the 
scourge than has already been demonstrated, especially 
that now, by the discovery of the real nature of the 
disease, actual protection can be given to those who 
may have to man the defences, and where the perplexing 
sporadic case can be definitely diagnosed ". (Jameson - 
Carr, Straits Times, Aug.l5th, 1936). 
The New Discoveries may now be discussed. 
Epidemiology before the new era of knowledge depended on 
observation of the occurrence of the disease in a human 
population highly susceptible, consisting of new- comers from 
non -endemic areas, and in communities where the virus had 
been imported from outside its usual range. 
Because of the recent employment of two new methods of 
investigation, to wit, the mouse -protection test and 
viscerotomy we are enabled to extend surveys into what has 
been termed, "silent areas ", where no clinical evidence is 
available, nor hitory of the presence of the disease on 
record. 
These new methods of survey have also unearthed another 
form of the disease itself, called "jungle yellow fever" 
which is found in areas where no aegvpti could be discovered. 
Apart from being a real menace to rural jungle 
populations, this form constitutes a permanent reservoir of 
the disease from which urban districts may be infected or 
re- infected. 
The affect of this has been well put by Soper, the 
discoverer, as follows: - 
"Thus the dream of an American Continent free of Yellow 
Fever vanishes, and what was scheduled to become the 
first "dodo" of infectious diseases, though deliberate 
human efforts at control, returns to its proper place 
in the public health conscience as one of the important 
permanent threats to the sanitary peace of the continent." 
(Soper. Present day methods for the study and control 
of Yellow Fever, Am.Jour. Trop.F.ed., Vol.17., Fo.5. 
Sept.1937). 
The mouse protection test, by which vie can make 
immunity distribution surveys, followed the discovery, of the 
possibility of establishing the virus in susceptible monkeys 
and later, in nice. 
Viscerotomy is a vast extension of the already kno m 
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pathological facts in relation to the disease as it is seen 
in the liver in fatal cases. 
The first shows the amount of exposure to previous 
infection in the living, while the second determines the date 
of the disease at any particular place. A description of 
these procedures in detail will be given in another section. 
Although the results of the protection test are 
trustworthy, in practice, they must be interpreted in terms 
of the local conditions, which vary. 
Tested by age groups, the urban type shows when the 
disease was present, the sexes being equal, but in the jungle 
type this is so only when the whole community lives in close 
proximity to the unknown vector. 
It is in the males that we find immunity in the jungle 
type as they are the sex who invite infection through having 
to proceed towards it in their work away from living quarters, 
and unless aegypti are present in the houses to become 
infected in their turn, the disease will not spread to those 
who remain at home. Viscerotomy necessarily presents 
difficulties as it depends on the personal skill of the 
examining pathologist. Only those who have had an extensive 
experience with negative, positive and doubtful livers should 
be given credence. 
The method is simple, being merely a non -mutilating 
puncture of the liver in all those who die after ten days or 
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less of any illness. 
Medical men are not needed in applying the procedure and 
the portion of the liver extracted can be sent in suitable 
fluid to a central examining post. 
Because the lesions in the liver are so characteristic, 
even though the symptoms have not been so, unsuspected cases 
of the disease can thereby be demonstrated, and measures 
taken to combat it. 
Soper states: - 
"Jiscerotomy is a valuable sentinel service pointing to 
spots of active infection where fatal cases are 
occurring. The consistently negative results in the 
cities and towns where anti- aegypti measures are in 
force have been important in showing that urban 
endemicity is not continuing in the face of control 
measures." (Soper, Study and Control of Yellow Fever, 
1937.) 
In 1907, Franco ( Franco, Toro-Villa, Fiebre Amarilla y 
Fiebre Espiroquetal., Acad.Nac.Med. Bogata, 1911) 
observed that Yellow Fever was possibly caused by mosquitoes 
other than ae,;vpti, and in Socorro, Colombia, an unexpected 
epidemic occurred which did not appear to be caused by an 
importation of the virus. 
Protection tests proved that there was a large endemic 
area, but the essential point was that this was so in spite 
of the fact that there were NO AEDES aegypti to be found. 
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This had been shown previously by Gorgas in 1916. In 
Tiarch 1932 an epidemic occurred at Sao Joa de Petropolis 
near Victoria, Brazil, confirmed by necropsy and inoculation 
of susceptible monkeys. 
Protection tests were made of 648 individuals with 12% 
positive results. In hamlets and areas without recognised 
cases only 5% were positive, but where cases had been 
diagnosed up to 19% were positive. 
2121y _316 of children under ten proved immune, showing 
that the disease was a field, rather than a house infection. 
No Aedes aegypti could be found. 
In the Colombian epidemic, the mosquito, Haemagogus 
equinus was thought to be the vector because of its biting 
habits, and the reservoir, the jungle monkeys; in Brazil 
two other Aedes, Scapularis and Fluviatilis were suspected 
because they had been proved experimentally') capable of 
transmitting Yellow Fever in the Laboratory, and were more 
numerous than other mosquitoes near the houses. 
The epidemic disappeared spontaneously before "failure 
of the human host" as shown by the protection test, and this 
is accounted for by the mediocfity of the insects as vectors. 
(Davis & Shannon, Studies on South American Yellow Fever, 
J1. Exper.Itied. 50.81 -85., 1929) . 
No animal reservoir was suggested but the area has many 
marmosets, an animal which has been suspected. In 1934 
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another epidemic of Jungle Yellow Fever was studied in 
Matto Grosso, a state in the interior of Brazil, far from 
the old endemic centers on the coast. 
The results were as follows; - 
(1) The epidemic took place without the presence of 
ìedes aegypti. 
(2) The identity of the disease as Yellow Fever was 
established by clinical observation, by autopsy, by 
the protection test, and by the transfer of infection 
from early human cases directly to white mice. The 
definite date of acquisition of immunity was determined 
i7i fifteen cases by the observation of negative 
protection test results on sera obtained before the 
onset of illness or early in the course of the disease 
followed by positive protection test results on 
convalescent sera. 
(3) Protection test survey results suggest that the out- 
break studied did not originate from immediately 
preceding urban outbreaks of A.edes aegypti- transmitted 
Yellow Fever; towns with aegypti showed negative or 
very low immunity rates for children. High immunity 
rates among Indians suggest this outbreak was probably 
part of Amazonian Jungle endemicity. 
(4) The paucity of human population in the infected district 
and the scatter of cases in both time and space, 
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together with the isolated circumstances attending 
many cases, argue against men being the only 
vertebrate host involved. 
(5) The sera from five Cebus monkeys captured for this 
study in known infected districts, all gave positive 
protection test results, indicating immunity naturally 
acquired in the jungle. 
(6) The immunity survey of the infected area revealed 
more than half the cases discovered. Rural immunity 
rates were higher than village 'rates, and rural rates 
rose as the proximity of house to fields and jungle 
increased. 
(7) "All available evidence points to infection occurring 
either in clearings next to uncleared jungle or in 
the jungle itself, especially during the working 
hours." (Burke. An epidemic of jungle yellow fever 
on the planalto of Matto Grosso, Brazil. Am.Jl.`irop. 
Ned., Vol.17., No.3. May 1937.) 
In his matterly Report on the Epidemiology of Yellow 
Fever, (Biraud. Present day problems of Yellow Fever 
Epidemiology. R.E.179., League of Nations., 1935) covering 
the new discoveries, Biraud states: - 
The campaign against the .Ades aegypti is still the 
chief weapon of prophyaxis, not only durin`; epidemics, 
but also in normal times." and again: - 
The most effective method of preventing the spread 
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of Yellow Fever, as well of brining about the decline 
and even the extinction of the disease, is a 
persevering struggle against Aedes aeypti in all 
infected localities, and in all urban areas and 
maritime, river and air ports, in infected or 
THREATENED areas." (italics mine). 
Soper, (Soper. Present day methods for the study and 
control of Yellow Fever. 1m.Jl.Trop.L)d., Vol.17. '?o.5. 
Sept.1937) sums up the situation at present thus: - 
"The use of the mouse -protection test and viscerotomy 
for discovering the past extent and present occurrence 
of both aegypti- transmitted and jungle Yellow Fever 
are discussed. Further studies are necessary before 
methods other than vaccination can be developed for 
the control of Jungle Yellow Fever. In the meantime 
anti- aegypti measures are IKPERATIVE (italics mine) 
for the protection of cities and towns in endemic and 
POSSIBLY EPIDEMIC REGIONS ( italics mine) . 
I can now finish this section by repeating what I said 
in the first page, "The philosophy of control has not 
changed." 
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CLII;ICAL FEATURES OF YLLLO'T 
FEVER. 
In a Thesis on Yellow Fever, with special reference 
to its control and political significance, only a brief 
account need be given of its clinical features, including 
symptoms, pathology, diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. 
Of these features, diagnosis, and especially 
differential diagnosis, must be stressed. 
:ere the disease to escape to the seeded East, and the 
sanitary cordon be eluded, then the responsibility of 
recognizing it would rest on the clinician, and most 
probably one who had never before seen a case. 
Symptoms. 
These will be enumerated as a list of symptoms and 
signs in a "classical" case, definite and easily recognized. 
From the earliest times, since the disease was noted as a 
separate entity, three stages have been described. 
First Stage. 
After an incubation period averaging five days, the 
fever announces itself as a chill, pronounced or mild, 
accompanied by malaise, headache, lumbar and joint pains, 
all of increasing intensity. 
The temperature rises as also the pulse, but - rLTD 
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THIS IS ONE OF THE IcIOST I PORT.AT'TT EARLY DIAGNOSTIC SIGNS - 
the temperature continues high while the pulse falls; 
this is the well known "Paget's sign ". This sign, 
although not constant, is very characteristic and should 
make the clinician extremely suspicious. 
The tongue has a central coating while the tip and 
edges remain red. 
The gums become sore and often have a red line at the 
teeth. 
Nausea, then vomiting may begin early, with the 
stomach contents first, followed by mucus bile stained, 
and soon black specks are noticed. The urine at first 
highly coloured, soon shows traces of albumen, which c mazy 
appear within forty-eiht hours with diminished secretion. 
This quick appearance of albumen is another important 
sign of differentiation from other diseases of like type 
at their beginning. 
Yellow discolouration of the conjunctiva can be 
noticed about the third day and is often the sign of 
alteration in dark skinned natives or tanned whites until 
the end. After death the colour is marked and at the 
first incision of necropsy it is characteristic. 
The face and upper part of the body become flushed, 
the eyes injected, with the "ferrety" look of the old 
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clinicians, and the skin dry. Some petechiae may be 
seen with slight bleeding from the nose and mouth (gums) 
and the stools dark (melaena). 
The mental condition is peculiar, the patient tossing 
about unable to rest because of the photophobia, loin pain 
and headache, and showing the characteristic recalcitrant 
attitude of the alchoholic. 
Second Stage. 
This is short and most delusive. The patient both 
looks and feels better, and I have found one up and shaving 
who stated he "would be out and at work next day." 
There is still nausea and some vomiting, but the 
epigastric pains are gone as well as those in the-back and 
forehead, and the patient is unsteady. The temperature 
may have remitted with the pulse, but not always. 
The first stage had been one of sudden stimulation due 
to invasion of the virus, the second stage is the calm 
indicating the profundity of the effect on the organism and 
the success of the attack. 
Third Stage. 
.After a few hours all the first stage symptoms continue 
and increase rapidly. Headache, pains and restlessness 
usually passing into delirium, making it difficult to keep 
the patient in bed. 
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Vomiting is severe with larger specks of blood, which 
goes on to the "coffee grounds" a,opearance which has given 
the disease the name in the Americas of "Vomito Negro ". 
In especially severe cases, the vomit is actually 
haemorrhagic. The expulsion from the stomach is gushing 
and without much effort. The early congestion becomes 
more marked, more petechiae with actual subcutaneous 
haemorrhage appear, especially in dependent parts as the 
scrotum, gums, nose, and even eyes may bleed. 
The temperature remains constant or may rise, but the 
-pulse becomes slower. 
The jaundice extends over the whole body and the urine 
is rollot^r. 
The albumen increases and suppression ensues causing 
mental symptoms usually followed by coma and death. 
The first case I ever saw, and which I attended, was 
easily diagnosed by the symptoms as above, and without 
assistance, and strikingly confirmed by the necropsy. 
It was the means of warning the Authorities that Yellow, 
Fever was present in the locality where there had been none 
seen for several years. 
The warning was unheeded, and an epidemic occurred 




The pathological features most constantly found in the 
disease are jaundice, "black_ vomit" or "coffee ground" 
material in the stomach, "box- wood" fatty change in the 
liver, congestion of kidney and spleen, and various 
haemorrhagec evidences. 
In the classical case, jaundice is constant; the 
colour is a bright lemon. It is most marked in the skin 
and conjunctiva, subcutaneous tissue, fat, peritoneal and 
endocardial fluids, cartilages, and surface of the aorta. 
Haemorrhages are also constant, it being found in the 
skin, epi and endocardium, renal capsule, peritoneum, pleura, 
lungd, bladder mucosa, adrenals, alimentary canal, and 
altered blood in the stomach. 
Liver, pale and soft, with well -marked and character- 
istic fatty degeneration and necrosis. 
Spleen, enlarged, firm but congested with the 
malpighian bodies prominent. 
Kidney, congested with cortex cloudy and swollen with 
sometimes haemorrhages. 
Heart, pale and yellowish. 
The Urine always contains bile and albumen, and, 
microscopically, granular and hyaline casts. 
Iicroscopically, Hudson (Hudson. :'iuer.J1.Path.4.595. 
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1928) has summarized the main features thus: - 
"The most characteristic lesions are in the liver, 
which shows marked fatty degeneration with the finer 
particles in the midzone. The liver cells become 
markedly necrotic with a granular, acidophile form of 
degeneration, beginning in the midzone and extending 
to the central and portal veins respectively, until 
in some cases nearly every cell seems to be 
involved." 
"In addition to these changes haemorrhages may be 
present. The spleen shows congestion, small lymph 
nodules, and the development of enlarged endothelial 
cells of the pulp, and an increase of free endothelial 
leucocytes." 
"The kidney shows numerous acidophile necrotic cells 
in the tubular epithelium, and also fatty degeneration 
confined to that region. Congestion of the small 
blood vessels, especially of the glomeruli, is a 
common feature. The tubules contain much granular 
debris, and hyaline, granular and calcareous casts. 
The heart shows granular and fatty degeneration in 
the muscle fibres, especially in the neighbourhood of 
the nuclei." 
Diagnosis. 
As I have shown above, the well marked case of Yellow 
Fever, especially if fatal, can be diagnosed with ease. 
This is particularly so if the case occurs in a country 
which has had Yellow Fever as a scourge for years, for 
there the clinician is continuously on the look out. 
Even in such circumstances of favourable locality, the 
symptoms are often so mild as to make diagnoses impossible 
without skilled laboratory assistance, and again, in these 
cases the patient is so little indisposed that the 
clinician never makes contact. 
Children especially come Under this distinction, and 
may ri;shtly be described the natural reservoirs e the 
disease. 
Boyce, (Boyce. Yellow Fever and its prevention. P.197, 
1911) states: - 
'It unfortunately happens that at the commencement of 
an outbreak the "well marked" cases are rare, while the 
milder types .. predominate. Therefore it becomes a matter 
of supreme importance to review the history of past outbreaks; 
and to learn from them the practical difficulties which 
medical men have had to contend with, in arriving at the 
true nature of the disease which had broken out in their 
midst." 
As regards unrecognized cases in the 1926 epidemic 
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in Brazil, in a report at the beginning of the outbreak 
I stated: - 
t4I think the question of increasing virulence by 
passage, as in other diseases, has not been given 
due weight ". (Jameson -Carr, Unpub.Report. Rock. 
Found., May 22nd, 1926.) 
In the section on History, it has been shorn how 
difficult the early clinicians found diagnosis to be,and 
how various the diseases were with which it was confounded. 
In my own experience in Brazil there was no disease 
of epidemic character which, at one time or another, had 
not been so confounded, and even those not epidemic, such 
as gonorrhoea, mistaken for the pains of yellow Fever in 
its arthritic complications. 
As the zones of Yellow Fever and Ealaria are 
concomitant, it follows that these diseases are commonly 
mistaken one Br the other, especially those types of 
malaria called billious remittant and blackwater fever, 
which have several symptoms in common with severe or fatal ' 
Yellow Fever. 
Infectious jaundice (Well's Disease) when severe is 
clinically so similar that even with macro and microscopic 
evidence Noguchi failed to differentiate the two diseases. 
Lanson -Bahr, (Manson-Bahr, Manson's Tropical Diseases, 
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P.330, 1935) states: - 
The difficulties of diagnosis on clinical grounds 
are often great, particularly in the earlier cases of 
an epidemic. Vhen several deaths, preceded by fever 
and black vomit have occurred within a limited area, 
and in quick succession, a suspicion. of Yellovr Fever 
becomes a certainty. There is no clinical feature, 
so far as is knovrn, which would distinguish a mild 
attack of Yellow Fever from an ordinary febricula, 
nor any pathognomorL c clinical sign that would 
absolutely distinguish a malarial remittent from 
Yellow Fever and infectious jaundice. Dengue is 
probably one of the most difficult diseases to 
differentiate from mild Yellow Fever. The facies, 
orbital pains, and backache are similar to those of 
Dengue, but the appearance of the characteristic 
eruption of the latter disease on the fourth day 
should settle the diagnosis in any doubtful isolated 
case. Probabilities must be weighed in diagnosis 
when it is based on clinical grounds alone. The 
only reliable guides, as between malaria and Yellow 
Fever are the discovery of the malaria parasite and 
the characteristic pigment and leucocyte variation in 
the one, and the determination of their absence in 
the other; and, when cases come to the post -mortem 
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table, the presence of pigent in the viscera in 
the former, and extensive fatty de`;enerati on of the 
liver cells in the latter. Occasionally, the two 
diseases nay co- exist." 
Other diseases which must be mentioned are Rift 
Valley Fever in Kenya, Phlebotomus Fever in the ?;ear East 
and India, mild influenza the world over - a common mistake. 
in Brazil - Kukuruku in Nigeria (Beeuwkes, ,(alcott Kum, 
Tr.Roy.Soc.Trop.Sed. & Hyg., 24,429 -451., 1931) an un -named 
disease in Columbia, (Bauer & Kerr, Bol.Ofic.San. 
Panamerican., 12,696 -715, 1933) and Dioundé in French .lest 
Africa, (Stefanopoulo, Bull.Soc.Path.Exot., 26.560 -562., 
1933). 
Only by failure to infect Rhesus lionkeys during the 
acute stage, and by the absence of immune bodies in the 
blood to Yellow Fever, were these diseases able to be 
a lifferentiated. 
Laboratory Diagnosis. 
As we have described, there is no certainty in 
diagnosis of mild cases, and in fatal cases the liver 
provides either by necropsy or the viscerotome, material 
for examination. During the first three days of the 
disease, that is, if there are symptoms recognizable, 
inoculation of the blood of the patient into Rhesus Monkeys 
will reproduce the disease, and they can be examined post- 
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mortem after about five days, killed or natural. 
No matter how mild the manifestations of the 
disease it can be tested by the monkey, or as is better, 
the mouse-protection method after recovery. 
These methods will be described in another section. 
The point of paramount importance is early diagnosis. Ye 
know that however early, either by laboratory or clinical 
means, valuable time has been lost in terms of transmission 
to the infectible mosquito. Hindle, (Hindle. rrocs. Roy. 
Soc.Med., Vol.27, pp.1 -8, 1933) puts the matter concisely 
thus: - 
t4In connection with the transmission of Yellow Fever 
the period of infectivity of the blood is of considerable 
importance. It is commonly stated that the incubation 
period does not exceed six days and that the blood is 
infective only during the first three days of the attack. 
However, in two cases recorded by Low and Fairley, both 
had incubation periods of ten days, and it is known from 
observation on monkeys that the blood is infective during 
part of the incubation period. In monkeys the virus 
appears in the blood within a few hours after the 
inoculation, although symptoms of the disease may not 
appear until some days later .... The period during which 
the blood is infective probably varies considerably, for 
virus has been discovered on the fourth day after the 
beginning of fever. How soon the blood becomes infective 
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probably varies according to the dose and other conditions, 
but I think it would be wise to consider the blood of a 
patient infective at least three days before the appearance 
of fever." 
Prognosis and Kortality. 
In mild cases the disease is of short duration and 
convalescence to recovery rapid. 
As we have seen, many cases are never diagnosed, being 
abortive or ambulatory. This is especially so in 
children, but such cases are all the more dangerous as their' 
virus, carried by the mosquito to another person can give 
rise to malignancy. 
Prognosis is bad when the initial symptoms are severe 
and the temperature remains high, in obese subjects, persons) 
of a nervous temperament, pregnant women (who abort), in 
the co- existence of another disease such as malaria, in 
ALCOHOLICS and even those who habitually use alcohol, which 
in my experience is the cause of the high death rate among 
Luropean men in the past, and will include women in the 
future, in the absence of skilled nursing and the presence 
of energetic but unskilled doctors who fail to realize the 
pathological requirements in treatment, in those who have 
been subjected to the blood- pressure -raising ordeal of a 
removal to a hospital after the first twenty -four hours, 
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and any other circumstance which has lowered the resistance 
of the patient. 
The mortality varies in different epidemics and 
amongst different races as has already been noted. 
In Africa the white rate and black rate are respectively 
high and low, while in the Americas both white and native 
Indian are equally non-immune unless in a locality long 
endemic; this latter would be the condition in the East. 
Boyce, (Boyce. Yellow Fever and its Prevention, P.214. 
1911) states: - 
"The very high death rate, nearly 100%, this year, 1910, 
in the outbreaks of Yellow Fever in :jest Lfrica, was a 
matter of considerable astonishment and perplexity to 
observers. But on the contrary, such a high death rate 
was to be expected, especially in a country where medical 
men were on the outlook for the typical severe forms of the 
disease. Naturally, in any disease the mortality must be 
very high if the severe forms form the bulk of those diagnosed. 
In my opinion, this apparent high rate is a positive proof 
that there were many other cases of mild Yellow Fever which 
escaped detection. Had all cases been diagnosed, I am 
convinced that the rate would have been very much less.... 
Another factor which very materially affects the death rate 
in any epidemic is, whether the medical men are expecting the 
disease or not, whether it bursts on them as it were, or 
whether they are expecting it. Yellow Fever cases carefully 
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nursed from the onset are not so fatal as is usually 
supposed .... it must always be understood that until the 
mild forms are recognized no death rate approaches accuracy. "' 
The same author quotes Guiteras as stating in 1910, 
that the rate may vary from 4% to Q2%, and the average rate 
in 227 cases as 22.7%. In Las Animas Hospital in Havana, 
Boyce quotes: - 
"The death rate amongst those admitted in the first 
forty -eight hours Was 17.7 %, and in those later, 
32.3 %. Everything therefore depends upon careful 
treaLment from the outset." 
TreaLi ent. 
ï,ild cases need no treatment, the virus being neutralized 
by the fourth day. 
If however, the disease proceeds beyond the first 
stage or is severe from the beginning, treatment is 
necessary. 
A few years ago, it was hoped that immune serum would 
be found of use, especially if administered in the early 
stage before extensive damage had been inflicted on the 
liver and other organs. 
Experiments on susceptible monkeys have been made, and 
the results are not encouraging. 
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Hindle (kn. Experimental study of Yellow Fever. Trans. 
Roy.Soc.Thop.Med. <44 Hyg., Vol.22., I ?o.5., pp.205- 434.,1929) 
states: - 
"The results of our observations on Monkeys do not 
support the view that such treatment (immune serum) 
is likely to be very effective. A monkey killed on 
the first day of fever showed extensive necrosis of the 
liver, and since in human cases the virus disappears 
from the blood after the third day of fever, it is 
probable that in these patients the changes are quite 
as rapid as in experimental animals.` 
Monkeys inoculated with the virus and given serum from 
a highly immunized monkey immediately after the first sign 
of infection - a rise of temperature - showed no alteration 
in the course of the disease, and died, giving teTpical 
post mortem signs of Yellow Fever, in thirty -six hours. 
It might be possible to administer serum to those 
known to have been in direct contact with the patient and 
who had been bitten. by the same mosquitoes or mosquitoes 
who had bitten the patient, but human experimental animals 
would be needed to prove it. Expectant Treatment, with 
rigidly disciplined nursing, must therefore be our gu ide. 
The main points in management are, absolute decubitus 
(no use of bed pan allowed, faeces passed into wool in the 
bed), alkaline waters, as much as can be easily imbibed 
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careful screening if discovered before the fourth day. 
From my personal experience in watching treatment in Brazil, 
I made for my oven guidance the dictum, "If you move them, 
you kill them." 
Of the many drugs I have seen used and which are still 
recommended in the text books, most, in my opinion, are 
useless and many dangerous, chiefly because of the 
annoyance to the patient. 
Clearin; -; of the alimentary tract is excellent for 
the comfort of the patient. 
The upper end he usually does himself by vomiting, the 
lower end should be cleared by a warm salt water enema, but 
even this should be avoided unless possible at the beginning.. 
No food should be given until a safe end is in sight, 
as the stomach cannot either retain it or digest it, nor 
can the intestine absorb it. 
In convalescence the dietary ladder must be climbed 
cautiously, rung by rung. 
Glucose should be given in small doses, well diluted, 
by mouth from the beginning, but if vomiting is persistant, 
in a 5% solution intravenously. This is to counteract the 
hepatic toxin. 
When the patient appears collapsed at the later stage 
there is a natural tendency to administer stimulants; this 
should be absolutely avoided. I have seen the very worst 
results from this practice, and cases which in my opinion 
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might have survived, ended fatally with copious haemorrhage. 
In one case, I used1-urphy's treatment and method of 
continuous proctoclysis when there appeared the dander of 
suppression, with a recovery result, but whet per due to 
that treatment or not I cannot say. It is worth trying and 
does not agitate the patient. 
Immunity. 
Persons who have recovered from Yellow Fever have a 
lasting immunity. This has been known since early times, 
and established by the observations of doctors, settlers 
in the Yellow Fever Zones, and sailors. 
It is the reason why the disease generally attacks 
only persons who have newly arrived in an endemic area. 
In 1928 by the discovery that Macacus Rhesus was 
sensitive to the virus, there was introduced a method of 
diagnosing human cases, and also clearing up many doubtful 
points as to the possibility and mode of transmission of 
the disease by various species of mösquitoes and 
determining the virulence of different strains of virus. 
(Stokes, Bauer 6., Hudson. J1. mer.Y,ed.Áss., 90. 253 -354., 
1928). 
Similarity in symptoms and pathology of the disease 
in man and monkey verified the diagnosis in the latter. 
These workers at that time demonstrated that a dose 
as small as 0.1cc. of convalescent serum protected the 
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monkey against inoculation of the virus, and that not 
only the convalescent serum but also that of persons who 
had suffered many years before protected against a lethal 
dose, wherever the ori_4n of the disease. 
Thus it became possible to identify Yellow Fever 
retrospectively, and make surveys over fare areas both 
suspected and unsuspected. 
Sawyer, (Sawyer. J1.Prev.i:ed., 5.413 -428., 1931) 
demonstrated by protection tests that the sera of sixty 
persons who had had what was called Yellow Fever between 
30 and 78 years previously, were immune. This is almost 
conclusive evidence that I'm unity lasts fer life. Further 
details of these discoveries and their application in 
prophylaxis :-rill be given in another section. 
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ETIOLOGY A.i) M 1,SLISSION. 
Before the discovery of the infectivity of rhesus 
monkeys by Stokes, 'Sauer & Hudson in 1928, as already 
quoted, which opened a new era in our study and knowledge 
of Yellow Fever, there had been many claims from other 
workers as to the causal agent of the disease. 
Lost of these claims can be explained as the result 
of secondary infections or mere artifacts. 
One claim however deserves special notice. Thomas, 
working in Para, Brazil, published, "The Results of 
Inoculation Experiments with Virulent Blood of Yellow Fever 
Cases or Bites of infected Stegomyia Calopus, "(Trans. 
Soc.Trop.ì:ed. Hyg.1909- 1910). 
In this suggestive report he stated that he had 
succeeded in obtaining a reaction in guinea pis four and a 
half to thirteen days after being bitten by infected 
Stegomyia. That after the reaction, the animals were 
immune to subsequent inoculation, and that durin_, the 
illness their blood was capable of infecting Stegomyia. 
He also used a chimpanzee in which a reaction was obtained 
five days .after being bitten by an infected Stegomyia. 
visited Thomas in 1anaos, on the Amazon, in 1925; when he 
discussed his findings with me, and it is interesting to 
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record that he showed to me correspondence which he was 
having with Hoguchi, whose claim that Leptospira icteroides 
was the causal agent of Yellow Fever. He vigorously 
opposed. The war came, funds gave out, also health and 
enthusiasm, but veritas praevalebit. 
Thus the causal agent can as yet, only be classed 
amongst the viruses, ultra -microscopic and filterable. 
In 1930, another important advance was made. Theiler, 
( Theiler. Ann..Trop. red. Parasit. 24.248 -272, 1930) showed 
that white mice were sensitive to Yellow Fever virus. 
The virus can be preserved by freezing and drying in 
vacuo (Sellards L Hindle, !rop.Dis.Bull. 25.539, 1928). 
It can resist phenol at 1:150 and mercuric chloride 
1:7.500 at 30 cent. for half an hour; such conditions 
microbes cannot stand. (Frobisher. Amer.Jl.ïyg. 11.300 -320, 
1930). It is killed by heating, in serum, for ten 
minutes (idem). It cannot resist six hours suspension in 
saline solution (Bauer, _xler.Jl.Trop.ed.11.337 -353, 1931). 
It has been demonstrated that the virus can pass through 
Chamberland L.11 filters without losing its activity, (Bauer 
Mahaffy. ,mer.Jl.Iyg. 12.175 -195, 1930). 
,any experiments have been made on the subject of 
virus culture, and it has been shown that the pathogenic 
power of the virus can only be maintained over long periods 
by cultivation in the presence of living cells, as in tissue 
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Theiler. in vitro. (:t,aagen & . Proc.Soe.Exper.3icl. 
í i:ed., 29.435-436, 1932). 
Vaccines. 
The practical outcome of the laboratory studies of 
Yellow Fever has been the production of vaccines for 
prophylaxis. 
This was the more to be sought as there is no effective 
treatment. 
The extreme virulence of monkey blood, which may have 
a thousand million lethal doses per cubic centimetre, made 
the preparation of a vaccine difficult. (Zauer. Armer.Jl. 
Trop.Lied.l1. 451 -457, 1931) . 
Extracts of the organs of the monkey were used during 
the Rio epidemic of 1926 -29, but did not give constant 
results. (-zragao, C.R.Soc.iol. 99.1341- 1343, 1928). 
Several other workers produced vaccines more or less 
successful, but the introduction of the mouse as a 
1 laboratory animal more controlable than the monkey gave 
rise to a method of sero- vaccination safer in its application' 
to man. 
ii suspended mixture of Mouse -brain virus and con- 
valescent serum, previously filtered, frozen and dried, was 
inoculated into humans. 
î3O reaction was felt nor was virus found in their 
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blood twenty -four hours afterwards, while all showed in 
time satisfactory immunity. (Sawyer, Kitchen Lloyd. 
J1. Exper. Pried. 55.945 -969, 1932) . 
The above method, requiring 50ccs. of human con- 
valescent serum was improved by using that of vaccinated 
ersons with like results. p , (Findlay. Bull.Off.Int.Hyg. 
i 
Pub.25. 1009 -1014, 1933). 
Human serum is difficult to procure in such large 
quantities as required, as it contains only a small amount 
of immuriisins, therefore horse immunised serum was employed, 
containing five times as much. (Pettit s'; Stefanopoulo. Bull. !, 
Off.Int.Hyg. Pub.26. 1075 -1077, 1934). This last method 
is being used in French Equatorial Africa for systemic 
vaccination of all Europeans, 1933 -34. 
A method of using virus alone, but attenuated by a 
temperature of 20 C. for four, two and one days for the 
three inoculations, and controlled for virulence on mice, 
has been tried in French Africa. 
The reaction, although usually slight, is enough to 
prevent timorous persons continuing the second and third 
inoculations. 
In a few cases there was serious nervous reaction. 
By mouse -protection tests, two -thirds of the volunteers 
(2.164) proved immune after the first injection. (Sellards 
& Laigret, C.R.Acad.Sc. 194. 2175-2178, 1932). 
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The negative result of this method is that no one so 
inoculated has cauht Yellovr Fever, but it means that the 
inoculated person has virus in his blood until immunised, 
ar,.ich constitutes a danger of the possible infection of 
mosquitoes if present. 
-Both the soro -virus and the virus methods produce 
immunity, but the first is more simple of application and 
safer epidemiologically. 
The application of vaccination in control will be 
discussed in another section. 
Animal susceptibility and possible reservoirs. 
.;hile it must be stressed that man is the animal 
reservoir of paramount importance, it has been shown that 
certain monkeys in Brazil and Columbia may be the reservoirs 
in Jungle Yellovr Fever. 
Inoculation experiments have been made on the following 
Orders; - 
Primates Rodentia 
Chiroptera : rtiodactyla 
Carnivera rerissodactyla 
Insectivora Birds. 
The results have been complicated as the reactions have 
been so various. 
Some species are absolutely insusceptible to all forms 
of virus no matter how inoculated; others susceptible to 
all forms but móstly to certain methods of inoculation and 
to virus adapted to either the viscera or nervous system. 
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Susceptibility has been found in every degree and only 
I 
a few-of the findings cari be referred to in relation to 
control. 
No matter what the degree, virus has been found in the 
blood after inoculation - quickly if the dose is large, 
(0.1 gramme of brain virus) or more slowly if small, 
(0.000001 gramme) . 
The sera of completely resistant animals are not fatal 
to the virus, which can be proved by sero- protection tests 
before inoculation, and by the time of survival of the virus 
in the blood and organs after inoculation. (Findlay. Jl. 
Path. 8; Bact. 38.1 -6, 1934). 
It has been shown that in both susceptible monkeys and 
those which are apparently insusceptible, Maccacus rhesus 
and Lasiopyga callitrichus, the appearance of the virus is 
delayed, indicating that there is multiplication. 
Vitus Vectors. 
Since the Reed Commission at Havana in 1900 -1901 
definitely incriminated Aedes aegypti as a carrier of Yellow 
Fever virus, the search has continued, not only concerning 
that insect, but many others. 
For the last forty years the epidemiology and prophylaxis' 
of the disease has been founded on our conception of insect 
carriers. 
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An extensive literature has accumulated and important 
'advances have been made, especially on the biology of Aedes 
aegypti, and other Aedes. 
As Aedes aegypti is by far the most important carrier, 
in fact the only insect of proved importance, a detailed 
account must be given. Epidemiolo4 caily, all strains of 
Aedes aegypti are of equal danger in terms of their ability 
to transmit Yellow Fever. 
It has been shown that the aegypti of the Dutch East 
Indies are efficient carriers, (Dinger, Schuffner, Snijders 
& Swellengrebel. Hederl.Tijds.v.Geneesk., 73.3255 -3257, 
4378 -4383, 5982 -5991, 1929). 
Strains from India, Java, 'rest Africa & America were 
proved equal. (Hindle, Trans.Roy.Soc.Trop. Led. 22.405 -430, 
1929). Strains from Tunis, Java and Cuba were similar, 
(Pettit, Roubaud, and Stefanoupoulo, C.R. Soc.Biol. 104. 
60 -63, 1930) as also Batavia, Athens, Havana and Dakar. 
(Mathis, C.R.Soc.Biol. 115.1624 -1626, 1934). 
Characteristics of Aedes aegypti. 
Imago or .Adult. 
As has been stated in the section on epidemiology, 
aegypti has essentially domestic instincts, due, in my 
opinion, to its preference for human blood. 
It seeks dark cool places for resting and has a colour 
preference for a black background. Unless compelled, in 
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seeking water or a blood feed, it does not fly far from 
its birth place. 
Experimenting on mosquitoes which have been coloured 
with aniline dyes, it was found that 69f were captured 
during the five days following their release, 66% in the 
house of release, and 3% in the house adjoining. (Shannon, 
Burke & Davis. Amer.Jl.Trop.k ed. 10.145 -150, 1930). 
It not only selects quiet water for depositing eggs, 
but also quiet air. 
As soon as the imago is dry it flies to cover as 
described above. 
The male is much the weaker, and always in any lay 
emerges first for reasons already stated. I have seen 
three males being carried on the wing by one female. 
The preferential breeding places and also compulsory 
breeding places have been fully described under epidemiology. 
I have shown that the condition of the water does not 
determine the laying, but the sides of the container. 
( Jameson -Carr. Exps.No.2,3,4,5,6. Unpub.Reports. Rock.Found. 
1925). The life cycle is not constant, depending on the 
temperature of the water in which the eggs are deposited 
and the food available for the larvae after hatching. 
I have found that I could control the cycle at will 
by controlling the above factors, the limit being from 
seven to twenty -three days in my experiments. (Jameson -Carr 1 
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Exp.No.5. Unpub.Report.Rock.Iiound., 1924) . 
41though the female will lay above any type of water and 
in any kind of container as already described, awaiting 
chance for the eggs to be covered, the water itself may be 
fatal to the larvae and even the eggs. In nature, brackish 
water of 2% strength is thus fatal. (Jameson -Carr, Exps. 
No.11 and 12. Unpub.Report. Roek.Found., 1924). 
If the water contains no food, the larvae will not 
mature beyond the first moult, being carniverous, the fittest 
survives as long as those that die are available. (Jameson - 
Carr. Exp.No.14. Unpub.Report, Rock.Found.1924). 
Both larvae and pupaecan survive on a dry surface for at 
least seven hours, and when again placed in water, proceed 
to maturity. (Jameson- Carr, cp.No.l5. Unpub.Report. Rock. 
Found., 1924). 
The insect on the wing is easily recognized by its 
gliding movement and hardly audible buzz, and at rest by 
the culex angle and the long white -banded legs which are 
continually waving. 
In my experience the female bites at all hours but 
most viciously just before sundown, and when I have lain on 
a bed within a net with twenty -five mosquitoes, they never 
bit except on those parts where the blood vessels were 
superficial, feet,hands and head. 
The extremes of temperature at which the Adult insect 
can live have been determined. It rapidly succumbs at 
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oC. -t 12o to 14 O 1.-Lt it becomes torpid, at 15 0 16 C 
its activity is diminished, it cannot survive above 39 C, 
and 28 C seems to be the optimum. (Bliss ¿. Gill. ixner.Jl. 
Trop.ed. 13.583 -588, 1933). 
Sensitiveness to high temperature would appear to be 
why it prefers shade and the proximity of water containers, 
and as mentioned before, may be the reason why the disease 
has not passed through the Suez Canal. 
The infected insect. 
The incubation time of Yellow Fever infection in the 
mosquito depends on the temperature of the surrounding 
atmosphere. It is reduced to four days at 37 C. and reaches 
eighteen days at 21 C. At 10 C. to 15 C. incubation is 
suspended and the insect remains non -infective. Should the 
temperature rise again to 18 C. incubation recommences and 
the mosquito becomes again infective. (Davis, Brazil Led. 
45.77, 1931, l per. J1..16.163 -176, 1932) . 
Men infectivity is retarded - even. for an unlimited 
period - by cold, it is not done may with, and if the 
temperature drops after the mosquito becomes infective, the 
infectiousness remains. (Hindle, Lancet, 1.451, 1930). 
It has been found however, that the virulence of the 
infection -transmiLLed by mosquitoes cooled for several days 
at 16 C. is so diminished as no longer to be fatal to 
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M. rhesus. (Schaffner, Dinger Snijders, ierslag, d.K.Akad. 
v.<;etensch. te Amsterdam, Afd. Yatuurk., 39 l?o.9., 1930). 
Identification Characters. 
Seen by low power (1 16) the head is dark, with a 
distinct double white median line and with white lines 
laterally and round the eyes; palpi black, white at the 
tip; proboscis black. Thorax brown, with two brilliant 
silvery broad lateral curved lines, which converge from in 
front towards the middle of the thorax, these becoming much 
narrower and continuing parallel to one another as fax as 
the scutellum; in the middle there are two r'arallel 
yellowish or whitish lines running g the whole length of the 
thorax. Scutellum awing it being 
covered with silvery white scales. Pleura with several 
patches of brilliant white scales. Abdomen dark, with 
white band at the bases of the segments. Legs black, the 
femora D'or the most part pale beneath, in many cases with a 
distinct white line running from the base almost to the 
apex and situated on the inner surface, a white spot is also 
visible at the apex; tibiad black; the first and second 
pair of legs with two white bands on the tarsi, the hind 
pair with five white bands, the last joint being wholly 
white. -,Ïings with the veins darkly scaled, the upper 
fork cell being distinctly longer than the second, and its 
base slightly nearer the root of the wing. Length 3.5 to 
5 mm; average 4.5 mm; but very small specimens are often 
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met with. (Boyce. Yellaa Fever and its Prevention. 
276 -277. 1911). 
Egg. 
The egg can survive refrigeration and even freezing. 
(Bliss w Gill. '.r.!er.J1.Trop.Med.13, 583 -583, 1933). They 
will resist dry for at least six months. (Jameson -Carr, 
Exp.Iro.13. Unpub.Report, Rock.Found. 1924) . 
The incubation period varies from one to eight days 
normally, according to the temperature but after lying on 
the side of a container for six months, when water was 
added to cover them, the first larva Was hatched in five 
minutes, showing that in the dry state development goes on 
inside the egg to a limit just short of fracture of the 
outer shell. (Jameson-Carr, Exp. No.16. Unpub.Report, 
Rock.Found., 1925). 
Eggs are never laid before the female has had a blood 
meal, averaging six days after the meal and the number 
laid in one batch varies from four to ninety -one, and the 
total during life from one hundred and ninety to five 
hundred and fourteen. (Ehatre. Survey of Jedes in Bombay, 
13., 1934). 
As fertilization takes place as soon as the female 
emerges from the pupal case, it follows that eggs must 
lie latent in.her body until she can find a blood feed. 
This period may be as long as 102 days; meanwhile, the 
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insect lives on fruit juices. 
There is no evidence whatever that hereditary 
transmission. of virus takes place from female to eggs. 
Identification Characters. 
Elongated, blackish and studded with white minute 
hemispherical bodies secreting a sticky fluid and surrounded 
by air cells. One end is sharper than the other, and it is 
this end that splits transversely when the larva is born. 
Each egg is laid separately and remains so. 
Larvae. 
hs noted before, larvae as well as eggs can survive 
freezing. 
It has also been seen that both temperature and food 
supply effect the growth of larvae, but markedly food. 
The change from larva to pupa takes place at the 
bottom of the container where it is vulnerable to bottom 
feeding fish. 
There are four moults between egg and pupa. 
It is capable of remaining submerged for long periods, 
as bng as five hours has been recorded. This enables them 
to feed in tanks and other receptacles of great depth. 
(Boyce. Yellow :.'ever and its Prevention. 282, 1911). 
The food of the larvae is various. They eat dead 
animal and vegetable matter with avidity, and in my own 
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experiments I found it convenient to use dried rabbit 
faeces which they attacked with ferocity. (Jameson -Carr, 
Exp.TTo.2. Unpub.Report, Rock.Found., 1924). 
Uhen first hatched, they are transparent but soon 
become dark on the in:;estion of food. 
Identification Characters. 
Under low power, the siphon is seen to be one quarter 
the entire length of the abdomen, and tuo and a half times 
longer than the width at the base. 
The larva lies almost perpendicular to the surface of 
the water. 
Under high power, Antennae smooth, the tuft being 
represented by a single short hair; at the apex there is 
a minute but distinct second joint and a very feu delicate 
hairs. The labial plate possesses eleven to twelve teeth 
on each side, and a larger terminal one. The base is 
also symmetrically crenulated. The thorax is rather hairy,; 
some of the hairs arising from four distinct chitinous 
hooks situated two on each side of the thorax. On the 
eigth segment of the abdomen are the lateral combs; each 
of these is composed of from eight to ten serrated spines, 
varying in form and also in the number of serrations. The 
siphon or pecten spines are variable in form and number, 
but usually there are twelve. Immediately following there 
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is a triple hair. The last segment is very short, being 
almost rectangular, and bears a number of bifurcated hairs. 
The papillae are stout, and about one and a half times the 
length of the segment and with rounded ends. (Boyce. 
Yellow Fever and its Prevention, 1911). 
Pupae. 
The pupae are extremely active, the females being 
dark and larger than the males, which are yellowish. 
(Jameson -Carr. Unpub.Report., Rock.Found. 1924). 
They can survive out of water for at least seven 
hours. (Jameson- Carr, Exp.ro.15., Unpub.Report. Rock.Found. 
1925). 
The adult emerges from the pupa on the surface which; 
during the delay, makes them very vulnerable to top -feeding 
fish and other predacious insects and larvae. 
There are no particular marks of identification from 
other mosquito pupae. 
Transmission. 
Until the virus nature of the infection of Yellow Fever 
was demonstrated, it had been thought that the only means 
of conveying it was by the bite of ..edes aegypti. 
Leaving out the proved cases in the jungle of South 
America where another mosquito must be the vector, even 
infections contracted in the laboratory staffs were con- 
sidered to have been of mosquito origin. 
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It has now been proved beyond question that infection 
can be acquired from handling infected material; either 
blood or other tissues of diseased man or other animal. 
Two hospital cases are quoted in persons taking blood 
counts. (Low L.; Fairlay. Trop.Dis.Bull., 28. 290, 1931) . 
Thirty-five laboratory cases up to 1931 where there 
was no evidence of the method of infection except contact 
with tissues. (Berry « Kitchen. T'rop.Dis.Bull. 29. 571). 
This manner of acquiring the disease must be rare, for 
I have swallowed black vomit, slept in the soiled clothing 
of fatal cases, and done post mortems with my bare hands, 
thinking to teach, by my immunity, the non -contagiousness 
of the disease, and emphasize the mosquito vection. This 
was between 1923 - 1926. 
The type of development in the mosquito of the virus 
appears very simple as it vas found that by grinding up 
infected insects in syrup and feeding this to normal insects,' 
the latter became infected after the usual incubation period. 
Thus the virus might be indefinitely preserved in the 
mosquito. (Marchoux Simond. Ann.Inst.Pasteur, 20. 
pp. 16.104.161., 1906). 
Faeces of infected insects are virulent, and the virus 
can be transmitted thus by way of the mucous membrane of the 
eye and the &in to monkeys; also, the male can be infected 
13 9. 
by the faeces of the female, and when ground up (the male) 
and injected, infects. 
As has been stated Before, the eg.s are not infected. 
This seems strange as the virus invades the coelom_ic fluid 
which bathes the ovary of the mosquito, which ne-ative 
fact is important epidemiologically. (Arag o Lime, 
C.R.Soc.Biol. 102. 53 -54, 1929). 
Exact experiments have proved that reciprocal infection 
of aegypti was rare in nature and that in actual fact 
infection dies out in a colony of these mosquitoes after 
about four months, i.e. the maximum life time of an 
infected female. Candle, Lancet. 2. 835 -842, 1930. 
Frobisher, Davis Shannon. mer.J1.Hsrg., 14. 142 -146. 
Kerr ïayne. rner.J1. Trop.ïied. 12. 255 -261, 1932) . 
The question of temperature on transmission has been 
discussed previously in this section. An estimate has 
been made of the quantity of virus contained in an infected 
mosquito and how much is injected at one bite. This is one 
hundred infective doses, or only one per cent of the total 
quantity contained in the body of the insect immediately 
after an infecting meal. l:he quantity is less ten days 
after the infecting meal than the day following, which 
proves that there is no development of the virus in the 
aegypti, and that it is only a vector. 
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Vectors other than Aedes Aegypti.- 
A knowledge of this subject has recently been 
atly advanced, and we now know that other species of 
mosquitoes are capable of transmitting Yellow Fever. 
Those suspected in Jungle Yellow-Fever have been discussed. 
Thirty -two insects have been tested by biting, in the 
laboratory. Thirty by injection of the body contents, 
twenty by both biting and injection. 
The results can be classed as very efficient, efficient;, 
inefficient, doubtful and negative. 
The only one classed as `livery efficient` is Aedes 
aegypti. 
A. Luteocephalus A. Fluviatilis are "efficient." 
All other insects rank in the last three categories 
as above. 
This research went beyond mosquitoes and included the 
otherDiptera, Hemiptera and Siphonaptera. (Biraud. 
Present -day Problems of Yellow Fever Epidemiology, R.E.179. 
Epidemiological Report, League of Nations, 1935). 
Therefore, although Aedes aegypti is the true Yellow 
Fever mosquito, and, in terms of control, the only one of 
importance, as has been amply demonstrated in the past, 
were other species present in large numbers, the possibility 
of infection being carried by them and an epidemic being 
maintained, could not be ruled out. This is more especially 
true in Afriaa and the East. 
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CONTROL AND PROPHYLAXIS. 
For four hundred years, immigrants, sailors and the 
sanitary authorities of the Yellow Fever zone dreaded the 
disease, not only because of its mortality, which was the 
cause of tremendous economic waste in humans, but also the 
material loss consequent on the stringent quarantine against' 
it in other countries. 
The psychic element was profound, for the cause was 
a mystery, the scourge came. as a visitation, and only cold 
weather was known definitely to stop it. 
Lven in the zone itself, it broke out one year, night 
remain for a few years, then disappear, only to return. 
The "white man's grave" became an apt description for 
all endemic areas, and for ntianys; that were only epidemic. 
With the discovery of the vector, and the brilliant 
success made by the American Army in Havana and Panama 
in control and eradication, followed in other pest areas and 
cities by like results, the terror abated. 
I use the word abated advisedly, for on the opening of 
the Panama Canal, a panic almost ensued in the East at the 
thought of what might happen were Yellow Fever to find its 
way by shipping to that part of the world, which up to that 
142. 
time had been free from it. ( Gorgas and Hendrick, 
William Crawford Gorgas, His Life and Work,1924). That 
this has not happened is due to the fact that the Canal 
zone has been in the hands of experts from the beginning 
and rigid quarantine regulations carried out on shipping 
when necessary. It must also be noted that since 1914, 
when the Canal was opened, the wooden sailing ship has been 
almost entirely superseded by metal ships whose water was 
not exposed to breeding female mosquitoes, and whose length 
of voyage was against the disease landing in man, 
Hardly had that danger been averted and the panic died 
down, when another arose as a result of travel by air, and 
that, not so much as to the possibility of infection 
arriving from the Americas, as from Africa. 
The former panic had given rise to an enthusiasm in 
the East for anti - larval work which I regret to state has 
not cóntinued. 
In 1927 I was allowed to make a cursory survey of the 
aegypti conditions in Bombay and vmote to the local paper 
because of an article which had appeared in it on December 
30th, 1926 as follows: - 
"Were there no malaria in Bombay, the mosquito pest 
in itself is a stain on the escutcheon of any modern 
city. Bombay with its daily and nightly tortures is 
spoken of wherever travellers meet. I was astounded 
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to experience, and disappointed to observe, that this 
reputation was warranted, even though the season is a 
slack one in terms of mosquitoes, and on making enquiry 
why it should be so, in spite of the city's pretension 
to modernity and its evident wealth, easily got at the 
truth. It is sufficient to say that the reason can 
be left to the civic conscience and civic pride of the 
city fathers, and others sharing the responsibility ". 
(Jameson- Carr. "The Times of India ". January 15th, 
1927). 
After much discussion amongst various authorities, 
(six years): - 
"The Government of India would be glad to be informed 
whether the local Government would be able to under- 
take at an early date, a Stegomyia survey of the 
major ports in the Bombay Presidency, with a view to 
assessing their vulnerability to the introduction of 
Yellow Fever infection ". 
This survey was accordingly commenced in the beginning 
of August 1933, and completed on the 31st of i,iarch, 1934. 
The comment of the officer in charge of the survey was: - 
"The history of the events recorded above shows that 
Bombay, and incidently the whole country is in exactly 
the same unprotected state against the disease to -day, 
as it was a quarter of a century ago." 
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"The Malarial Branch of the Public Health Department 
has not been merely doing, as its name implies, anti- 
malarial work, but does anti -mosquito work in general, 
although it devotes more attention to the control of 
the malarial vector in particular." (Th.atre. A 
Survey of Aedes Mosquitoes in Bombay and i.easures 
suggested for their Control, 1934). 
I mention these matters to show that the Eastern Ports 
are potential Yellow Fever endemic centres, that the 
authorities are either not interested or hard to move; 
that where malaria is an ever present and thoroughly 
understandable menace, it is natural that Yellow Fever and 
its possibility of entrance from a great distance is not 
appreciated outside medical circles, and that this being 
so and the means of control being ultimately in the hands 
of government and business, some influence more powerful 
than local authority and more rapid in execution must be 
envisaged if the East is to be protected. 
We may now consider what has been done to prevent 
Yellow Fever spreading. 
The International Sanitary Convention of 1926 formulated 
stringent regulations to control ships coming from infected 
ports and going to uninfected ports where there were Aedes 
aegypti. In Articles 35 to 40 of the Convention, ships 
which were infected (a case on departure or during the 
145. 
voyage) were compelled to moor not less than 200 metres 
from inhabited land; patients must be landed and placed 
under proofed nets; other persons landed must be under 
observation for six days after, and all mosquitoes 
destroyed on board. 
Suspected ships, which were designated as those coming 
from an infected port, or a port in commercial contact with 
an infected port, if the voyage had been less than six days 
and -there was a possibility of ae; ypti bein on board, 
must also conform to the regulation. 
All health officers and ships' doctors must have the 
text of the Convention in their possession. 
At the time of formulating these regulations all our 
standard knowledge on transmission was incorporated, the 
three to four days of infectiousness in the patient, 
an incubation period of six days, domestic habits of the 
insect and.the persistence of the infection durin the 
life time of the insect. 
Since the date of the Convention we have added vastly 
to our knuuledge, but it is apt here to quote a statement 
made by Aristides Agramonte of Havana at the Jamaica 
Conference of 1924: - 
"After the disease has been stamped out in a given 
locality, one must depend for its permanent exclusion, 
upon quarantine; this cannot be relaxed unless the 
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country or regions of the countr,; from which the 
infection might be reintroduced are kept upon strict 
surveillance, or their authorities have given proof 
of honest notification of cases, so that confidence may 
be placed on their reports. This measure of 
quarantine, based upon a six day period of incubation, 
has already been demonstrated as absolutely reliable; 
the Panama Canal Zone, ITevr Orleans; and other southern 
ports of the United States, and all the Cuban ports 
are good examples of the value of quarantine against 
Yellow Fever invasion. I would warn rani tarians to 
be war- of attempts to estimate the period of 
incubation as of longer duration, based upon results 
obtained by experiments on animals. In conclusion, 
I beg to recommend that we do not swerve from the 
path heretofore followed by the pioneers in Yellow 
Fever prophylaxis, unless it be to introduce such 
measures as may be necessary to meet peculiar conditions 
of the country, and that only, if they in no way 
weaken the fundamental structure of anti -mosquito 
campaigns." (Lóramonte, Internat.Oonfer.Health. 
Probs.Trop.?mer. pp.207 -20 3, 1924 -). 
Honest notification comes under the subject of the 
politics of Yellow Fever and will be discussed later. 
Except in the East, where small wooden ships still do 
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a large part of coastal traffic, the menace of the 
transport of Yellow Fever, either in man or mosquito, has 
largely gone. This of course depending on the care of 
the authorities of ports and ships to apply the 
regulations strictly. If Yellow Fever were to infect the 
East Coast of i;frica, the old danger from wooden vessels 
breeding aegypti would return, and menace India. 
The great increase and range, as well as the rapidity 
of aerial travel during recent years have made it urgent to 
revise and add to the regulations of prophylaxis. This 
has proceeded, pari passu, with our increased knowledge of 
the range of Yellow Fever as revealed by protection test, 
and the possibility that other reservoirs than man, and 
other vectors than aegypti, are in existence. 
Many articles have appeared dealing with the subject, 
and even Italian and French writers have suggested the 
possibility of the disease being reintroduced into Europe. 
(Reitano. Iiorn.di I«ed.L=il. 79. 539 -543. 1931, and 
Moulinier. Jl.L ed. de Bordeaux. 110. 251 -253, 1933). 
The most serious apprehension has been caused in the 
countries of the East and with ample justification. 
In the Dutch Indies this has been dealt with by 
various writers. (Snilders. Trans. 3th 'Congr. Far -East. 
Ass. Trop.Tïed. Bangkok. 1. 133 -150, 1930. Dinger, Gen. 
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Tijds.v.ILedrl.Indie. 72. 1331- 1336., 1932. and De Vogel, 
BBu11.Off.Int.Hyg.Púb. 27. 1324-1331, 1935) . 
By .far the most complete research has been done in 
British India and a full set of suggested regulations to 
govern the situation is given by Sinton, (Health Bulletin 
'o. 20., 1934). ïne African question has been discussed 
in reference to Tanganyika, (Scott. East African med.J1. 
9. 283 -293, 1933). 
In America the danger has been definitely admitted, 
(Gumming. U.S. Pub.Health report, 46. 2361 -2366, 1931. 
and Griffiths. Bull.Off.Int.Publ. 24. 948 -952, 1932), .chile 
there was much discussion at the Pan. -American Sanitary 
Conference on the whole subject, in 1934. 
The transportation of persons in the incubation stage 
and those having the disease in the very Mild ambulant 
stage, is a danger which does not require emphasis, but the 
question of the mosquito in the aeroplane, whether infected 
or not, has needed some investigation. We have had 
evidence in Natal, Brazil, that A.Gambia can be carried 
across the Atlantic ocean from Dakar, French Africa, with 
fatal effects. (Shannon. Amer.J1.Hyg. XV. 3 pp. 634 -663, 
1932). In the Americas, various types of planes were used 
to convey aegypti, which were first coloured for 
identification. 
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A series of 102 observations were made, from San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, to Miami, ilorida, U.S \.- 1,250 miles - a 
fifth of the . mosquitoes survived after one day t s Might with 
several stops. Between Central America and the United 
States, experiments on twelve planes of three different linet 
resulted in 8% of the aegypti reaching the termini, some 
after thirty hours, others after seventy -eight hours, and 
ten in between landings, including three all -night stops. 
In the Belgian Congo and Kenya, similar results have been 
obtained. (T.I. and J.J. Griffiths, U.S.Pub.Health Rep. 
46. 2775 -2782, and Bu11.Off.ïnt.HygPub1. 24. 948 -952, 
1931 and 1932; Id;cLullen. Bu11.Off.Int.Hyg.rubl. 25. 
1024 -1027, 1933; Trolli. Bull.Off.Int.Hyg.Publ. 24. 603- 
612, 1933; S-ymes. Bull.Off.Int.Hyg.Publ. 26. 1048 -1056, 
1934), In these experiments many types of aeroplanes were 
used and the authors came to the conclusion that mosquitoes 
could be transported, therefore infected mosquitoes m_i =;ht 
be, and that they could bite persons en route because the 
experimental insects did so. 
It must however be remembered that because flying 
fields aretsually well away from the centres of human 
habitation and that during the resting period of the planes 
there is seldom either the attraction of water for 
deposition of eggs, or humans for a blood feed, remaining 
in the plane, so the possibility of an aegypti seeking 
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such a resting place is remote. 
In any case, control of aerodromes is an easy matter 
in terms of anti -ae :ypti pork. 
One danger must be mentioned. In ~:y observation of 
flying fields and aerodromes in I :`alaya, I found A. 
albopictus in quantity, and they are incriminated as carriers 
of both Dengue and Yellow Fever experimentally, and classed 
as "inefficient ". Their breeding habits are very similar 
to «.aegypti but their restin,_; places, after biting, are 
not in houses but in the jungle. It would be impossible 
to control them as we can aegypti. 
Finally vie may say fairly definitely, that althou_h 
there is a possibility of the virus being conveyed by 
mosquitoes in aeroplanes, the probability is that it would 
be conveyed in humans. As it is the British Empire on 
which the greatest responsibility rests for the prevention 
of the spread of Yellow Fever to the Last, the situation 
in India may be taken as an example. 
This situation is fraught with danger from three 
separate angles: - 
(a) The insect vector. 
(b) Iluman population. 
(c) Simian population. 
Sinton has summed the matter up thus: - 
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"The evidence available goes to prove that there are 
present in India large and widely spread numbers, not 
only of the most dangerous carrier of Yellow Fever, 
Aedes s;jpti, but also of several potential carriers. 
While the latter may not from their habits appear 
so dangerous to man as is Aedes aegypti, yet there 
seems little reason to doubt that they would be 
capable of transmitting the disease from nan to man, 
should occasion arise. The chief danger from such 
mosquitoes, more particularly from the jungle - 
haunting species, appears to be that they may spread 
the disease to monkeys. Such an occurrence would 
-give rise to a very dangerous potential reservoir 
of the disease, which it might be almost impossible 
to stamp out." 
Again: - 
et there ; evidence that Yellow' Fever has invaded As is o 
for many centuries, there is no reason to suspect,' 
that the population has acquired immunity. That they 
have any such mass immunity, is not borne out by the 
results of the protection tests which have been done 
with the sera of people from 1iadras. It therefore 
seems probable that the population of India as a whole, 
have little or no immunity, either natural or acquired, 
against the virus of Yellow Fever, and that the 
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introduction of the disease would be followed by very 
severe consequences." (Sinton. Health Bull. ? ?o.20. 
Delhi. pp. 3 and 4.) 
It has been proved that the two common, almost 
domestic monkeys of India are highly susceptible to the 
virus both by bite and inoculation, and that the pathology 
is identical with human cases. (Stokes, Bauer and Hudson. 
Am.J1.Trop.Med. VIII. pp. 103 -164). 
Such close association with humans and, ipso facto, 
with aegypti, makes this factor of especial danger. 
Certain African monkeys have been shown to be immune 
to protection test, proving that they had been infected 
by the virus. The virus must have been transmitted by 
mosquitoes of the jungle variety, and as certain Indian 
jungle mosquitoes are carriers, it follows that the virus 
could thus the more easily spread amongst Indian monkeys and 
so to man. 
Again, while the infective period in man is the first 
three days, in the monkey it continues throughout the 
disease, thereby increasing the danger time in the simian 
population to infect mosquitoes. (Hinman. Ann.Entom.Soc. 
Amer., XXV. pp. 617'- 620). 
The enormous simian population which, in some parts of 
India, has reli_ous protection, would not only be a vast 
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source of infection, but also a reservoir of the virus, and 
being religiously protected, be all the more difficult to 
control. 
Temperature, which has been discussed in a previous 
section, in terms of incubation in the insect, is favourable 
over a great part of the country and during a greater part 
of the year, while in many parts it is idéal. Soper in 
Columbia, and Stefanpoulo in Guinea, have recently shown 
that natural infection in monkeys is a fact. 
Once the jungle mosquito had spread the disease to the 
jungle monkey, would it be possible to eradicate the 
disease7.. 
Again let it be stated - the disease must never reach 
the East. 
Having shown how highly susceptible India is with its 
congested population of man, Ìonkey and mosquito, we may 
now discuss the possible route of infection. 
In the Epidemiological Report of the League of Nations, 
R.E. 179 of 1935, p.143, it is stated: - 
"The nearest focus (to India) is in the south of the 
Anglo- Egyptian Sudan in the provinces of Bahr -el- Ghazal 
and Mongalla. This latter province is crossed by the 
Imperial Airways' air-mail line from the Cape to Cairo 
with halts at Juba (night stoppage) Ma.lakal, Kosti and 
Khartoum. The journey Juba- Cairo, now performed twice 
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weekly, takes two days. On the other hand, Karachi 
is two days journey from Cairo by the direct service 
(twice weekly) of the Dutch Line "K.L.M." and three days ! 
from Alexandria by the Imperial Airways' line, with 
halts in Palestine, Iraq, Iran or Arabia. 
British Inikda, a highly infectible country, is therefore; 
five days by air from the Yellow Fever foci of the 
Southern Sudan." 
Since the above was written the time of flight has 
been shortened to 22 days to Karachi from Khartoum, and 
five days from Khartoum to Singapore or Bangkok. (Bradshaw's 
International Air Guide, 1938). Smaller lines and private 
planes communicate in all directions with these main points. 
An infected man could therefore arrive at any of these 
infectible centres well within the incubation period and in 
turn infect mosquitoes before recognition of the disease 
could be made or prophylactic measures inaugurated. 
So much for the direct method of transportation by air, 
which under peace conditions has been, and can be controlled 
by stringent regulations, but, in my opinion, would almost 
certainly break down in war. 
The other method is slower and more insidious than air, 
i.e. by land from the lest Coast and Centre of Africa to the 
East Coast, and from thence by coastal boats to India. This 
is the more likely method. 
East Africa is highly infectible, having Aedes aegypti 
ubiquitous, as well as Aedes 7ittatus and Pedes africanus, 
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the two latter both possible vectors. (Scott. East í. ..fric. 
Med. J1. 9. 283 -293, 1933.) 
We have seen how the Americas became infected by 
sailing ships which in the early days were uncontrolled, 
and to -day the Arab dhows and other primitive craft would 
present the same problem. 
The East Coast would quickly become an endemic area 
with the added difficulty of early recognition being 
hampered by the racial immunity of the black population. 
Until the present, the long journey over high 
mountains for the human, and the low temperature in the 
crossing for the mosquito, has been an effectual barrier, 
but with the advent of modern means of travel, by air, 
rail and motor car, the stage is set for the first epidemic 
unless stringent regulations are enforced. 
The migratory habits of the natives, who use the 
motor bus and lorry services freely, are an added danger. 
Segregation of areas of sleeping sickness in the 
campaign against that disease have taught the sanitarians 
how difficult it is to control the migrating negro. 
In 1929 the Advisory Council of the East Bureau of 
the League of Nations health Organization discussed the 
measures to be adopted to prevent the importation of the 
virus to the East, the most urgent being - (a) the 
interdiction of all air traffic from infected or even 
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suspected areas to any of the countries in the regional 
area of the Eastern Bureau until such times as the measures 
concerted by the Office international d'Hygiene publique 
are being effectually applied.; (b) The prohibition by 
law under severe penalty of the importation or possession 
of Yellow lever virus for any purpose in all countries in 
the East liable to infection with this virus. 
This included India, Ceylon, Siam, Philippine Islands, 
Netherlands Indies and Belgian Congo. 
This was reiterated in 1930 by the Congress of the 
Far -Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine at Bangkok. 
In 1929, the Permanent Committee of the Office 
international d'Hygiene publique had drafted regulations 
for the sanitary control of aerial navitation. 
FOR THREE LONG YEARS THIS TAS UNDER DISCUSSIONTITH 
THE VARIOUS COT4MITTEES AND GOVE (ìTIMWTS CONCERNED. .
It was finally signed at the Hague on April 12th, 1933, 
BUT DID NOT CONE INTO FORCE UNTIL AUGUST 1st, 1935. 
Thus is seen the difficulty of procuring agreement 
among nations regarding the formulation of initial regulations 
of advantage to them all commercially, but of how much 
greater difficulty is their honest application. Compared 
with previous sanitary conventions, this last took into 
consideration the new knowledge of the disease, especially 
the fact that typical cases are only a small percentage of 
157. 
the existing disease. 
Provision was made for means to be used to identify 
hidden cases by biological tests such as sero -protection 
and animal inoculation, with notification of the results. 
(Arts. 36. 37.) 
Specially severe measures were taken to prevent 
importation of the virus into infectible areas. 
In endemic areas, where the disease could be either 
clinically or biologically identified all aerodromes must 
be "anti- amaryl" which meant a competent medical staff, 
all necessary sanitary equipment and housing as in ordinary 
"sanitary" aerodromes, but in addition, special dwellings 
and water supply for the local staff, crews and passengers, 
rendered mosquito -proof. (Art. 38). 
Aerodromes may be "separate local areas" and 
communication suspended with other localities if auto - 
chthonous Yellow Fever appeared. (Art. 41). 
In contradistinction to previous Conventions, notice 
was taken of the importance of controlling departures, as 
well as arrivals. 
(a) Inspection and, if necessary, disinsectisation of 
aircraft. 
(b) Medical inspection of passengers and crew; suspected 
persons to remain under observation until six days have 
elapsed since the last day on which they were exposed 
to infection, observation}\ meaning isolation in a 
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mosquito -proof house at the aerodrome itself. 
(c) The names of passengers and crew to be entered in the 
journey log -book, together with relevant information 
with regard to their exposure to infection, and the 
period and conditions of the observation undergone 
before departure. (Art. 42). 
Before the above rules were made, the infectible 
country had to take measures against the infection arriving, 
now the infected country must also take measures against a 
possibly infected departure. 
Countries where the disease does not exist but which are 
infectible by reason of mosquitoes which are carriers, need 
not have anti- amaryl aerodromes, but are authorized to take 
all necessary precautions to protect themselves, including 
observation of suspected arrivals for six days. (Art. 47). 
Where all the regulations have been carried out at the 
point of departure, even from an infected country, unless 
under very special circumstances, aeroplanes shall not be 
prohibited from landing, but may be ordered to some 
parcitularsanitary aerodrome. (Art. 48). 
In uninfectible countries, only inspection, disinsecti- 
sation and medical examination of passengers may take place, 
but no "observation ". 
These are obviously excellent regulations ON PAPER, but 
it is the spirit not the letter which is important. 
All depends on the honesty and competence of the medical 
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officer at the port of departure from an infected country. 
V'iith the best intention and skill it will not be 
simple to decide whether there has been exposure to infection 
within the previous six days, owing to the very various 
manifestations of the disease. 
Apart from the typical case, Article 36. demands 
recognition of the form which "might be revealed by biological 
examination ". 
This involves two procedures: - 
(1) Inoculation of M. rhesus, which would only confirm a 
suspected case, and which requires all the apparatus 
of a first class laboratory. 
(2) Positive sero -protection test, which would only be of 
value had it been done recently, and in very young 
children. 
Even thus, either a positive or negative test could 
my imply that the disease had, or had not, been present 
but might have died out. 
To enforce such a stringent and severe measure as 
Article 42.b. (vide page 157 ) on a positive sero -protection 
test alone, would be unwarranted, therefore it should be 
strengthened by consideration of the presence of high 
morbidity among natives, and a high aegypti index. 
The region of the aerodrome should be regularly tested 
by sero -protection, clinical and viscerotomic observation 
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;emphasized and anti- mosquito measures rigorously enforced. 
It is gratifying, to record that these regulations have 
been tested by application in the case of Yellow Fever 
reported in June 1934 at gau, in the Lnglo -EF rptian Sudan. 
The Government closed the Province of Bahr -el- Ghazal 
to all kinds of air traffic, and carried out every Convention 
regulation at the aerodromes at Juba, Malakal and Khartoum. 
All passengers from Bahr -el- Ghazal were under "observation" 
for six days before embarking at the first two aerodromes 
mentioned above, which had been made "Anti- amyral" for the 
occasion. 
Thus was the spirit as well as the letter of the 
Convention carried out. 
Since the signing of the 1935 Convention, two other 
methods not included at that date, have been proved. 
Disinsectisation during flight, and anti -amoral vaccination. 
The first had been provided for on departure and on arrival, 
but it is obvious that it must be more efficacious AFTER the 
plane has started when no more insects can enter. 
The latest test, carried out in an Imperial Airways 
Transcontinental Plan with an aqueous solution of pyrethin, 
caused the death of 50 mosquitoes in 15 minutes, and without 
any inconvenience to the passengers. 
We have stated before that the danger of mosquito 
!carriage is possible but not probable. 
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The great danger is the carriage of the man during the 
incubation period. 
It follows therefore, that the staff and crews of a 
service should have vaccination as a pre -requisite to 
employment, and this would obviate "observation ", at least 
of them, when passengers had to be so controlled. 
As a mass practice, vaccination holds out one of the 
best methods of control. In countries like Lfrica where 
there is a mixed population of whites who are highly 
sensitive, and Negros who have both a racial and specific 
immunity, the whites could all be vaccinated and, as they 
are the travelling part of the community, a large measure 
of safety would be established. 
This has been carried out on an extensive scale in 
French Africa and in some of the colonies in British 
Africa. 
To vaccinate the natives is much more difficult, but 
it could be done to those vtho are the more mobile, such 
as railwaymen, motor drivers, post office officials, 
chauffeurs and soldiers. 
In the Americas, which are included in infectible areas, 
the problem is different. 
In the 'Nest Indies, the major population is negro, and 
therefore potentially like Africa, on the mainland, the 
"Nhite- Indian population is equally sensitive. 
At least the administrative members of the areas could 
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be vaccinated, as has already been done to the Medical 
Staffs, and all mobile services. 
In the areas of jungle Yellow Fever, until the vector 
and reservoir have been demonstrated beyond doubt, the only 
available method of prophylaxis is mass vaccination. 
This is now being done in certain areas in Brazil, but 
the results await publication. 
This we do know. The sera of vaccinated persons 
until now have all been protective to mice, and there has 
been no case of Yellow Fever recorded in those who, being 
vaccinated, have been exposed, either in endemic areas or 
the laboratory. 
The sanitary regulations embodied in the Convention of 
1912, 1926 and 1933, are all dependent on the honesty and 
ability of the various authorities and their staffs, in 
their application. The measures to be taken to prevent 
the spread by sea and air are relatively simple, but by no 
means fool- proof, and can never be without eradication of the 
most easily attacked link in the chain of disease, i.e. the 
mosquito. 
This has been brilliantly demonstrated many times in 
South, Central and North America. When we come to consider 
how to protect land frontiers we are confronted with a much 
more complicated problem. 
Ships and aeroplanes can be compelled to follow routes 
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and make ports and landings where they are subject to 
proper inspection and control, but no specific nor general 
rules can be laid down as regards land -to -land frontiers. 
Migrating natives, caravans, hunting parties, and many 
other conditions which readily suggest themselves, not only 
in savage and semi -civilized countries, but in civilized 
communities, would entail administrative expense impossible 
to realize. 
',pith the complexity of nationalism at various 
frontiers, only some special bilateral arrangement might 
prove effective between the actual adjacent administrations. 
There is only one way, and that a proved way, in which 
to render susceptible areas or towns safe against the 
introduction of infection, and that is, to maintain the 
Aedes aegypti index below the critical point. 
In the first part of this section emphasis has been 
given to the measured adopted to prevent the importation of 
Yellow never to areas in the world which, up to the present, 
have not been infected but which are infectible. 
The same measures are applicable to those areas in 
the endemic region which, although free from Yellow Fever 
at the moment, may at any time again become infected. 
Actually there are many such areas in the endemic region, 
and they should be all the more interested in measures which 
would prevent the return of conditions of which they have had 
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tragic experience. 
That this intelligent conception of self -preservation 
has often been neglected Was best seen in the return of 
Yellow Fever to Rio de 4aneiro in 1928 -29, after an absence 
of twenty years, and in spite of ample warning that it was 
at its gates in 1926. (Jameson -Carr. Unpub.Report. Rock. 
Found. August, 1926). 
Unless an epidemic is present in some other part of 
the endemic region, it has been found impracticable to 
insist on the application of all the measures in the various 
Conventions as concerning arrivals in any particular area 
free from infection, but complete safety is assured in 
Such an area if anti- aegypti prophylaxis has been persistently 
maintained. It was the neglect of this simple precaution 
in Rio de Janeiro Which allowed the spread of the disease 
when it arrived, at resultant panic -cost to re- establish 
control and reputation. The fundamental principles in a 
consideration of the methods to be employed in an anti - 
yellow fever campaign were discussed and emphasized in 1932, 
at the Cape Town Conferences of the Health Services of the 
World, and again at the ninth Pan -American Sanitary Con- 
ference in 1934. 
In practice it was noted that there were two aspects: - 
(1) Measures of permanent application in the endemic zone. 
(2) Measures of urgency, when an epidemic is discovered. 
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In the first, the anti- aep;ypti campaign stands, as 
ever paramount. In the second, there is merely an 
amplification and extension of the first. 
iere the first practised continuously and vigorously 
in all the key points, including large and small towns, 
ports, river stations or other centres where humans 
congregate, there would seldom eventuate the need for the 
second, nor would it cause perturbation in the surrounding 
areas. 
This fundamental axiom was affirmed at the Buenos Aires 
Conference in 1934. It would be impossible to quote from 
all the numerous books that have been written in great 
detail concerning the various experiences of, and methods 
employed by, sanitarians in Yellow Fever zones since the 
vector was discovered. 
I propose to give my own experiences during the 
campaign in Brazil, under the International health Board 
of the Rockefeller Foundation, Brazil. 
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The Rockefeller Yellow Fever Commission began work in 
Sao Salvador, the capital city of the State of Bahia, in 
November, 1923, at the tail end of the regular periodic 
epidemic. 
During December, all the key cities had appointed to 
there a regular officer of the service who immediately 
instituted a campaign against Aedes aegypti in the larval 
state. 
The idea of the Commission at that time was that if the 
key cities could be controlled for a certain time, they 
being the endemic centres, the interior would burn itself 
out from "failure of the human host." 
That this unfortunately was not so, has been discussed 
in the section on Epidemiology. 
Work was thus begun in nine cities on the coast of 
'Brazil, from Belem in the T'orth to and including, Sao 
Salvador in the South. 
My station was Parahyba do Norte, the capital of the 
state of that name, half way between the terminal cities. 
It is important to note that the language was 
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Fortugese, of which I knew nothing. 
The seasons in this part of Brazil are divided into the 
wet and the dr,,r, and my arrival in Parahyba coincided with 
the middle of the dry season, or the year end. 
Immediate contact was made with the Brazilian Fedica.l 
Officer of Health, who had received instructions from his 
Government to assist the Commission in the work. 
The language difficulty at once became apparent, and I 
decided that to prevent initial errors, no definite plan of 
campaign should be made, nor work begun until I had learned 
sufficient of the medium of communication to make myself 
thoroughly understood. 
Meanwhile a house was selected in the centre of the 
city, large enough to include an office and compound for 
the accommodation of the staff work and apparatus. 
This inclusion of house and office is important, 
especially at the beginning of a campaign, for the Director 
must be on the spot and at work many more hours than the 
staff. 
The General Head Quarters should always be chosen as 
near the strategic and tactical centre as possible, as the 
inspectors start from the centre each morning, and return 
there with their reports and apparatus each night. 
The first month was employed in hiring; men suitable 
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for the work, and this is not easy. 
Only healthy, morally reliable men should be employed, 
and especially those with normal eyesight, as an inspector 
has to enter houses at a time when only the women are at 
home, see the minute speck which is the aegypti egg, end 
be free from marked malformation or disease, such as skin 
disease, for he must deal with the drinking water of the 
inhabitants. 
In the anxiety to lower the index at once, these points 
were not appreciated and were the cause of many complaints 
from householders, and then j:t was brought home the 
essentially domestic nature of the campaign. 
Later, during an inspection of eyesight in another 
station where there had been reported a very consistently 
low index for two years under impossible meteorological 
conditions, it was discovered that the whole force had 68.7% 
under normal vision. The chief inspectors, 75% less than 
normal, including the director himself. The report stated: 
"it is submitted that normal vision is of primary 
importance in work of our type. The age of the force 
varies from 17 to 66 years, and therefore, opthalmo- 
logically, no man over ^O can be blamed should he fail 
to see small larvae, the presbyotic condition being 
normal at that age, therefore each man should be examined 
before being appointed, this being just to the man and 
safe -guarding the Commission". (Jameson -Carr. Unpub. 
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Report. aock.?ound., Jan. 1926). 
The index in this town had been given as under lip for 
two years, whereas it was over 12, thereby giving a false 
sense of security. 
Before opening the office to hiring, a plan of the town 
had been acquired and an estimate made of the number of 
houses, average number of houses in a zone of one day's 
work, and the number of zones and. districts. 
A large blckboard was constructed, and on it the plan 
was painted in white, three districts marked with different 
coloured lines, and zones deliminated. 
At the end of each day's inspection, the man in 
charge of a zone chalked off the block of houses he had 
inspected so that only a glance was needed to see how the 
work was progressing. 
Ta.turally, in a larger town, more than one blackboard 
would be needed, as I found in Bahiv, ; when I was transferred 
to that State. 
In the compound, fish tanks had to be built of 
concrete, as in the first experiment I had. used old wine 
barrels cut in half, which, still retaining acetic and 
tartaric acid, caused the death of the fish. 
The placing of fish was a constant cause of friction 
with the inhabitants as they accused. them of poisoning their 
water, and has since been given up. 
To..day fish are only used in large tanks whose water is 
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not used for drinking. 
A book with tear -out leaves was given to each 
inspector, who made entries as he went from house to house 
as follows: - 
(1) Number of houses inspected. 
(2) Total number of houses encountered with foci. 
(3) Total number of water containers inspected. 
(4) Total number of containers breeding mosquitoes. 
(5) Total number of containers encountered with live fish. 
(6) Total number of fish placed. 
(7) Number of water containers sealed. 
(8) Percentage of houses found with foci. 
(e) Percentage of containers found with foci. 
(10) Notes. 
At the end of each day these reports of the inspectors 
were collected by the chief inspectors of the district, 
and the district as a whole calculated; while at the end 
of the week, the whole town report was completed. 
Two checks daily were made on the inspectors, first 
by the chief inspector of the district who examined five 
houses immediately behind and in front of his man without 
telling him of the result, and by my assistant, who covered 
the whole tow irregularly, while I myself examined at any 
point without notice. 
A rapid means of finding an inspector was by means of 
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flags on small sticks with a metal point which could be 
stuck in the gate or in the adobe wall of a house so that 
it hung at an angle to the wall, permitting at a glance 
the location of the house in which an inspector was working. 
By experiment, we found that the best colour for a 







We chose the Yellow, as we found that the first three 
were used already in the town for specific indication. 
The Yellow was associated with our work and had the 
letters "F.A." stamped on it, (Febre Amerello). (Unpub. 
Report. Rock.Found. 1925, G.Jameson -Carr). 
Each inspector carried with him an Identity Card to 
guarantee that no unauthorized person entered a house, for 
by this means we had already eliminated two thieves who had 
applied for work. 
As an encouragement to good work, the "Semana Inglez" 
(English week of 5i days was introduced) no other labour 
in the district having this priviledge, and as a result, 
the work was both speeded up and better done. 
The scheme of covering the whole town in one week 
was originated on the assumption that from egg to adult 
took eight days, but it was soon demonstrated by careful 
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experiment that the cycle in Parahyba was never less than 
thirteen days, and this fact led to another scheme being 
left with the authorities after the immediate danger was 
over, and the aegypti under control, and at much less cost. 
This will be quoted at length at the end of this 
section. 
It will be seen in the section on Epidemiology, 
Page et seq. the various types of water containers 
that an inspector could encounter, and the means of control 
were also various. 
As to method, much depends on the water supply of any 
particular town and even particular districts and 
individual houses in a town. 
If water was laid on, and the supply constant, there 
was no problem in terms of water. All the inspector had 
to do was to see that no water was allowed to stand in any 
receptacle, and if found, emptied. Outside however, he 
had to watch for dis -used tins, coconut shells, etc., and 
these were either punctured or smashed. 
If the supply was intermittent or dependent on rainfall 
and roof collection, water had to be conserved, and fish 
placed. 
As I have already stated, this method caused much 
friction with the inhabitants, but at that time was 
necessary, as we did not have the backing of the law which now 
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is enforced, and if after a warning a container is found 
with larvae, it may be oiled, which ensures cleaning, 
especially if containing drinking water. 
I attempted to obviate this friction by supplying 
cotton covers for the jars of drinking water which had 
a tape attached for tying round the top. 
This was only partly successful, and depended on the 
care of the house -wife or domestic, while the children were 
often found using them as caps. 
Tanks were sealed by paper strips and paste, and as 
they usually contained water for washing or gardening, 
- 
could not be oiled; if they could not be closed, fish 
were used. 
Parahyba was a town with an intermittent water supply 
to the better class houses, and a well or river sup__ly 
to the poorer class. 
This means that it was, what I term a "jar" town, and 
as many as 200 eighty -litre jars were found in one house, 
all breeding aedes aegypti. 
:pother common breeding place was in the "Dias" or 
circular earthenware channels placed around the foot of 
citrus trees to prevent the red cutting ant from 
destroying them. 
The inhabitants objected to having oil used as they 
claimed that domestic animals might be poisoned by drinking 
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from them. 
This objection was overcome by the subterfuge of 
dipping the small brush, carried for cleaning out such 
containers of debris, in oil before entering a garden, 
the fine film of the bristles of the brush being transferred 
to the water or left on the sides; an invisible but 
efficient film remaining. 
The question of the texicity of oil iras settled in 
the presence of a committee of the householders by my 
drinking a spoonful with no evil result, and also pouring 
some down the throat of my on chickens and a sheep. 
The question of the use of oil in our work vas made 
the subject of a special report covering the laboratory 
and the field. 
Many experiments were rade with different oils and 
combinations of oils, until the proper one was discovered, 
and its physical, chemical and biological properties 
determined on both cedes aegypti and Culexi tieans. 
From the point of view of its mechanical application, 
the laboratory was confirmed in the field, and also such 
things as the type of spray most economical, the weight 
Which could be carried, the weight of man required to carry 
a tank full, and even means to reduce fatigue by adjusting 
the tank to the shoulders and back. (C.Jameson -Carr, 
Unpub. Report. Rock.Found. Feb.2Gth.,1925). 
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A, useful fact was discovered that if a container of 
earthenware, wood or cement (the majority were these) were 
oiled every week for six months, sufficient oil was absorbed 
by the material to release a film lethal to larvae for 
another six months without re- oiling. 
Because it was found necessary to eradicate not only 
Aedes but also Culex mosquitoes in order to get the goodwill 
of the people, who failed to distinguish between the two, 
oiling of drains and cess pits :ras undertaken. 
Here I ran up against another snag, for the oil killed 
the aerobic organisms which reduced the cess, but happily 
the inhabitants did not realize that, and their freedom 
from Culex which were more troublesome than Aedes as biters, 
made the important part of the work more easy of accomplish- 
ment. 
As the rifle is to the infantryman, so is an electric 
torch to an inspector. In the early days before torches, 
an inspector had to either empty a container to a small 
water depth in order to see larvae, or dip out the last two 
or three inches. That procedure took much time and labour, 
so that only few houses could be examined in one day. 
With the advent of the torch, search was speeded up as 
the inspector could shine his torch into the container and 
see the larvae wriggling down to the bottom, and also the 
black eggs deposited on the sides above the water line. 
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At the beginning o;" the campaign in Brazil, all the 
force had been supplied with torches which cast a diffused 
light which, although good enough in comparison with the 
old method, was .got strong enou, _,h to see the bottom of a 
tall 62 litre jar which was the usual water storage in 
Parahyba and elsewhere. 
A very complete research was macle into this question. 
as to the best type of light, and the length of time a 
battery would last under average use. then it is noted 
that the Yellaa Fever Commission used 10,000 batteries a 
month, any saving in this item of expenditure is of great 
importance. 
Our final discovery was as follows. S7Dot light 
efficiency was twice as great as diffuse light, es six is 
to fourteen days use. 
Each diffuse light cost 576 milreis per year, each 
spot light cost 288 milreis per year, which deducting the 
e_.tra cost of the spot light, 20 milreis, gave a saving of 
288 milreis per light per year. 
Every battery issued was first tested by a volt metre 
and the voltage noted., different zones (according to numbers 
and type of container) was known to use up more or less 
voltage, therefore an inspector could not claim a new 
battery before it was due, which again saved mach pilfering.' 
In Bahia, where this method was not in use, I found 
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thousands of batteries had been given out unnecessarily 
and the discarded batteries sold in the town. 
Knowing the exact voltage life of a battery in 
relation to the amount of work required in any particular 
zone, made for fairness in checking up on the results of 
any particular inspector, who before the introduction of 
precise knowledge, was often unfairly critisized for not 
discovering larvae, by one of us checking after him vrith 
a fresh battery. 
The type of torch should be the "fixed focus" variety 
with a specially strong switch, as these soon become 
unserviceable Dying to the fact that they are switched on 
and off hundreds of times a day. (Jameson-Garr, Unpub. 
Report. Rock.Found. August and 1?ovember, 1924). 
Beginning the work in Parahyba in January, 1924, -with 
an index of 69, by August of the same year the index was 
4 %; notwithstanding that we had been through the rainy 
season, and had had all the difficulty of building up the 
organization 'while working. 
h:hen the low percentage figures had been reached, and 
maintained low for some time, it was noted that in certain 
zones, but more especially groups of adjacent houses, 
complaints were received from the inhabitants of the 
presence of adult mosquitoes. 
At that time sleeping nets had been discarded over the 
whole to'm as unnecessary. 
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I, with ray immediate assistant, would visit the zone 
or house and make a special thorough search for the missed 
water deposit which was breeding. 
It was often a matter of long waiting and watching 
individual mosquitoes to find but from whence they came. 
A fact; had been noted that the male mosquito always 
remained in the immediate vicinity of the breeding place so 
as to catch the female before she had time to become 
thoroughly dry and so escape impregniation, also that males 
always emerged first and in greater numbers. 
From these facts, a method was developed called "the 
converging method" to find difficult foci of breeding. 
A place of maximum complaint vas made the spot of 
convergence, and several inspectors began catching adults 
at the periphery of a circle whose centre was the spot. 
The sex was noted in terms of percentage, and as the 
percentage of males increased, so one ?mew that the breeding 
1 place was being approached. 
In this way these foci which the inspectors had missed, 
not unnaturally, were found, and the index still further 
reduced. (Jameson -Carr. Unpub.Report. Rock.Found., 1925). 
This method has been used with great success throughout 
Brazil since that time, (Soper. Present day Liethods for 
the Study and Control of Yellow Fever. pp. 666.668, 1937). 
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and so- called "iJother Foci Squads" have become a permanent 
feature of the campaign, and with the use of oil, backed 
by application of the law, it is claimed by Soper that 
indices are at 0% in some Brazilian cities, and those the 
most difficult to control. 
Habitations and areas in any town where strangers 
congregate, either foreign or native, require special 
watching. 
At first, while having instituted this special watch 
on Hotels, Boarding houses and Houses of Prostitution, we 
had neglected one of the most potent sources of contact, 
the churches. 
This was a catholic country, and all classes Mixed 
freely at all times in religious observance. 
Parahyba was a bishop's diocese, with a cathedral, 
many churches, and a monastery, as well as a convent. 
Being anxious not to antagonize such a powerful 
religious as well as political influence at the beginning 
of the campaign, the examination of their premises had been 
more cursory than particular, by the inspectors, who had 
an actual fear of finding foci in a sacred edifice. 
I myself examined them and found larvae in many 
places, as well as in the fonts of sacred water. 
.Naturally, a person feeling ill, especially in the 
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dangerous incubation and first stage of Yellow Fever, 
would seek consolation in his church, meet there awaiting 
him an Aedes aeypti, which after twelve days would infect 
others at their devotions, and so on. 
Lecca and Benares are well known in relation to the 
spread of disease. 
The Bishop, who was an intelligent priest, allowed me 
to experiment with the view of finding some solution of the 
problem. 
He readily admitted a thorough inspection by 
inspectors who were Roman Catholics, (we had some 
Protestants), but the question of the Holy .a.ter presented 
difficulties. 
However, even this was satisfactorily arranged by 
using a saline solution which did not interefere with the 
original purpose of the water. 
It was found that although the insect would lay her 
eggs above the water line as before, neither would they 
hatch, nor larvae live, in a strength of 2¡ sodium 
chloride. (Jameson- Carr. Lp.Po.12., Unpub.Report. 'Lock. 
Found., August, 1925). 
The question as to whether _cedes would breed in other 
than man -made containers was important, and was made the 
subject of an experiment. 
I had failed to find either eggs or larvae in any 
collection of water whose sides were of earth during my 
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entire stay in Brazil. 
I was able, however, to force ,:,odes to lay, and the 
eggs subsequently to breed out, in an artificial mud 
puddle when all other deposits were unavailable. 
This finding allowed us to confine our work to man- 
made containers while having regard to the remote 
possibility of forcing the insect to develop sylvan habits 
were all household deposits rendered unapproachable. 
This is a real danger, but there are, as yet no 
records that it has happened. (Jameson -Carr. Unpub. 
Report. Rock.Found. Exp.I,o.6., 1925, and Carter. The 
Early Hist. Yellow Fever. p.12. 1931.) 
After the force had been thoroughly trained and the 
town under effective control, experiemnts were conducted 
to confirm or not various statements made by other 
observers on the effect of control and the means of 
attainment. 
One such was recorded in the "Tropical Diseases 
Bulletin" ]:o.4. Vol.21. para. 3., 1921, -where it was 
stated: - 
"Efforts at controlling the mosquito have hitherto 
met with little permanent success, though temporarily 
the Stegomya index of BO% can be reduced to 5% by a 
week's intensive work. The effectiveness of such 
measures suggests the advisability Of instituting 
a 'cleaning -urn'+ vreek at least once a year in every 
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town where cases of Yellow Fever have been knaun to occur 
within the last twenty years." 
A small town on the railway some kilometres from 
Parahyba ;'pas selected, and the whole force employed to 
thoroughly clean it, in terms of ,Ades, in one day. 
The corrected census was 1,642 inhabitants, with 
459 houses including; those not occupied, which was 66. 
The result of the inspection was - 
Houses inspected'.. . .. .. .. .. .. 393 
Houses with foci .. .. . 78 19.Új 
Deposits inspected .. .. . .. .. .. 962 
Deposits breeding mosquitoes .. .. 
Dumber of fish placed .. .. 
.. .. 109 
.. 207 
11.3`¡ 
All the methods used in Parahyba were employed, in- 
cluding oiling where possible, covering, emptying, and the 
obliteration of unnecessary deposits both outside and inside 
houses. 
One week later, an exactly similar inspection was made 
and the result noted as follows: - 
Houses inspected .. .. . .. . .. 393 
Houses with foci . .. 16. . . s. 93 20.6 
Deposits inspected .. .. .. .. .. .. 815 
Deposits breeding mosquitoes .. .. .. .. 113 13.8`, 
Deposits with live fish .. .. .. 00 .. 9 
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In the first inspection adults were - found in 10% of 
the houses. In the second, only in 4 %. In 505 of the 
deposits breeding in the first inspection, pupae were 
present. In the second only 4.65, but the actual index 
of both houses and deposits were higher. Thus was 
completely disproved the contention of the statement in the 
Bulletin and the increase explained when the.habits of the 
laying female adult ,i4' remembered. 
On the first day all deposits were emptied regardless 
of the water level and the inhabitants naturally filled 
them up again which then covered the eggs sticking to the 
sides which hatched at once. 
Jars which had been dry on the first inspection, but 
with eggs on the sides, were included, and the inhabitants 
took the opportunity to replenish their supply all at once, 
with the resultant increase in percentage. 
Only a system which allowed of a complete eradication 
of eggs as well as larvae and adults would permit of such 
an optimistic result as suggested in the statement quoted, 
and.that could seldom be applied. 
The point to be noted is that aedes control needs 
time and that drastic methods are seldom applicable, 
therefore all the more should control be instituted 
and maintained before the disease has been introduced. 
(Jameson -Carr. Exp.no.19. Unpub.Report. ROck.í4ound. 
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June 15th, 1924). 
After more than a year's work as described above, I 
had come to certain conclusions which I believed applied 
to taie problem of Yellow Fever Control generally, and made 
the following report: - 
The Director General. 
Yellow Fever Commission, 
DRA.L I L. 
February 15th, 1025. 
Sir: - 
I have the honour to submit the following deductions 
from a study of conditions in relation to mosquito 
breeding and its control in the city of Parahyba do Forte, 
Brazil. This study has extended over fourteen months, 
from December 10th, 1924, to February 10th, 1925, or 
biologically speaking, one dry season through a wet season, 
a second dry season into the beginning of another wet 
season. 
Thus a complete cycle in the life and habits of the 
mosquitoes of Parahyba has been observed, and the effects 
of control on the start of another. 
At this point, I wish to make a distinction between 
"control" as understood in relation to the stamping out 
of Yellow Fever, and "control" in relation to what is 
possible of accomplishment by authorities who depend on 
their funds gained by taxes, which again depend on the 
variable economic situations of any year, and not least, 
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on the appreciation by those in power for the time being, of 
the advantages of control. 
As regards the former, the tóConirnisae contre Febre 
sunarellatt had a definite object in v i ev , i.e. the rapid 
and intensive reduction of the index of -cedes aegypti, and 
its maintenance over such a period as v; ould render the 
vection of the disease impossible, and therefore completely 
abolish it. 
The Rockefeller Foundation at this time bore the 
entire expense of the campaign. 
Zhi1e this was the object; in order to gain_ the 
co- operation and appreciation of the inhabitants who are, 
in their ignorance and often even superstition, the main 
obstacle to a campaign in public health in all countries, 
the other species of Mosquitoes found breeding in or in the 
immediate vicinity of the city, were included in the 
measures used, as people of the householder type do not 
differentiate between species, nor the diseases they convey. 
In this city these other species were f edes ar;y- 
rotarsis and Culex fatigans, both vectors of disease, while 
a few others added their torment in a lesser degree. 
As regards the latter, it has been shovm, pari passu, 
that a city can be rendered not only safe, but comfortable 
so much so that it excites the envy of other cities not in a 
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like position, and thereby raises the "ver;onha" (pride) 
and civic status of that city. 
The urgency of the former necessity obliged the 
Cormnissae to expend funds much greater in amount, and to 
employ a staff of larger numbers, than would have been the 
case had there only been the latter expediency. 
Again, in the campaign in Parahyba, early in the work, 
it was found necessary to separate the Commissae from the 
Prohylaxia Rural (Public Health Department) which department!, 
was sup_osed to give actual and moral support to the 
object, and on whom it depended for the enforcement of th 
regulations regarding it, and although we never had this 
assistance, in fact their antagonism, we have accomplished 
all our aims, without once appealing to the authorities. 
In other words, we believe that our object would and 
should be better achieved by influencing the people from 
below upwards than from above downwards. 
The result has been gratifying both from the point of 
view of eradication of the mosquito and the attitude of the 
people. 
I am of the opinion that now that the danger of Yellou 
Fever is passed, mosquitoes per se can at least be kept under 
to the extent of rendering Parahyba comfortable, if not as 
safe as it has been during the last six months, and for a 
much less expenditure, compatible with the city's financial 
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position. This opinion has been deduced by the study of 
the mosquito cycle and the results of the campaign. 
Our scheme has been the inspection of each habitation 
once a week, or twice, as the condition of a particular 
zone demanded, and therefore the employment of a greater 
number of men than necessary for an ordinary scheme, and 
the use of material and appliances in excess of that 
.required; had we had the pacer to enforce the law. The 
average of such expenditure has been 15,000 dollars (milreis) 
a month, and the employment of up to sixty rersons during thé 
most intensive part of the campaign; but this has been 
much reduced latterly while retaining a satisfactory index, 
in terms of Yellow Fever. 
The raison d'otre of the scheme of the Commissiai has 
been the cycle time of the Aedes aegypti, which was taken 
as ei,ht days minimum. 
1 "e know that this cycle time varies in different 
climates and in different countries, having the same 
general climate, and also different conditions of 
deposition of eggs. 
In our laboratory in Parahyba we have found that the 
minimum cycle time of Aedes aegypti is thirteen days under 
the most favourable of food and temperature, and in those' 
deposits most favoured by the mosquito. 
Not content with laboratory findings, we followed 
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these observations into the field and confirmed -them. 
(vide previous reports). 
4e also found that, when once a zone had been 
thoroughly worked by our intensive method, and had an 
index which was not only what is called an "inspector's 
index" but a confirmed "Director's Index ", that it 
maintained that index for at least one month after all work 
. had stopped. 
Again we believe from experience that once houses 
which are isolated by a wall, hedge or strip of land, are 
rendered free from both larvae and the eggs of Aedes 
aegypti, they will not become reinfected for a long 
period, unless water deposits are introduced which contain 
either larvae, or, as is more usual, eggs, of which more 
anon in another report. 
Acting on this belief and confirming it to our satis- 
faction, we cut out certain zones in this city, and by 
recent re- survey, have proved we were justified, so much 
so that we have proposed a formula, "Given thorough control 
for a year over the entire area of a city, thereafter only 
the central congested sections need be worked." In other 
words, take care of the centre and the periphery will 
take care of itself., 
The weakness of flight of Aedes aegypti is well known 
and has been used to determine the extent of isolation and 
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fumigation in relation to actual fever control. 
As regards Culex and Anopheline mosquitoes, these 
points do not hold good, but in a country such as this 
where the dry season is of such an extent that the available 
deposits in and around a town are practically obliterated, 
much can be accomplished, especially with Culex, by a closed 
system of sewage, and this is being done in Parahyba, while 
the Commissao itself completely controlled the main source 
of Anophelines in the immediate vicinity of the city, (vide 
previous report). 
Based on these facts, the plan which I propose for the 
city of Parahyba for the continuence of the work after the 
departure of the Commissao, is as follows: - 
(1) The minimum cycle being thirteen days, the force shall 
visit each habitation once every twelve days. 
(2) That the work be under the Chefe of the Department of 
Hygiene, not the Prophylaxia Rural (a Federal 
Organization)0in order to ¿ive it a city status. 
(3) That the City take over the work directly from the 
Commissao so that no day be lost in its continuence, 
and that they employ men trained in the ranks of the 
Commissao as being thoroughly trained in the work. 
(4) That the force consist of: - 
1 - Fiscal. 
1 - Chief Inspector 
5 - Inspectors. 
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Immediately it will be asked how it is that so small 
a force can take over a work, which required up to 60 men, 
including fishermen and oilers. 
First. 
The work is in such a state that the adult mosquito 
is reduced almost to vanishing point. 
Second. 
In a city scheme fish need not be employed as the force 
could be armed with the law, and the fines provided for 
in the regulations be enforced as to emptying and 
covering all deposits. (Art.12- 63 -4 -5 1591 and paras. 
of Regs. of the Dept.Saude Publica). 
Third. 
All the inhabitants could be compelled to oil their 
own cess pits until such time as they are replaced by 
connections to the new drains, the type of cess pit 
beine the reason for our large expenditure of oil. 
Fourth. 
Oil cans and fish buckets being unnecessary, assistant 
inspectors are not needed. 
Fifth. 
The stores and cEfice work being small, could be 
included in the general arrangements of the Hygiene 
Department. 
(5) E xpenses. 
This work being of a permanent nature, lower salaries 
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could be paid than was done by the Coi aiiissao, which was 
temporary, but they would have to be enough to attract 
both good men and prevent bribes being offered to cover the 
reporting of law breakers. 
Chief Inspector .. .. .. 800 dollars per mensem. 
Inspector .. .. .. 400 tt It It 
Assistant Inspectors, 
(5 at 250 dollars) .. ..1,250 tt It tt 
Spot Lights. 
(7 at 45 dollars) .. .. 315 " initial cost. 
Batteries at 12 dollars 
(2 each month for 
7 lights) .. .. .. 168 It 
2, 933 tt per mensem. 
Total yearly expenditure: 33,196 
Subtract Spot Lights: 32,811 
Per Capita charge: 657 





Comparative commodity value: 
One Bottle of Beer: 2 dollars 50 cents. 
The Rockefeller Foundation for twelve months 1924 -25 
had expended 250,000 dollars. 
The expenditure of lights and batteries was arrived at 
according to a previous research. (Exp.-:c.17. of Report). 
The nunberof personnel was calculated as f ollaws: - 
Granted the thirteen -day cycle stands, in one day, as 
at present, our average visitations number 150 to each 
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inspector, in twelve days therefore, he could visit 
1,800 habitations. 
The number of habitations in Parahyba is 8,285, 
therefore five inspectors (asst.) could visit 9,000, 
thereby allowing ample margin for additional or inclusions 
for at least one year. 
This means a split week, but I an of the opinion that 
as my cycle was determined in terms of the minimum, the 
Sunday could be included with safety and the working week 
kept intact. 
It must be noted that many zones in Parahyba are 
composed entirely of "Shacks ", and by many personal trials, 
I have confirmed the fact that they can be well worked at 
a rate of 80 for the first hour, and thereafter in descending 
numbers to 40 for the last hour, giving an average of 
300 a day. This fact could be utilized in properly 
apportioning the correct number of houses to each man. 
=-n excellent blackboard map of the city, with zones, 
districts and the number of houses in each, is available, 
and has been used by the Coua:.issao. 
In all such schemes the weak points must be noted, and 
I regret to submit that there is one which is of paramount 
importance. As we all knau the administrative ability of 
the inhabitants of the tropics is below that of northern 
latitudes. My experience here shows that the men we employ 
can produce the results, but only if properly fiscalized; 
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in this lies the danger and weakness of my scheme. 
The man of Brazil of sufficient education and 
personal honour to undertake such a ;cork is not of the 
type who will do it, as it involves hard, sometimes dirty 
labour, and only those who have lived in the Ä:orth and 
learned that all labour is honourable, have been of service 
to the Cornraissao. Such men are rare. 
However, as the aim of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
as stated in many Reviews, is to educate the people to 
look after their own health problems, this has never been 
lost sight of, and while lowering the index, the future 
of Farahvba has had our attention. 
I regret that I cannot put this scheme to test myself, 
owing to the necessities of our particular service, for 
although I believe no mosquito need ever reach adult life, 
undoubtedly the larval index would go up, but after all the 
safety of any town depends, not on its larval, but on its 
adult mosquito population. 
To sum up, the question is, "find the man ". (Jameson - 
Carr. I npub.Report. Rock. Found. .Feb.l5th, 1925) . 
I have quoted the above report in full because of 
the statement nade in the third paragraph of this section 
regarding the comparative simplicity of Yellow Fever control' 
in terms of the mosquito alone,and the social and adminis- 
trative difficulties met during an approach to the problen. 
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After blunders and failures due to concentration on 
the insect alone, I wrote out for my own benefit what I 
considered was the physical, mental and moral equipment of 
the person responsible for the direction of any scheme of 
Yellow Fever control. 
The failure to recognize the necessity of selecting 
personnel with the three attribútes above mentioned above, 
well balanced, was the cause of the discredit of the 
Foundation between 1923 and 1926, coupled with the lack 
of co- operation between Federal and State Authorities, and 
which gave rise to such antagonism in the public press as 
illustrated in the " Diario de Noticias ", "The Smash-up 
of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Illusion concerting 
North American Science". (Bahia, July 1926). This lesson 
was quickly taken to heart, and the entire service re- 
organized with the well- knot -.n satisfactory results. 
In my opinion, it is essential that a Director of an 
area should be thoroughly trained, not only in the purely 
scientific aspects of the disease and its control, but also 
in business administration. 
I personally found that everything 11_iad ever learned 
became, at some time, of value. 
habit of command gained in both military and naval 
service, for Yellow Fever is an enemy to be conquered, and 
needs a plan of campaign with strategy as well as tactics; 
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a rigid discipline, for one is often dealing with a 
personnel whose morale is poor end must be built up. 
Infinite tact and patience, for it is largely by persuasion 
that the people can be bro.,rht to aid themselves and you. 
A vide knowledge of human beings in their domestic 
environment, especially women, because they are the 
members of the household with whom the Inspector comes in 
direct contact. 
An understanding of mass psychology, as well as the 
individual, for panics are bound to occur. 
An ability to learn foreign languages and an absence 
of yationalism in its aggressive phase which so quickly 
antagonizes, no matter how erudite one may be in the 
particular subject. 
A particular as well as general knowledge of the 
entomology of the mosquito, for the insect is not constant 
in its habits, and behaves variously in different localities.' 
In fact, physics, chemistry, meteorology and 
piscatology are all enlisted, without which the campaign 
will be both ineffectual and vastly wasteful. 
Each phenomenon noted in the field must be brought to 
the laboratory and worked out, and each experiment and 
discovery in the laboratory proved in the field, otherwise 
one is open to a wrong conclusion in either a priori or a 
pösteriori false premises. 
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,Uthough a knowledge of the patholoy, bacte-riolo_;y 
and serology is not necessary in pure control, yet it will 
1 
save face and increase prestige if the Director is au fait 
with these aspects. 
The history of the disease must be studied both 
generally, but particularly on the spot, as well as 
epidemiology as a subject. 
Lastly, it raust be remembered that sound health is 
essential, for there is noticing so strenuous as the constant', 
wear on both body and spirit which is entailed in a Yellow 
Fever campaign. 
Excessive heat, long hours in the field or over the 
microscope, continual vetting by rain, sweat and swamp 
water, hard travel by various means from foot to aeroplane, 
long periods of poor food and water, constant discouragement! 
both from your own failures and the antagonism of others, 
the need of never relaxing for a moment, a position gained 
must be held at all costs, all this mikes a demand on the 
whole man which only a whole man can sustain. 
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`ttTE POLITICS OF CONTROL. 
The definition of political science is the science of 
the form and principles of civil government, and the 
extent and manner of its intervention in public and private 
affairs. 
It is the latter part of the definition which ":.rally 
concerns the control of Yellow Fever. 
It must be emphasized that there has been, and I fear, 
always will be, a sinister as well as a dexter political 
influence at work Wherever control has been exhibited. 
As has been stated before in a previous section, we 
have knovm since 1900 all that is necessary to control 
Yellow Fever, and therefore we are forced to the conclusion 
that, it having been amply proved that the disease is 
extinguishable, and that it is sound politics that it 
should be, either scientists have been lacking in forceful 
exposition to the politicians, or the politicians have been 
deaf to the appeal. 
In my own opinion, it is fair that both should take 
the blare. 
T,ass inertia and the spirit of complacency have 
combined with ignorance and vested interests to dull the 
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fair vision engendered by the spectacular success of the 
pioneers of control. 
It is a sad fact to have to record that disaster 
follaued by fear has been the chief stimulus to political 
and social recognition of the need of instituting control. 
It was the fear that Yellow- Fever would compel the 
evacuation of Cuba)where the Sr;anish Army had failed, which 
gave Reed his opportunity of research, and :good and Gorgas 
their chance to demonstrate control. 
Yet, having shown conclusively and spectacularly that 
the Yellow Fever tide had at last been turned, it required 
the fear of disaster and military necessity to break dawn 
the resistance of military ignorance and governmental 
complacency, and allow the same Gorgas to apply the same 
method six years later in Panama to the same military-organi- 
sation of the same Government, and demonstrate the classical 
example of what could be done when the sciences of sanitation 
and politics co- operate. 
It is therefore more cogent to the study of political 
influence to observe the sinister aspect, and under three 
headings - Local, National and International. 
Local. 
For this aspect I can do no better than give my awn 
experience on being appointed Director of the Yellow Fever 
Commission in the capital and State of Parahyba do Norte, 
199. 
Brazil. To fully- understand the local political conditions, 
it is necessary to quote the instructions with which I 
was presented and which were to guide my work. 
"INSTRUCTIONS APPROVED 3Y THE I II'?IS' R OF JUSTICE 
AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS END SENT OUT .'Y TIE 'NATIONAL 
DEPARTL T OF :PUBLIC HEAL H IN CONNECTION .UITH THE 
?1RETV}. ;ì?T.ITI"'TL s;ORKS AGAIT.iST YELLO V FEvi:t. 
An agreement having been established between the 
Federal Government and the Rockefeller Foundation, 
to execute the works of the definite extinction of 
Yellovr Fever in the States of the North and North - 
East of Brazil, I,herewith authorised by the Elnister 
of Justice and Internal Affairs, send out the 
instructions that must be observed by the men in 
charge of said tiworks: - 
(1) The basis of the campaign will be the extraction 
of the transmitting insect in its larval state. 
However, in the cities where there are, just at 
present, still cases of yellow fever, the service 
of separation and observation may be maintained, 
independent and completely separated from the 
work of the campaign against foci." 
Then follows a description of the personnel: - 
(3) The Central Commission (Rio) will direct the 
prophylactic campaign and superintend the 




(4) To the Chiefs of the Prophylaxia Rural (Federal) 
will fall the local direction in the corresponding 
:Mates. They will have to fulfil, and make 
their subordinates fulfil, the Central Commission's 
decisions. 
(5) The Fiscals (The Rockefeller State Director was 
called a Fiscal) who will be immediate assistants 
to the Chiefs of Prophylaxia Rural, will inspect 
all the time the service, and deliver weekly 
reports to said chiefs, to ce transmitted to the 
Central Commission. 
(C) The Fiscals are authorities to correct weak points, 
of the service, directly or indirectly, and to 
call the employees' attention when necessary. 
They can propose to the Chiefs of the Prophylaxia 
Rural the penalties of suspension and dismissal 
of men under their orders. 
(6), (7), (8), (9) and (1C) describe the work to be 
(11) The appointing and dismissal of employees under 
their orders will be done, in accordance with 
proposals of the Fiscals, by the Chiefs of the 
Prophylaxis, Rural, or during their absence, by 
the Fiscals themselves. 
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(12) The nomination of higher staff ( Fiscals, Chief 
Inspectors, Office Employees) will be made by 
the Central Commission. 
(13) Any step's to be taken, which have not been 
foreseen in these instructions, will be taken 
by the Chiefs of the Prophylaxia Rural in zones 
where they exist, or in their absence, by the 
Fiscale, and communicated to the Central 
Commission. 
(14) Other extraordinary steps found necessary, will 
be asked for by the Chiefs of the Prophy laxia 
Rural, or during their absence, by the Fiscals, 
to the Central Commission. 
(15) The General Director of the Depar liment will be 
in charge of the part in connection with the 
requests to the Federal Government of steps 
to be taken by the latter, as well as, through 
the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, 
communicate with the State Governments to 
obtain the necessary administrative facilities 
regarding the works. 
(16) The facts of greater importance requiring the 
interference of the Governments Superior 
Authorities, will be communicated, by the 
Director of the Department, to the Minister of 
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Justice and Internal 1.ffairs .'t 
These general orders were followed by private 
instructions from the :irector General of the Commission: - 
(1) Our agreement is to do antilarvae work only, and 
in the large cities only, and not to isolate, 
fumigate nor do any other direct or indirect 
handling of cases. 
(2) Naturally we want to know of cases, and they 
should be reported by you to the Bahia Office 
(Headquarters) and if it is possible, in fatal 
cases, to obtain tissue for Doctor Noguchi, but 
this must be by persuasion, as we have no right 
to make demands. 
(3) The work is to be done under the Servicio de 
Prophylaxia Rural, and although the agreement 
gives us clearly defined right to obtain dismissals 
and employ personnel, it is to be done by the 
Chofe de Prophylaxia Rural on our recommendation. 
(4) tiïe must cultivate the goodwill of the Chief in 
each state, and you -can pay him one conto monthly 
(1,000,000) for his aid in employing suitable men 
and obtaining popular co- operation. 
(5) Endeavour to become the trusted ftiend and 
assistant of the Chief. If you can obtain that 
203. 
status, all the minor differences will be easy 
to adjust. Convince him that you want the 
people to credit him with the success, and try 
to see to it that they do." 
Although the foregoing instructions were national in 
their scope, they affected the local situation politically. 
It must be noted that the coastal area to be worked 
extended from Manaos, 900 miles up the Amazon River, to the 
capital of Bahia, a distance of 2,600 miles, with a further 
900 miles to Rio de Janeiro. 
Communication was by boat, and slow, and by telegraph 
which was very uncertain. 
As has been stated before, the idea was that were the 
disease controlled for a length of time in the larger towns, 
which were considered endemic centres, it would die out in 
the interior by failure of the human host. 
At that time, Jungle Yellow Fever had not been 
discovered. 
On arrival in Parahyba I found that the Chief 
Prophylaxis Rural had acted on the instructions by employing 
personnel which in his opinion were sufficient to do the 
work. 
He had had no experience in Yellow Fever control, and 
the numbers were quite inadequate, and consisted of relations' 
and friends in the best positions whether capable or not. 
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The squad was at once augmented, but I soon found that 
everyone, from the President dawn, was interested in having 
his man employed by an organization which paid much above 
the market price for labour. 
After a month of trial, it was found impossible to carry 
out the primary object under such conditions, and I was driven 
to disband the original force and hire anew only those who 
were willing to work for me alone. 
This naturally caused much ill feeling amongst those in 
authority, and a campaign of vituperation aras begun against 
me in the Press. 
I pointed out to the Chief that he was ordered to give 
MB co- operation and was being paid for it, but as it was 
not forthcoming, I stopped his conto a month. 
en it is remembered that the national name for 
Yellow Fever was "Febre Patriotica" or the disease which 
kills the foreigner, and that the disease was not alarming 
to the immune native, any interference with the domestic 
life of the people was bound to be resented. 
I have already mentioned the use of fish and the 
objections to it, which in one town caused the death by 
shooting of one of the Inspectors. 
Our principal detractors and antagonists were the 
upper classes, who objected to the necessary invasion of 
their privacy, and among than the local doctors were the 
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worst. 
This can be appreciated as in cleaning the water and 
covering it, there was a marked reduction in intestinal 
disease, especially amongst children. This is comparable 
to the results in i :_alaya after malaria control. 
In other words, we were reducing the doctors' living. 
As long as Medicine is a competitive business, such 
antagonism must be taken into consideration, and I found 
it not only in Parahyba but also in Singapore, where, after 
I had written to the Press about the prevalence of Dengue 
and the apathy to it, and the danger of the presence of 
its vector, I liras approached by a local practitioner who 
informed me that I was meddling in his private affairs, 
as Dengue was part of his income, and a very satisfactory 
disease, as it had a mortality of only 0.5% and a protracted 
convalescence. 
I lay stress on the medical attitude in Brazil, as 
doctor and politician are almost synonomous terms in that 
country. 
The matter of procuring post mortem material also 
presented a serious difficulty. 
This was a Roman Catholic community, and at that 
stage of civilization which made it a desecration to 
perform a necropsy, especially by a heretic. I was 
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repeatedly warned not to attempt it, and when the necessity 
arose, when I had to exhume the body of a Catholic 
foreigner, I was attacked by a mob at the grave -yard, while 
doing the diging myself, but I got the tissues. 
In spite of every obstruction, not short of an attempted 
assination of myself, the index was reduced below the 
danger percentage and kept so. 
Thus it can be seen that the local political 
difficulties were an outcome of the national attitude, and 
the impossible conditions stated in the Instructions of 
divided control and absence of preliminary knowledge of 
the situation by the Rockefeller Commission. 
As the object of tactics is to win battles, so the 
object of strategy is to place your forces in a position 
to do so. 
The tactics employed against the very limited objective 
in Brazil, i.e. to clean only the main coastal cities, were 
mufficient to do so, but the strategy aiming at the 
eradication of the disease was not. 
Twice, the disease was proclaimed extinct, in 1925 
and again in 1926, only to be discovered in the interior. 
The weakness of the strategy of divided control, with 
all that it involved, was laid bare. 
The fact that each state was actually a law unto 
itself, made any Federal scheme difficult of attainment. 
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It was soon found that penalties could not be enforced. 
In the chartered cities of India and halaya, this also 
obtains. 
Local pride and vested interests are serious obstacles 
to the sanitarian as this personally witnessed case will 
illustrate. 
In a large city on the coast, I was present in the 
office of the Chief of the Prophylaxia Rural whose duty 
it was under the Federal Latin, to issue pratique to out- 
going ships. A British captain entered to obtain pratique 
and was given a clean paper. 
'J hen he had left, I asked the Chief why he had done 
so wall was shorting cases of 
disease in the city, including Yellow Fever and Small Pox, 
of which latter disease there were more than 1,000 cases 
marked for that day. 
The Chief replied with a somewhat condescending smile, 
"Ey dear doctor, do you not understand that I am the son- 
in-law of the Governors ". 
In a Report by the Surgeon General of the United States 
Public Health Service, it was stated: - 
"The first essential in the suppression of an 
epidemic is the truth. The deadliest enemy of the 
state is the man guilty of intentional concealment. 
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Tiz;ilance, truth, knowledge, energy and money are 
the essentials in the suppression of epidemics, and 
of these, none is of more importance than the truth. 
Communities have pandered to the vicious passion of 
a trade element, as merciless as it is sordid and 
depraved, and ever ready to raise a hue and a cry 
against a physician who reports cholera or Yellow 
Fever. Feeble -spirited Health authorities; timor- 
ously submitting to the dictum of unrighteous maroon, 
have suppressed, and do now suppress the truth; have 
falsified reports, and have consigned States and 
Nations to the ravages of unresisted pestilence, when 
thousands of lives might have been saved, and distant 
communities forewarned, have protected themselves." 
(Surgeon General 'iman. Suppression of pidemics,190C) 
NATIOYAL. 
:e have seen in the review of local politics that the 
success of a campaign depends in the first place, on sound 
strategy. Strategy cannot be changed after the battle is 
joined. If strategy be unsound, good tactics are of small 
avail. 
Yellow Fever knows no state boundaries, therefore it 
follows that all plans for its control must be national 
in scope, and further, international, but of which more 
later. 
209. 
In July 1926, I was requested to write a short 
summary of the Yellow Fever situation in the State of 
Bahia, as it was there that the failure of our campaign 
was most evident. This was as follows: - 
(1) The Rockefeller Yellow Fever Commission began 
work in Sao Salvador, the capital city of Bahia, 
in _ovember 1923, at the tail end of the regular 
periodic epidemic. 
(2) This epidemic had been present, not only in the 
city of Sao Salvador, but also in the interior 
of the State, especially between latitudes 12 
and 14 degrees South. 
(3) Yo cases were reported in Sao Salvador during 
1924, but in the above Interior area, many were 
reported, and several confirmed by Dr. I ?oguchi 
and others using the Pfeiffer Test. 
(4) In 1925, no cases were reported in either the 
City or State, but in the town and area of Franca 
on the Jacobina Railroad, there was an epidemic 
of fever which had all the clinical signs and 
symptoms of Yellow Fever, and which was so severe 
as to stop the train service to that town, and 
cause the Railroad authorities to appoint a special 
medical officer to attempt to control it. These 
facts were only elicited during the 1926 
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contd. (4) investigation.. Here it must be noted that 
there had been no medical inspection of the 
Interior of the State of Bahia between 
October 1924, and Larch 1926. 
In 1926 diseases of an epidemic nature began 
to be reported in the Interior by travellers 
during January, called variously "Typhoid 
Fever ", "sever of bad character ", 'Fever 
Unknown." etc. Luring February 1926, the 
Press took it up, and on March 1st, a fayor 
of a small interior city on the Rio Sao 
Francisco made an appeal for help to the 
Governor, definitely stating that he had 
Yellow Fever in his town. Since that date, 
a general epidemic was confirmed throughout 
the interior in that area not immunized in 
1923- 1924, and coinciding with the movements 
f 
of non - immune troops from the Southern States 
(5) 
(6) 
of Brazil, and spread along their defence 
lines against the revolutionists, and has 
appeared in those troops returning to the 
City of Sao Salvador, together with civilian 
cases in the interior towns in that area. 
One permanent inhabitant of Sao Salvador, by 
game Dias, and known as the "Calcada Case ", 
has been infected from those cases arriving 
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from the Interior, he being in direct contact 
with ran-, infected troops. ìßo secondary cases 
have been found or reported, notwithstanding the 
fact that the district in which he lived includes 
some of the dirtiest and most difficult zones, ans 
a large foreign population. Dias was a barman 
serving the infected troops who were billeted 
one hundred metres away in the terminal city 
station serving the epidemic area. 
((7)The general index the for z district in which the 
case lived was 2.7; for the preceding week-in 
which the infection must have occurred, and 4.25 
for the zone of the patient's work and sleeping 
quarters, from which he had not moved during the 
possible incubation period. (THIS CASES 
PROVED TO BE INFECTED WITH LEPTOSPIRO ICTEROIDES 
AHD THEREFORE NOT YELLOW FEVER BUT ACUTE ìI."_LIG_`AI T 
MIL'S DISEASE.) 
(8) Owing to the recurrence of the revolution in the 
Interior, troop movements have extended to includti 
the entire region controlled by the Sao Francisco 
River, from the sea to the town of Pira Fora, 
which is the terminus of river transportation in 
the State of Linas Geraes, AND ONLY GOOD FORTUITE 
CAN R.EVE`l2 THE DISEASE BEING CARRILD INTO R GIONd 
.R7 
170 PREVIOUS HISTORY OF YE 0- FEVER FLED 
BEEN FOU';li. 
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During June, the Department of. 
Public Health in Rio de Janeiro repor ted cases 
in .Pira Fora, whether amongst troops or civilians 
was not stated, and this is important because 
of the meteorology of the moment and the 
altitude, whichas a narked effect on the prop- 
agation of Yellow Fever, Pira Fora standing 
480 metres above sea level. The population 
floc on this river is a factor of epidemiologicaÌ 
importance as it is seasonal, and consists of 
Coffee Pickers from the towns along the Sao 
Francisco and in the States of Bahia and h- nas 
Geraes, proceeding to the State of Sao Paulo for 
work. This exodus begins in ',:arch, which is 
the month of highest Yellaw Fever incidence in 
Brazil. 
(9) Finally, 1926 has been an optimum Yellow Fever 
year. 
(a) Natural periodical increase due for 1926. 
(b) Excessive heat during the natural Yellow 
Fever period, December, January, , February, 
and March. 
(c) Carnival and religious movements, fiestas etc.' 
(d) Excessive rains. 
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(e) .,xad lastly, that acid test of all control 
in Yellow Fever, the introduction into, 
and movement through, an infected endemic 
area, of large numbers of non - immune 
troops. (G.Jameson -Carr, Unpub.Report. 
Rock.Found., July, 1926.) 
This Report was dubbed "Pessimistic and unwarranted ", 
so that I felt that if the drastic change -which I believed 
necessary in the strategy of the campaign were to be made, 
I should have to resign in order to speak more frankly. 
I:y last report follows: - 
To the Director of the International Health Board, 
Rockefeller Foundation, 
61, Broadway, New York. 26th July, 1926. 
Sir: - 
I have the honour to submit to your notice my personal 
letter to you of June 16th, 1926, in which I said, "I am 
writing you personally now, in the hope that I shall not have 
to write officially and strongly ". You have requested me 
to -day to do so, after having accepted my resignation ... 
The present situation in Brazil is due to the following 
causes: - 
(1) That no proper preliminary scientific survey was made 
of the many conditions governing a campaign against 
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Yellow Fever. 
(2) That personnel ,eras used, eseecially in the most 
important endemic centres, totally untrained in the 
proper appreciation of what is required for an 
intelligent attack on Yellow Fever. 
(3) That because of such employment, vital facts were not 
discovered nor interest taken, and much waste of time, 
lives and material ensued, and antagonism created vrith 
the Brazilian Authorities. 
Ì 
(4) That no adequate inspection nor control eras exercised by 
those in direct charge, and from that, false ideas and 
scandalous waste has followed. 
(5) That statements were publicly made as to the presence or 
not of the disease, without means being employed to 
confirm them, nor honest warnings heeded, on the contrary, 
such warnings were flouted. 
(6) That a totally unscientific and uïabusinesslike atmosphere 
has pervaded the conduct of the campaign from the 
beginn_in;. 
(7) That the reports of indices in several cities have been 
false and in Bahia, (main endemic centre) false from the 
beginning, and known to be so. 
(8) That this "blunder" will be repeated if the campaign is 
continued under the some conditions. 
'ihese reports and quotations are given to show hoir when 
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National strategy is wrong, local tactics, no matter haw 
good arc of no avail. 
They also give extraordinary point to an amazing 
statement in a paper published in the "Transactions of the 
Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene ", in 
November, 1938. 
"During 1925, only three cases of Yellow Fever were 
reported from all the Americas. These occurred in Northern 
Brazil. It is not quite certain that all three were 
authentic. To one who knows something of the history of 
Yellow Fever, this record is striking." 
"Iuuever, in 1926, the movement of non - immune troops 
through the interior of North East Brazil resulted in a 
flare -up of the disease in several states. 1LiIS OUTBREAK 
WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AND THE LAST HALF OF TEE YEAR 
1927 WAS FREE OF IOETO11 CASES. But the optimism of late 
1927 and early 1928 was shattered by the discovery of cases 
in NARCH AND APRIL in the States of Sergipe and Pernambuco, 
=NAY CANE THE ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED declaration of cases in 
the capital city of Rio de Janiero, where the disease had 
not been seen during two decades following the memorable 
campaign of OSVALDO CRUZ." (Soper. Yellow Fever, the 
Present Situation, (Oct.1938) with special reference to 
South America. Trans. Royal Soc.Trop.Iied. & Hygiene. Vol. 
.G Xii. No.3., Nov. 1938). 
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One can only deduce from this statement that, either 
my reports were not nade available to the proper authorities, 
by the inundation, or that they went unheeded. 
At least this was accomplished, before the end of 
1926 the entire personnel of the old Commission was changed, 
but a change of strategy was not actually introduced until 
the disease invaded the capital city, proving a well -known 
military axiom that small losses inflicted suddenly cause 
more perturbation than large losses over an extended period. 
Dr. Soper's paper gives in detail the extensive service 
which is now at work in Brazil and rich has produced the 
great advance in laiowledge and technique of the control of 
Yellow Fever. 
Vaccination has cone into its own, and more than 
"800,000 persons have been vaccinated during the first 
nine months of 1933." 
Thus divided control gave place to National control, 
penalties were enforced which was impossible under a purely 
foreign direction, even although the foreigners were paying ', 
all the expenses. 
Brazil, although nominally a republic and democratic, 
is virtually a Dictatorship, and therefore could more 
easily enforce national law, and in war against either 
disease or a human enemy, dictatorship has proved its value. 
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INZL'RNATIONAL. 
In January 1936, I sent a letter to the "London. Timesft 
which was acknowledged but unpublished, although it was 
published in "The Straits Times" on August 15th, 1936, which 
began as follows: - 
"In this lull in the world -wide controversial storm 
over the power of the League of Nations to control the 
future well -being of the world, with military and economic 
potentialities emphasized, attention might be called to one 
section too little known and appreciated, to wit, the Health 
Section." 
"Even if the pessimistic opinion of Iyr. Lloyd George, 
that "as an association of nations to establish right and 
peace on a basis of justice it is doomed", is proved correct, 
perhaps a new beginning might be made on the common basis of 
international health." 
"This has a special significance for the British Lnpire 
with its breadth of lands and diversities of peoples." 
In view of recent events, this portion of my Thesis 
has had to be reconsidered, as I had hoped that some common 
ground might be found at the time of writing (1938- 1939). 
After attending the Anti- ITalaria course conducted in 
Singapore by the League, and seeing the work of the Eastern 
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Station in that city, doubts began to arise in my mind. 
This was strengthened by a visit to the Health Section 
in Geneva during the Spring of 1938, and forced me to the 
regretable conclusion that as co- operation in health matters 
depended on complete political co- operation, the League was 
a laudable but, for many years yet, a pious illusion. 
Apart from the European situation and its repercussions 
all over the world, but especially in those parts diectly 
r i 
concerned in the control of Yellow Fever, the present 
composition of the League precludes co- operation as a whole 
but actually favours a much stronger co- operation between 
those countries which have most to gain or lose. 
As I have stressed before, the war has almost certainly 
- 
Í 
endangered even that hope. 
Absent from the League is the United States of North 
America, which never joined, Japan, Germany, Italy, and ipso 
facto, Ethipia, Austria and Czecho -Slovakia. 
In South and Central America, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, San Salvador and 
Venezuela have resigned, while Republic Spain has disappeared. 
Those who remain are Great Britain and France with their 
colonies and the Dominions, Russia with her small protegees, 
the Scandinavian countries, Liberia, Turkey, and the yet 
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unconquered portion of China, Egypt and the countries 
bordering on the Indian Ocean. In April of this year, 
(1939) Switzerland informed the League that in the event 
of war it could no longer be headquarters of the organization 
Since the above was written, the course of the 
European 'Jar has had disastrous effects on the League of 
Nations. At the present moment, (August 1940) i r. Avenol 
the League Secretary has resigned, and the Political Section 
has practically ceased to function. The International 
Labour Office and the Health Section will probably be 
transferred to Nau York under the direction of the Rocker 
feller Foundation. Thus we may dismiss the League of 
Nations in terms of Yellow Fever Control. 
that alternative international possibilities remain? 
Taking the Americas first, it is noted that at the 
present time they are realizing more than ever their mutual 
interests, and being the pioneers in control, are more aware 
of the benefits from it, as well as the danger from the lack 
of it. 
Two things have recently accentuated this awareness. 
First, the discovery of the jungle form of the disease, and 
second, the scheme of building a highway through South and 
Central America to rorth America. 
The difficulty of controlling foot and wheeled traffic 
in contradistinction to air and sea, has been noted in the 
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section on Epidemiology. 
Even the latter has been difficult to enforce in South 
and Central America as during the Rio epidemic of 1929 the 
disease was found on ship -board all along the East Coast 
from Buenos Aires in the South to 1,1amos, 900 miles up the 
amazon, in the North, a distance of 4,000 miles. (Soper. 
Trans. Royal Soc.Trop.fyied. !yg., Vol. XXXII. i o.3. 
p.229, 1938). 
It is therefore obvious that strict international 
co- operation is essential in view of the greatly extended 
means of rapid communication between those countries, and 
this should prove the more easy of decision and enforcement 
as the Americas are free from the threat of general war 
which stultifies all plans for co- operation in .Africa and 
makes the spread of the disease to an ever- present 
menace. 
It must be noted that those countries which still 
remain devoted to the ideal of internation co- operation from 
a political and military stand -point are those upon which 
the actual responsibility for the control of Yellow Fever 
in Africa must rest, to wit, Great Britain and the Union of 
South Africa, France and Egypt. 
Great Britain and Egypt with the Union, form a 
geographical continuity, which,under complete control, would 
be a barrier against the spread of the disease to the East 
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Coast, and by the same token, constitute the first line of 
defence for Asia. 
iron 'North to south, we have Egypt, Anglo- Egyptian 
Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia, and the Union of South Africa. 
Although Egypt is now a political entity, her interests 
are British interests, nor is her position directly threatened. 
Our ancient friendship with Portugal would ensure the 
co- operation of i.lozambique and Angola, while France controls 
the great part of the rest of the continent. 
The Belgian Congo would give added strength to the 
barrier, and as one of the main traffic routes lies across 
that territory, it is in her interests to co- operate and 
therefore she undoubtedly could. 
There remains outside the system only Libia and Ethiopia 
with a small occupation of Spain in the North- . ;est in 
addition to Liberia. 
1Tow that France is probably also out of the picture, 
the main responsibility devolves on the British Commonwealth, 
who control an unbroken line of territory across the advance 
of the disease. 
Nothing and no one can pass from the endemic `.;est to the 
East without traversing British controlled land or water; 
the Commonwealth alone car take the necessary steps without 
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the prior aid of other nations. 
Statements of principle are the province of scientific 
writers, but action, that of Governments. 
The intellectual conception of the complete control 
and possible eradication_ of Yeliovr Fever in Africa is a 
magñifident ideal but so also is the responsibility 
tremendous, and in my opinion, only money and force, self- 
interested, can accomplish that ideal. 
Great Britain accepted such a responsibility when she 
extended her power to the East where between a fourth and 
fifth of the human race live. 
Great Britain would be answerable to Asia were she to 
shirk the use of the power she has acquired through the 
centuries for the defence of her trusting dependents. 
e know vrhere we are, in quarantine, larval exter- 
mination, viscerotomy and vaccination; the necessary weapons 
are to hand, how are they to be applied in time to prevent 
a great disaster? 
Recently we have witnessed the people in the majority, 
accept a clean break with sacred tradition in terms of 
commitments and conscription. This was only made possible 
by bringing home to the man in the street, a pressing danger. 
Yellow Fever spread is such, and in my opinion, only a 
break with tradition by granting dictatorial power to the 
medical officer selected, will accomplish the desired result. 
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Only by such power did Gorgas create the Canal Zone. 
The onus of producing the initial atmosphere is laid 
on the medical profession. The onus of delegating the 
power and the means is upon the Government. 
9 -dhere there is no vision, the people perish." 
2Z4 
S VT I.': i. A R Y. 
HISTORICAL SURVEY, ERIDEL`lOLOGY AND GEOüR1i1TiICAL 
DISTRIBUTION. 
Special emphasis has been given to the Historical 
Sur -ivy covering, as It does, a discussion of the probable 
country of origin of tho disease, showing how, and why it 
spread to the ;'Jest, its influence on commercial, political 
and military affairs both in the area of origin and in those l 
areas in which it gained either endemic or epidemic 
prominence, and the contrasts and comparisons which may be 
deduced from a study of its ravages in the est in con- 
templating the result of a spread to the East. e 
relation of spread to war, and the critical position and 
responsibility of the British Empire in Africa and the 
East, has been made a point of major importance. 
A Survey has been made of all the factors controlling 
the man -mosquito -man cycle. 
The Entomological, Zoological, Yeteorological, 
Geographical, Social, Religious and Lilitary elements which 
influence the spread and permanence of the disease have been 
discussed. It has been shown that notwithstanding the 
immense amount of new light ti hich has been thrown on the 
cause of the disease and the discovery of new and precise 
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methods of diagnosis and epidemiological research, the 
aim and method of control remains fundamentally the same. 
The geographical distribution of the disease from the 
year 1800, is shown by means of charts. (Vide Appendix). 
CLINICAL FEATURES. 
Only a cursory account of the clinical features has 
been given, including pathology and treatment. Emphasis 
has however been laid on differential diagnosis and the 
difficulty in determining mild or ambulatory cases, especially 
in children, and the new means of so doing. It has been 
stressed that this difficulty is the strongest argument 
in favour of !íedes aegypti control, particularly at points 
of possible entrance in the East. 
ETIOLOc_:Y AND `úgA?1SLISSION. 
In this section there is shown how from the discovery 
in 1928, by Stokes, Bauer and Hudson, of the nature of the 
infection, and that man was not the only animal which could 
carry the virus, there has emerged tuo factors of paramöunt 
importance enriching our armamentarium towards the 
elimination of the disease. The one, the protection test, 
the other, vaccination. 
These discoveries have been discussed as well as some 
personal observations on the life and habits of i.edes 
aegtpti, noting particularly the essential similarity of the 
226. 
rlmorican insect to the Eastern insect, and its implications. 
PaOP HYW:IS AHD CO ±'TROL. 
A comparison has been made between the attitude of 
the sanitarians in the ::est and in the East, showing; that 
the ultimate factor in control is not the sanitarian but 
Government. 
A survey has been made of the work already done by the 
countries concerned, locally, nationally and internationally, 
with the reports of various congresses on Hygiene, including 
the regulations of the Permanent Committee of the Office 
International dt_ ,,Tgibne Publique of the League of Dations. 
The difference has been stressed between the East and 
;est in terris of the new dangers. 
1. description has been given of the work of control 
in Brazil, noting both successes and failures and elucidating: 
the causes of the latter. 
A review has been made of the influence of politics 
in control, local, national and international. 
The international situation to -day has been surimarized 
with special reference to the responsibility of the British 
Empire and the Union of South Africa. 
The possibility of the war involving endemic Yellow 
Fever areas, and the slackening or complete breaking of 
established sanitary cordons is exposed. 
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C O N C L U S I O N S. 
(1) For centuries Yellow Fever has been a major 
disaster to the social and commercial life of 
the countries involved. 
(2) ',Tith the knowledge we now possess, Yellow Fever can 
be eradicated. 
(3) The Onus of eradication devolves upon Government. 
(4) Special responsibility rests upon the British 
Empire. 
(5) 'säar is the factor of paramount danger as a means of 
extension to the East. 
(6) ,e are faced with the proposition, is man a maker 
or a victim of his history? 
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THIS 'TRANSLATION SHarS I'!ATIONAL POLITICS IN REFERENCE TO 
THE CAMPAIGN. IT ALSO PROVES THAT RIO DE JANEIRO HAD 
BEEN WARNED, CONTRARY TO THE RECENT STATEMENT OF DR. SOPER 
AS QUOTED IN THE SECTION ON "CONTROL." 
A FALSE CIVIC PRIDE PREVENTED THE CITY FROM HEEDING THE 
WARNING THAT THE ENEMY WAS AT HER GATES, HERE IT ARRIVED 
IN 1928 -29. 
THE STATEMENTS AS REGARDS THE COMPOSITION OF TT`F PE: -SOI?I EL 
OF THE CONI.:ISSAO IS PARTLY TURF, ONLY TWO OF THE DIRECTORS 
OF STATES ERE QUALIFIED AT THIS TIME. 
MY OWN WARNING TO THE COMISSAO, AS QUOTED, UNDER "CONTROL" 
WAS FLOUTED. 
AGAIN "REGIONAL ENDEMICITY" IS EXPOSED. 
249. 
APPENDIX I. (contd ) . 
Translation from the "DEUTCIE ZEITTJ G" Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
June 19th, 1926. 
"A Rio paper has just published a conversation with 
Dr. Carlos Seidl, Chief of the National Board of Health, on 
the subject of the epidemic of Yellow Fever which has broken 
out again in various Northern States." 
"Dr. Seidl's opinion on the possibilities of a 
further spreading of this fearful disease is not exactly 
encouraging, and the Papers which have just arrived fron. 
Bahia, give strong foundation for his fears." 
The Yellow Fever is raging in its worst form in the 
North East of that particular State." 
"In Bomfim, Q;ueimadas, Miguel Calmon, Joazsiro and 
other towns, a large number of fatal cases have been 
registered." 
"In Niguel Calmon alone, according to reliable 
information, there have been 78 deaths." 
"Among the Paulistaner troops who were sent North to 
fight the Rebels, and are still stationed in Bomfim, the 
fever has already clamed eight victims who were swept 
away in the course of a few days," 
"In the meantime, the fever has already spread further 
from Bahia up the Rio Sao Francisco as far as the terminus 
for navigation in Minas, Pirapora, in fact in disturbing 
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proximity to the most highly populated zone of the country."' 
" The sick registered in Pirapora were also all" from the 
Garrison." 
"lhe local Newspapers are almost universal in blaming 
the Rockefeller Comnissao for the Epidemic, and strangely 
enough, they also disclose the fact that the Comriissao is 
not composed of Doctors, or even medically trained people, 
but of retired soldiers, diamond diggers, retired teachers 
etc., A discovery which we pointed out several weeks ago, 
and to which the Press is again referring, that is the 
isolation of the Yellow Fever Bacillus by two young Bahia 
Doctors, might be of the greatest importance in the fight." 
"The fever germ was discovered as we know by the 
great Japanese bacteriologist, Hideo Naguchi, but could not 
be studied owing to certain difficulties in the investi- 
gations." 
"Now, there appears to be the possibility for bacterio- 
logical research, and with it a new prospect is revealed in 
the fighting of the evil, where up to the present, it had to 
be limited to prophylactic measures." 
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TRANSLATION ILLUSTR&TING THE USELESSNESS OF GOOD TACTICS 
WITHOUT SO= STRATEGY. 
STARTING A CAMPAIGN "1:ITHOUT EXTENSIVE PRELEZNARY SCIENTIFIC 
SURVEY. 
NEGLECT OF OUTPOST WORK. 
MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS WITHOUT DATA. 
MUST= TO UNTRAINED LOCAL DIRECTORS. 




I TRANU TA T I OI FROI n iE T D TAR I0 DE NOTICIAS" G± I3.A.EIA. 
July, 1926. 
THE SIvïASH UP OF THE ROCItiFELLE?. FOUNDATIOI?. 
THE ILLUS.%OIr CONCERNING NORTH AMERICAN SCIENCE. 
"In our former edition we had occasion to broach the 
subject of Yell= Fever in reference to the Rockefeller 
Commission, reaching the point of asking ourselves if 
perhaps this North American Society sought in agreement 
with the Sub- Secretary of Public Health, to deny the 
existence of this disease amongst us." 
"In rapid analysis we proved clearly that the above - 
mentioned foreign Commission from all points of view neglected 
their duties and obligations, even evading fulfillment of 
its contract with the Government of Brazil." 
"In this connection, our colleagues of the "COi ;FAZE" 
in Sao Paulo point out that "years ago when the Rockefeller 
Commission assumed the management of the campaign against 
Yellow Fever in the North, there were people who doubted ',:Le 
proficiency of their efforts." 
"Dr. Gustave Barroso, pupil of Osvaldo Cruz, and chief 
of this service in that part of the country, disagreeing with 
the plans given to him, asked to be exonerated from further 
connection with the Commission; and in Sao Paulo, Dr. Jose 
APPENDIX II. (contd) . 
de Toledo Piza, in a lecture before the ledical and 
Surgical Society, not only protested against the 
relinquishing to foreigners the responsibility which Gswaldo' 
Cruz and 4milio Ribas had responded to with the greatest 
success, but also doubted the efficacy of the new American 
method, consisting in breeding a special fish capable of 
destroying the larvae of Stegomyias, if we are not 
mistaken." 
"Recently, the smerican Scientists proclaimed their 
task finished, pompously advertising the definite extinction 
of this disease." 
``But while the work of the two great Paulistas has, 
up to date, not been shattered b;r the re- appearance of 
Typho- Icteroide in Rio or Sao Paulo, the work of the 
Rockefeller Commission has been completely answered by the 
facts." I, 
"The Sao Paulo people, as well as we, deny the careless- 
ness of the much lauded efforts of the Commission Rockefeller 
with all their scientific baggage with reference to the 
campaign against Yellow Fever." 
"Did not the Rockefeller people loudly proclaim and 
officially confirm that the disease now spreading amongst 
is was under control, snuffed out and extinct ?" 
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"And now, what excuse have they, ".what reasons can 
the I:orth American Commission .vive to pardon such an 
official promulgated scientific lie ?" 
"Yellow Fever, incontestably, is spreading without 
encountering barriers or impediments in a large part of the 
State." 
"Haw then explain the supposed extinction of Yellow 
Fever in Bahia ?" 
"By one means only, says conscience, in one way only 
shouts the TRUTt-IU" 
"BY ITORTH A1ERICAU BLUFF." 
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CASES OF iLLLO'.i I'I;VER'DEITTED TO THE STRANGERS' HOSPITALI 
RIO DE JANEIRO, slim ITS OPENI::;G. 
Auust9 1925. 
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2 3 5 6 1 17 
6 60 42 25 2 2 137 
4 6 8 2 20 
7 8 36 13 5 2 71 
1 3 1 5 
1 1 14 8 3 5 2 1 35 
5 3 5 4 1 2 2 2 1 7 32 
1 2 7 7 2 2 21 
1 1 7 1 1 1 1 13 
2 2 9 8 2 10 4 1 1 39 
3 6 13 7 3 1 33 
1 1 2 
1 1 1 3 
1 1 2 
1 (last case) 1 
27 87 127 94 42 17 15 7 1 2 4 8 431 
Off Ships: 154 or 35.45 
L ortality: 157 or 36.420 
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March was also the month in which there was highest mortality, 
most of the ship cases arriving; in the so- called "lies theni c" 
stage with anemia and black vomit. 
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RECORD CF FOREI TI'. RS =ERRED Tir TEE BRITISH CEI:`ETEi2Y 
(GLT:B0IL) FROM 1811 to 1924, INCLUSIVE, ALMOST ALL BEIT;G 
BRITISH SUBJECTS. 
Compiled from: - 
1. Interment Books and Certificates. 
2. Christ Church Register, 1811 -1925, 
(1816 -1821 missing). 
3. Undertakers' Records. 
4. Interment Books at Cemetery. 
5. Graves themselves. 
6. Cash Boots for A.;s;pro.2riation Fees. 
l'aE--YELLO4V FEVER RaZ IOD. 
Jan.Yeb.1ar.Apri1.P . Jun .Jul.Aug.Sep.OctJov.Dec.Total. 
11811 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
1812 0 1 1 1 5 0 1 2 0 1 2 1 15 
1813 0 0 1 3 2 2 0 1 0 0 4 5 16 
1814 2 1 0 3 1 2 2 0 5 1 1 2 20 
1815 9 4 3 6 5 3 0 8 0 1 0 0 39 
1822 
(No trace of further entries until 1822) 
1 1 2 2 0 1 2 0 9 
1823 1 1 3 1 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 3 26 
1824 6 1 1 1 5 1 3 5 1 4 2 5 35 
1825 4 5 2 1 3 4 3 4 1 3 1 1 32 
1826 6 3 5 6 4 2 1 5 6 1 3 3 45 
1827 3 7 4 4 6 3 n. 2 1 7 2 4 4-7 
(contd) 
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1 3 2 6 1 1 3 7 1 1 
2 3 1 1 4 3 1 5 3 1 
6 !'_ 9 1 3 1 3 3 4 1 
7 5 7 1 5 3 5 0 3 2 
4 3 ú 3 3 2 1 1 4 
4 2 6 2 2 4 2 2 
4 6 2 3 6 4 5 1 2 0 
5 1 3 1 3 4 5 5 1 3 
6 6 0 1 5 2 0 4 ' 1 0 
5 1 4 2 0 2 4 2 2 4 
1 2 1 2 4 1 3 3 2 1 
1 1 2 2 2 4 1 1 6 0 
4 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 2 
2 0 1 2 4 1 3 1 3 4 
3 3 6 1 3 5 7 4 6 5 
8 9 3 6 7 4 6 4 7 4 
5 4 4 9 2 3 4 2 3 4 
3 0 5 4 3 0 0 1 1 5 
6 5 8 8 5 6 5 8 
9 10 9 2 5 5 7 5 3 11 
12 12 9 7 4 3 4 2 8 2 
14 1 10 7 8 4 0 6 6 12 
144 105 115 92 116 82 88 95 87 96 
5 2 33 
1 10 35 
2 5 42 
0 2 40 
0 3 26 
3 2 29 
4 4 41 
1 3 35 
1 3 29 
3 3 32 
0 2 22 
1 3 24 
6 2 20 
3 1 25 
5 5 53 
4 9 71 
8 11 59 
7 9 38 
67 
1 11 78 
4 11 78 
1 13 82 
87 142 1249 
APPENDIX III. (CCi,: J) 
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Yollorr Fever 'Period. 
Jan.Feb.Ï.':ar..lipr.l.:a;T.cTtìne.v'U 1 .1ì1'..?ep.0cti.._:oV.Ùec.l'o G<^.,.l. 
1850 15 46 94 51 43 9 4 9 0 1 0 3 275 
1851 6 14 2 9 22 13 11 5 1 7 4 4 3 119 
1852 10 23 56 30 41 18 13 13 7 12 6 23 252 
1853 22 20 40 18 12 12 5 4 11 3 4 3 154 
1854 2 2 1 9 1 5 8 4- 1 5 1 8 47 
1855 2 2 7 5 5 10 4 1 7 2 5 2 52 
1856 A 5 3 9 6 6 0 2 6 1 0 4 46 
1857 3 10 11 10 5 2 3 5 6 2 3 64 
1858 6 2!'-. 20 5 6 6 0 3 2 0 2 1 75 
1859 3 4 10 4 5 3 3 1 2 2 C 2 39 
1860 3 5 8 9 12 7 5 1 1 3 5 4 63 
1861 4 5 5 1 1 5 5 0 5 1 3 1 36 
1862 5 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 0 4- 2 5 28 
1863 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 0 3 1 0 4 20 
1864 3 7 3 3 2 3 7 2 2 6 2 2 42 
1865 2 1 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 15 
1866 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 0 4 2 3 23 
1867 0 1 3 2 3 3 3 1 1 0 I 2 20 
1868 3 6 2 3 1 2 4 1 2 1 2 3 30 
1869 2 1 4 8 5 4 0 3 2 4 1 6 48 
1870 7 11 10 1 6 1 1 3 2 3 0 1 46 
(contd.) 
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Jan. Feb .Ttia.y. June .Jul.Aug.Se -t. Oct . Nov. Dec.Totali 
1871 3 1 3 4 4 3 0 2 3 3 3 2 31 
1872 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 5 3 1 1 3 28 
1873 13 19 13 5 9 4 6 3 2 4 2 6 86 
1874 2 3 6 1 9 9 2 1 4 3 3 1 44 
1875 1 3 7 5 5 5 0 3 1 2 2 2 36 
1876 4 2 17 11 6 6 3 3 0 2 0 6 60 
1877 4 3 6 4 4 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 23 
1878 3 8 9 3 2 3 4 3 á, 3 1 2 4-5 
1879 6 7 10 1 3 1. 2 i 1 0 42 
1880 3 4 7 7 3 2 3 2 0 1 3 1 36 
1881. 3 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 17 
1882 3 1 2 2 2 1 O 2 1 2 2 0 18 
1883 1 1 0 6 4 0 4 3 1 6 0 0 26 
1884 2 3 1 3 5 2 2 3 0 0 1 3 25 
1885 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 15 
1886 1 3 8 4 4 3 3 .1 0 1 1 3 32 
1887 4 1 4 1 n 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 19 
1888 1 ï 1 3 7 5 2 2 1 3 1 4 31 
1889 3 12 11 5 3 3 2 2 5 3 0 0 49 
1890 0 2 4 1 . 0 1 3 4 1 1 2 1 20 
1891 3 7 4 12 7 4 8 5 4 5 2 10 71 
1892 11 17 36 9 4 2 1 2 0 5 2 3 92 
1893 2 0 3 6 4 3 4. 1 2 1 6 4 36 
(contd) 
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Jan. 2eb.Ttlhr._ipr .May. Jva1e. Ju1y .Au3. Sept . Oc-L.ì?ov.Dec . T ota1. 
1094 4 17 20 3 6 4 0 0 0 2 4 0 65 
1095 2 1 3 7 3 0 3 0 1 1 1 5 27 
1896 3 2 13 6 2 2 1 0 C 0 2 2 33 
1397 1 2 2 4 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 17 
1098 2 6 5 3 3 ! 3 3 1 0 2 5 37 
1099 2 3 9 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 28 
1900 2 3 4 2 1 2 3 0 3 0 1 2 23 
1901 0 4 0 1 2 0 2 2 z. 1 2 0 18 
1962 2 3 1 3 3 2 2 3 2 0 1 25 
1903 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 10 
1904 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 0 1 3 16 
1905 1 0 2 0 3 0 1 1 1 3 1 4 17 
1906 1 3 3 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 15 
1907 0 2 0 2 3 0 1 0 0 2 1 12 
202 346 538 335 299 194 159 122 131 131 101 166 2724 
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Post Yellow Fever Period. 
Jan. Feb .ï,ax .1inr .I °ay. June . July.Aug. Sept.IIct .N ov. De c .T otal. 
1908 3 1 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 2 0 13 
1909 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 10 
1910 1 4- 0 2 1 1 2 3 3 0 0 0 17 
1911 1 0 G 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 9 
1912 1. 3 2 0 2 0 1 2 0 3 1 3 18 
1913 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 3 8 
1914 1 2 0 3 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 16 
1915 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 14 
1916 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 0 1 2 1 3 18 
1917 2 0 1 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 2 4 15 
1918 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 7 2 8 3 2 30 
1919 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 9 
1920 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 2 1 1 3 0 16 
1921 1 2 3 1 Z 2 1 3 1 0 4 0 20 
1922 4 2 2 1 3 3 1 0 2 3 2 4 27 
1923 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 0 3 2 1 18 
4924 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 5 2 0 2 19 
22 22 18 17 14 24 25 23 25 32 27 28 277 
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GRAND TOTALS FOR THE 
Tia-LEE PERIODS. 
I 
Year Jan. Feb .Ear .Apr .î.ay. June .July .Aug .S 2.Oct.Nov.Dec. Total. 
Pre -Yellow Fever Period. 
1811- 
1849. 144 105 115 92 116 82 88 95 87 96 87 142 1,249 
Ye4ow Fever Period. 
1850 -' 
1907 202 346 538 335 299 194 159 122 131 131 101 166 2,724 
Post -Yellow Fever Period. 
1908- 
1924 22 22 18 17 14 24 25 23 25 32 27 28 277. 
GR1'uTD 
TOTAL.368 473 671 444 429 300 272 240 243 259 215 336 4,250 
NOTE: - 
The highest mortality was always in LURCH. 
Pre- Yellow Fever Period .. .. mortality 9.2% of total 
for years. 
YELLOW' 1,'EVII3 PER IOD .. .. mortality 19.7% of total for 
years. 
Post -Yellow Fever Period .. mortality 6.4% of total for 
years. 
The marked reduction in mortality in the Post -Yellow 
ever Period in comparison with the Pre -Yellow Fever Period 
264. 
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was due to absence of Small;-ox in the now vaccinated British, 
which was not started until 1E372. 
Compare " .ñìr:''f;AR IO DE i:,S `' ATIS ̀_ IC IÉi D i, L'=OGRAPIiIO Sxï"I ̂ ARIA." '. 
Rio de Janeiro. Vol. I., 1920 -1921. 
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COPY OF A REPORT OIT THE rimaioR TOWNS OF THE STATE OF BAHIA, 
BRAZIL, FROM JANUARY TO MAY 1926, ITTU3ThJTING REGIONAL 
ENDEMIC I TY . 
THIS REPORT WAS 3.QE ILLE DIAJhLY AFTER BAHIA AIT) .ALL BRAZ IL 
HAD BEEN PAOCLAIKED .ILREE OF YELLOW FEVER, SRO:TING THE MISTAKE 
OF C ONTRO LL DIG ONLY Ti MAIN ENDEMIC CENTRE 
IT ALSO ILLUSTRATES TEE ILLUSION OF 'LIE PFEIF FaR REACTION. 
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Translated from Portuguese. 
Places where suspected or confirmed cases of Yellow Fever, 
have been verified in the Bahia -S, Francisco Railway sector 
and in the Bomf im- Iiundo Nova, Franca branch. Statistical 
data for the Prophylaxis Department. 
APrROx !'i '.IE NUMBER DISTANCE F:Oïd 
PLACES I?UMBER OF OF BOi'FIM 
ESTATES =HABITANTS. Ii! KILOMETERS. 
Alagoinhas 2,000 8,000 322 
Queimadas 300 1,500 95 
Itiuba 250 1,200 52 
Carisca 20 150 12 
BOMiFIM 1685 7,000 -- 
Carrapichel 120 600 9 
stiva 20 100 12 
Jaguarary 500 1,800 32 
Barrinha 30 200 62 
Jurema .50 250 92 
Missao do Sahy 110 500 9 
Campo Formosa 250 1,500 44 
Saude 100 500 66 
Jacobina 1500 6,000 121 
Miguel Calmon 700 2,000 136 
Mundo Novo 1400 5,000 214 
.t- The railway spur from Franca to Mundo Novo is not yet 
267. 
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in uso. The last station is Franca, six leagues from 
Iiundo Uovo and in daily communication with this city. 
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Explanatory table of Yellow Fever deaths in the Bahia - 
Sao Francisco Railway sector, and the branch from Bo_mfin to 
Franca -Mundo Novo during the months of January to Iay, 1926. 
PLACES NUMBER OF 
FATAL CASES OBSERVATIONS. 
Alagoinhas ? Supposed to have been very many. 
Queimadas 
Itiuba 3 Two S.Paulo soldiers and a child. 
Cariaca 1 One woman died in Bomfin. 
Bomfim. 8 Three were S. Paulo soldiers 
infected in Itiuba, two were 
soldiers coming from Jacobina, one 
patient coming from Carrapichel 
(male), one woman coming from 
Liissao and another who died in 
Palmeiras estate. No cases ob- 
served among inhabitants of the 
city. 
Carrapichel 10 All infected in Carrapichel. 
Estiva 2 Infected in Carrapichel. 
Jaguarary 8 Infected in Jaguarary. 
Barrinha 3 Infected in Barrinha. 
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=JEER Va1, 
PLLCES FATAL CASES 
Jur em-ti 2 
I.rassáo do Sahy 13 
Carro Formoso ? 
Saude 1 
Jacobina 2 
I4gue1 Calmon. 78 
Lund() Novo ? 
OBSEDVATIOTTS . 
Reported by Dr. -.n-tonio Goncalves ; 
from Cunha e Silva. 
From April 13 to Lay 31. 
Suspected cases occurred among 
soldiers of kaes Lerie Battalion, 
according to information of 
military ph :, sici an, Dr. 11cen 
is avarr o . 
Patient died in Cannavieiras 
estate. 
Patients carte from I_ig el Calmon 
on fifth day of disease. 
From January 1 to :pril 15. 
Endemic center since 1922, and 
from February of this :-oar up to 
the present innumerable cases have 
been reported according to 
information from Dr. Adalberto 
Campos. (liete: written in ink: 
Small town of 5,000.) 
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n' OF -i r: ) ' r .., T.- ` i`,7 C.rs ü vï;LLo,r l,rti II; .,,.:_. : _, 1926. 
Germano í inzi - 29 '.cravata street. Conlin.' from .-1a oin.has, 
illy 11. 
Custodio de Carvaliio - _..ay 21. Soldier. I=ilitar r ziospitalp 
coming from Jacobina Tranca. (Died) . 
Ulysses I._endes - Soldier. ililitary Hospital. I,ia r 11. Coming 
from dueimados. (Died). 
Joaquim L usto Dias - rortuCuese. 3ecco do 3ambu 7o.9 Calcada 
Street. Lay 6. (Died). This case iras 
infected in the city of Bahia. 
Jose Gabriel .Vreire de Castro - CominC. from 1_laoingas. 
Yay 22, 21 Chile Street. (Died) . 
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Bahia, June 10, 1926. 
Index in recent days in the interior of the State. 
Sao Felix 14.4 
Cachoeira .0..*0.<,.n..,...m000000a o*.i4.4 
; orl:rirm 
Mur itiba 
0 ....... 0...no0.. .. ...13.6 
. c.,.....,.0.a......0......3o 
Santa LLl%1- .. s a. a . . o n o o c. e o o n. o e s s . . a s ..4 
Joazei-ro 
áa2mto 111110r0 .. .. . ..... . .. ... * ... 0 022.3 
Nazareth ............. ..............22.4- 
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Pfeiffer's reaction with the serum of patients 
of Liguel Calmon. (Bahia). 
Name of Patients. 'place of Origin Result. 
Jeron_ymo Cas tao 
Esmeraldo Dias Rios. 
Severo Correia 
Jowl de Noura Vieira. 
Maria de Silva laves. 
Epaminondas Prado. 




































These Pfeiffers viere 
made at the Osvraldo 
Cruz. Institute by 
State doctors. 
(Signed) C.I. 
Bahia, June 11, 1926. 
Josephine Franca ' 7 
Ç tenogr apher. 
Note Negative result of Pfeiffer's 
Reaction in 14 cases of Clinical 
Yellow Fever. Conn are roguchi 
Stokes. 
12 charts and maps showing latest 
knowledge of distribution of Yellow 
Fever in South America. Taken from 
"Transactions of the Royal Society 
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene ". 
Vol.XXXII. No. 3. November 1938. 
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abet; >Wow Fever (occurring in the presence of AIDES AEGYP77 
and secondary to Jingle *lbw Fever). 
Jungle Yellow Fever (occuning in Me absence of AFDES AEGYP771 
00 Roces where coses of Yellow Fever were naffed hem J4 1st /933 lo June 30th. 1937 
0 Places where coses of Jungle *lbw Fever hod been notified hem 
,A*!st. 1936 to June 30m. /937and where the disease reappear- 
ed doing the /938 epidemic season 
(i) 
/-Nebvo 
2-SGollye/o do R. Mono 
3-MOdevode 





















25 Mer/ s 
26- Pombo 
27 -Rio Nevo 
28 -5. J000 Nepomuceno 
29 -Alto Rio Doce 
30- Pbomgo 
3/ - Guirioemo 





37 -Aar do 1.spoMo 
38-Entre Rios 
39 -Juiz de Fdro 
40 -Monos Barboso 
4 /- Alonso Arios 
42 -Poroto do Su/ 




47 -Pedro do Rio 
48- /taparo 
49- Pehopons 
50- Rots da Sente 
5 /- Barende 
52 -Are/os 
53- Bonond 
54- S Jodo Marros 
55 - /aso 6¡onde 
56- Parolr 
58 - Pwabo 
59 -Ouos Boros 
60- Noddeno 
62 -Bon, Jadm 
63- Sopeco/o 





I LOCALITIES IN SOUTHERN BRAZIL WHERE YELLOW FEVER CASES WERE NOTIFED 
FROM JULY 6.1935 TO JUNE 30t0936. ( 
3 
) 
/-.bfobé 69-Papis - 7> !
4-0e rt.a°pnnóo 
6 r PrvCave 7J-fwamope+ 74-Jas: 9rumoo RFl+ 75 Ayoor 
¢ Susd 76-/la Poke/ 77-Arose rWrcn-.e/ /0- 7g ñr,ey, 
79-Nao Gana* /P-ASds 
/3- canmw Ayo 6 
4 Stem: 82 FrukY /3-ftr0rv 
e, G eo,e /6- Mbneb 7 Campos eSWislmo 
/9- Salo Grande auaaaea 
/9- Sto Pedro eb á-w e7-(karbrA'o 
20- LLvrix BB-L 'v 
21- Espri/o SOVO ab 
12- G4roUe:v [osa 7 -Garcrv 
?3- Savo Barbaro do Rlireay 
24-ass 9e.eoro/e° 
21- 8arwdùw do Campos 9ygop;y7 
26-Pfroi8 94R7LármRen 27- Sala C/a, 4 
ú 28- / 
30-ardvA r 
97-Coso &ova 








34- /a-saro ,aal do us 9 
nP 
-Berrw'do 
35- rananno : ia+o 103-4047,1,74/ i 1(75-San'a Gnu dos ara 
Bu-s« sw a Ace/lo .39-Rotors -O Bol-SaYI)oWCoud 
4/-Fví /OB-F¢Leav 
42- /bba.a /09-7/51.7a Obs 
43-FO:a 
sa a ' 
41 Anpal°ba 
46 RoPe ' . 
47- Si"n Mg./ gr arnç:o _ 
5/-P4mMao s3- 
s1- 
n)- omod 59-r4 
59- _ 
6/- 
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. 
MAP IV. 
LACAUTIES IN SOUTHERN BRAZIL WHERE YELLOW FEVER CASES WERE NO11FIED ( 5 
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A T L A N 
Urban Yellow Fever (occurring in the presence ofAfDES AEGYPT7 
and secondary to jungle yellow fever 
.Jung /e Yellow Fever (occurring in the absence of AIDES AEGYPT /1 
O Places where cases of Ye/Ow Feder were no/, ed from July 1st. /933 
10 June 30 m. 1934 
Mnr:I I I . 





BRAZIL.-Places in which anti -larval and adult mosquito capture services were in operation 
during the first quarter of 1938. 
LWB.1 ` 
DISTRIBUTION OF FIELD VACCINATION IN BRAZIL IN RELATION TO KNOWN OCCURRENCE OF YELLOW FEVER 
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Urbai Ye //ow Fever Jungle Yellow Fever 
o 
occurring from 1st  to 
June 30M 1.937 






oa-urrvq from /937 to 
June 30m 1938 
O Places where cosec of Jungle 
Yellow Fever had been naffed 
from July Ist 836 to June 
30e /937 and where me 
disease reappeared during the 
l939 epidemic season. 
Area ùr which field vaccination 
units worked between me 
/937 and 1338 epidemic 
seasons 
iii 
Area n which field vaccination 
units worked during and after 
the I39 epidemic season 




lM ̂ rdio. F. occur-bp :, tta presenu of hides osy7yp1;. 
MEN 
R.,31 Yellow FM.' ocarrbç In file presence of Aid. o6vYA". 
,::rKpe lk!p Fever occvrUq In 1M absence of bides oeyrpN. 
GRAPH.- Confirmed cases of yellow fever in Brazil from January, 1932 to May, 1938. 
URBAN, RURAL AND JUNGLE YELLOW FEVER IN BRAZIL FROM 1932 TO MAY, 1938. 
Type of Yellow Fever. 1932. 1933. 1934. 1935. 1936. 1937. 1938. 
Aegypti- transmitted 
Urban ... ... 11 2 1 19 7 3 0 
Rural ... ... 55 16 8 0 0 0 0 
Non -aegypti- transmitted 
Jungle ... ... 4 1 6 110 165 215 258 
Total ... ... 70 19 15 129 172 218 258 
8 Photostatic copies of charts 
taken from "Rapport Epidemic - 
logique de la Section d'Hygiene 
du Secretariet" Societe des 
Nations. R.E. 179. showing 

















































































































































































































































































































3. REARTITIO}I DEA CAS DE FIÈVRE JAUNE SIGNALÉS EN AIFRIQUE DI' ` uII. 
3. DISTRIBUTION OP YELLOW-FEVER CASES REPORTED IS SOUTH AMERICA. 
(1.1929 - IX.1935.) 
Wee 
OIkiNO 
FIEVRE JAUNE -YELLOW FE/ER 
tas snkAita - REPORTED CAWS 
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FLYING CLIPPER SHIPS 
PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS SYSTEM 













Refer to Schedule Diagram 
Pages 13 to 16 
Map showing Air Services of 
South and Central America. 
Note Caption. 
